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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are susceptible to a wide range of security at-
tacks in hostile environments due to the limited processing and energy capabilities
of sensor nodes. Consequently, the use of WSNs in mission critical applications
requires reliable detection and fast recovery from these attacks. While much re-
search has been devoted to detecting security attacks, very little attention has yet
been paid to the recovery task. In this thesis, we present a novel mechanism that
is based on dynamic network reclustering and node reprogramming for recover-
ing compromised nodes. In response to node compromise, the proposed recovery
approach re-clusters the network excluding compromised nodes; thus allowing
normal network operation while initiating node recovery procedures. We propose
a novel reclustering algorithm that uses 2-hop neighbourhood information for
this purpose. For node reprogramming we propose the modified Deluge protocol.
The proposed node recovery mechanism is both decentralized and scalable. We
also propose a novel, lightweight authentication protocol that can secure network
and node recovery operations such as reclustering and reprogramming. More-
over, we demonstrate through its implementation on a TelosB and MicaZ based
sensor network testbed with up to 30 motes that the proposed recovery method
v
vi
performs well in a low-resource WSN.
We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our recovery protocols on low-resourced
WSNs with up to 1000 nodes using the NS-2 simulation platform. We show that
our method successfully identifies nodes with high energy levels and is also capable
of identifying the number of higher neighbours these nodes have. These nodes are
then used as effective local data Aggregator Nodes (AGs) in the recovery process.
In extending this to mobile sensor networks, it is necessary to formalize the mo-
bility support mechanisms. We establish the mobility support needed to ensure
the speedy recovery of a mobile WSN and also analyze the impact of mobility
on the recovery procedures developed in our earlier work. We discuss mobility
of member nodes and of AGs in the cluster model, and also identify triggers for
reclustering of the network based on loss of connectedness due to mobility. The
challenge is to provide mobility support to a mobile WSN which produces the
same recovery performance as in a static WSN.
In addition, our results indicate that the recovery protocols we have introduced for
both stationary and mobile WSNs are as efficient for a mobile WSN as for a static
WSN in producing a connected set of AGs capable of maintaining communication
with the Base Station (BS). Indeed, for networks in which most nodes are mobile
at any time, our results clearly indicate that the network is unable to recover
from natural breakages of the Connect Dominating Sets (CDSs) due to motion.
Furthermore, a mobile network under attack has no chance of survival without
mobility support.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) represent a new generation of real-time em-
bedded systems with significantly different communication constraints from tra-
ditional networked systems. These constraints are important because WSNs can
be applied in a wide range of applications and on various types of equipment. Sen-
sors are employed to monitor a diverse range of conditions at different locations,
such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion and pollutants.
With their development, various attacks have occurred. The aims of these attacks
are usually to take over or destroy nodes in the network, or to disrupt data
flow. Detection and recovery have become major challenges in protecting sensor
networks from these attacks.
Section 1.1 started with the research motivation. Section 1.2 gives the research
objectives in regards to recovery mechanisms on sensor networks. Section 1.3
discusses the system assumptions. Section 1.4 presents the design model which
1
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includes detection, response and recovery stages. Section 1.5 outlines the thesis
structure. Section 1.6 summarises the chapter.
1.1 Motivation for the Research
WSNs are susceptible to a wide range of security attacks in hostile environ-
ments due to the limited processing and energy capabilities of sensor nodes.
Consequently, the use of WSNs in mission critical applications requires reliable
detection and fast recovery from these attacks. While much research has been
devoted to detecting security attacks, very little attention has yet been given to
the recovery task. In this thesis, we present a novel mechanism that is based on
dynamic network reclustering and node reprogramming for recovery from node
compromise. We compare our approach with the current detection and recovery
protocols so that we can use the best from existing work alongside our own ideas.
1.2 Research Objectives
The goal is to develop and test several protocols for efficient detection of and
run a recovery from attacks in simply structured stationary and mobile WSNs.
These protocols are proposed in the following chapters.
We will set up a WSN with TelosB and MicaZ motes and simulation on NS-2
[NS-] and test to identify which detection and recovery protocols have the highest
potential for use. A NS-2 simulation platform will also be set up to perform the
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
testing on the large scale networks.
In this research, additional cryptographic techniques will be added to the func-
tionality of the WSN and embedded in the recovery protocols. We will compare
our approach to that of other researchers in both static and mobile cases.
For the purposes of an attack situation in which nodes can be lost or compromised,
efficient detection and recovery can only take place if the network can function as
normally as possible. Therefore, we propose to retain connectivity and maximize
flexibility in the network. This is achieved by allowing each node to play the
role of either a member node or a Aggregator Node (AG) as appropriate under
the conditions that arise for the entire network to efficiently re-organize itself in
order to remain connected. The objectives of recovery are to:
  R1. Restore the network functions to a target level established by the Base
Station (BS).
  R2. Maintain the network for as long as possible.
1.3 System Assumptions
WSNs can be built in a number of ways depending on the desired application
[LR02]. Often, several types of nodes are present, classified in terms of the role
they play, such as gathering data, analyzing data, and deploying applications
etc. Networks may be built with various power resources to assist in performing
these functions. Mobile components can be added to increase the functionality
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and flexibility of the network (for instance mobile agents are used in LiB2). Re-
cent research [KS04] has found that significant energy savings can be achieved
by dynamic management of node duty cycles in sensor networks with high node
density. In this approach, some nodes are scheduled to sleep (or enter a power
saving mode) while the remaining active nodes provide continuous service. A
fundamental problem is to minimize the number of nodes that remain active,
while still achieving an acceptable quality of service for applications. In particu-
lar, maintaining sufficient sensing coverage and network connectivity with active
nodes are critical requirements in sensor networks.
WSN operations include data discovery, which is achieved by way of sensing
application specified target events. Additionally, the sensor network needs to
process this information in a distributed manner and then forward it to any
interested data sink or remote BS. These sensor network tasks can be managed
individually by a sensor node or by several nodes simultaneously.
An intuitive analysis of the sensor network activities of a simple network leads
to mapping tasks to roles as follows:
  Member node - senses data and transmits it.
  AG - senses, collects, analyses and transmits data.
  BS - controls the system, senses, collects, analyses, transmits and stores
data.
Since all sensor nodes in the network are essentially deployed to collaboratively
sense target events, all nodes must assume the functions of a member node or AG.
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In addition, AGs take on the responsibility of coordinating the sensing activities
in their neighbouring region (also known as a sensing zone) and aggregate and
forward the information to the BS. The task of coordination is not a simple one
and it is also not a short term job. In order to provide instantaneous sensing and
reporting capability (dependent upon sensing applications) each AG may need to
systematically rotate its responsibilities transparently among neighbouring nodes
without much overhead communication.
1. We assume the existence of a globally unique ID for each sensor node. We
assume that all node locations are fixed for the duration of their lifetime.
2. We do not assume that sensor nodes are tamper resistant; on the contrary,
we assume that if an adversary compromises a node, they can extract all
key material, data, and code stored on that node. While tamper resistance
may be a viable defense for physical node compromise for some networks,
we do not see it as a general purpose solution. Additionally, effective tam-
per resistance tends to add significant cost per unit, and sensor nodes are
intended to be inexpensive.
3. We assume that the BS is trustworthy in the sense that it has never been
compromised and always behaves correctly. Most, but not all routing pro-
tocols depend on nodes to trust messages from the BSs.
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1.4 Design Models
We base our work on a simply structured WSN with two types of nodes: member
nodes which do basic collection, transmission and receiving of data, and AGs
which have additional responsibilities of assimilating and analysing data. We
assume that very little power resources are available.
We propose a decentralized approach to node configuration with two conditions:
first, that each node not be ’too far away’ from an AG, secondly, that the network
is divided into a set of clusters of about equal size. WSNs configured in this way
are expected to be able to implement detection and recovery more quickly than
WSNs which are not configured in the same manner.
We also use a method of ’clustering’ in which, after an attack, the network dy-
namically re-organizes itself to achieve both of the above conditions, thus permit
the implementation of recovery protocols to continue.
This involves the following work to be undertaken throughout my PhD thesis.
  Development of protocols and techniques for recovering from attacks in
wireless networks including reclustering, reprogramming, authentication
and mobility support.
  Testing of protocols for recovery from attacks in wireless networks.
  Production of a wireless network structure prototype which recovers quickly
from an attack in stationary and mobile sensor networks.
We identify three stages needed for our recovery model. The first is detection of
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an attack or compromised node, the second is a response to this and the third is
recovery from it. Each stage employs different strategies and methods.
1.4.1 Detection
There are a number of procedures available in the literature for the detection
of attacks. Authentication procedures and voting algorithms [LB07a] are often
used. We have developed algorithms for detection which we will deploy in this
work [LB07a], [LB07b]. We will distinguish between insider and outsider attacks
later in this thesis.
1.4.2 Response
In the response stage, we identify what kind of attack has been launched and
which nodes, if any, have been compromised. In case a node has been compro-
mised, we use the behaviour of the node to assist in determining this fact. This
may include some of the following: the node cannot manipulate data including
writing, reading, sending and receiving; the node corrupts, modifies or deletes
data; the node transmits large amounts of data, jamming the traffic in the net-
work; the node sends fake data to sniff for information (such as keys, algorithms
or passwords).
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1.4.3 Recovery
Once a response has been executed, a distributed recovery methodology is im-
plemented. Our ideas here are novel, using self-organization of the WSN with
a specific target structure to optimize the recovery process. We propose a de-
centralized approach to node configuration with two conditions: first, that each
node be no more than two hops away from an AG, secondly, that the network
is divided into a set of clusters of about equal size in such a way that any two
nodes in the cluster are at most four hops away. These features, along with self-
organization, will be deployed in order to ensure that communication between
the network nodes and the BS is not disrupted.
WSNs configured in this way are expected to be able to implement detection
and recovery more quickly than WSNs which are not. This is because we will
employ a localized approach, cluster by cluster, in detecting, responding to and
recovering from an attack. A detailed description of self-organization and cluster
building are provided in the next section.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The thesis comprises eight chapters and is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the research topic. It lays the foundation
of the thesis model by giving an overview of the theoretical basis for the research.
From Chapter 3 to Chapter 7, the development of each key technique used in
our recovery mechanism is discussed and comprehensive testing is conducted
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accordingly.
Chapter 3 focuses on the reclustering protocols used to partition the networks
automatically. The network determines the time to trigger the reclustering pro-
cess when a portion of networks are under attack and some of the nodes lose
connections with their neighbours.
Chapter 4 presents a new reprogramming technique to recover the nodes from
attacks based on the Deluge [YYS03]. The BS or AGs can utilize this technique
to restore the compromised nodes without reclustering the entire network.
Chapter 5 specifically examines a few of the possible hash functions and proposes
the RABIN which is a lightweight hash function used for authentication purposes
in sensor networks.
Chapter 6 presents the theoretical development of the recovery mechanism and
integrates three techniques discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 together.
Chapter 7 introduces the mobility support and extends the research work we have
done in previous chapters to mobile sensor networks.
Chapter 8 gives an overview of the comparison with other researchers’ work on
recovery in sensor networks.
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the contributions of this thesis and some possible
avenues for future work.
Appendix A provides the original Multi-point Relays (MPR) and enhanced ver-
sions related to the reclustering which is part of our recovery mechanism design.
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1.6 Summary
In this chapter, the foundations for this thesis have been laid by introducing the
research problems and issues. We then discuss the motivation and goals of the
research. This introductory chapter has later discussed the system assumptions
and the design model which will be used to frame our research work.
In the next chapter we will briefly introduce the sensor networks and discuss
related research that has been conducted on recovery in sensor networks.
A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely
of jokes.
—Henry Dribble
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, the literature review was conducted focusing on reclustering,
reprogramming, authentication and mobility support. The research regarding
recovery on mobile WSNs is also presented.
Section 2.1 addresses the important elements for sensor networks. Section 2.2
and 2.3 further investigates the threat models and attack scenarios which can be
adopted for our recovery mechanisms. Section 2.3 surveys the current develop-
ment of reprogramming techniques. Section 2.4 surveys the current development
and techniques used for reclustering, reprogramming, authentication and mobility
support in sensor networks. Section 2.4 concludes this chapter.
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2.1 Sensor Networks
Advances in wireless communication, low-power electronics, and low-power radio
frequency design have enabled the development of low-power sensor nodes with
integrated sensing, processing and wireless communication capabilities. These
sensors are tiny devices designed to sense and collect data of particular interest.
Equipped with routing capabilities, a network with these wireless sensors can offer
an efficient and easily deployable solution for information gathering in complex
and large-scale environments.
WSNs are envisioned to consist of hundreds, even thousands of low-power, low-
cost nodes, possibly mobile, but more likely at fixed locations, deployed en masse
to monitor and affect the environment. They do not rely on a fixed infrastruc-
ture (i.e., wired connections or wireless BSs) and are self-configuring, multi-hop
networks. These properties make them particularly attractive for military ap-
plications as they offer reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities not possible
with traditional communication networks [CK03]. For example, in battlefield
situations they can be deployed to detect enemy movements or serve as early
warning systems by sensing the presence of chemicals and gases used in chemi-
cal and biological warfare. They can also find application in disaster response,
habitat modelling, environmental monitoring and industrial sensing. Typically,
communication is achieved by multi-hop wireless communication between the
sensor nodes and a central point commonly referred to as a sink. However, other
communication patterns such as one to one communication between sensor nodes
can also be observed in many emerging applications.
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One of the main concerns with WSN operation is information and communica-
tion security. The broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes these net-
works inherently insecure. Further, sensors are limited in their computational
and communication capabilities, and being battery powered, they are also energy
constrained. As a result established security mechanisms become either com-
putationally infeasible or energy inefficient [GR02]. In addition, most protocols
proposed for WSNs were not designed with security as a requirement. Conse-
quently, sensor networks suffer from a wide range of security attacks that can
degrade network performance and compromise the confidentiality and integrity
of the data collected.
The security techniques developed in this project will be targeted at present day
sensor node platforms, such as the Berkeley MicaZ mote [HC02]. The MicaZ mote
is a small (several cubic inch) sensor/actuator unit with a CPU, power source,
radio, and several optional sensing elements. The processor is a 4 MHz 8-bit
Atmel ATMEGA103 CPU with 128 KB of instruction memory, 4 KB of RAM for
data, and 512 KB of flash memory. The CPU consumes 5.5 mA (at 3 volts) when
active, and two orders of magnitude less power when sleeping. The radio is a 916
MHz low-power radio from Radio Frequency Module (RFM), delivering up to 40
Kbps bandwidth on a single shared channel and with a range up to a few dozen
metres or so. The RFM radio consumes 4.8 mA (at 3 volts) in receive mode,
up to 12 mA in transmit mode, and 5 uA in sleep mode. An optional sensor
board allows mounting of a temperature sensor, magnetometer, accelerometer,
microphone, sounder, and other sensing elements. The whole device is powered by
two AA batteries, which provide approximately 2850 mA hours at 3 volts. Since
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we do not have access to the source code in the MicaZ mote, our experiments
will be carried on the open-sourced Telos B research platform, which is held to
be an equivalent platform by the research community.
A critical factor in sensor network operation is efficient power management. At
full power, the Berkeley MicaZ mote can run for two weeks before exhausting its
batteries. Consequently, if long-term network operation is required it is critical
they run at very low duty cycles. Similarly, since the power consumption of
the radio is three orders of magnitude higher when transmitting or listening than
when in sleep mode, efficient radio management is another critical factor [KW03].
Sensor networks are characterized by data redundancies due to the large number
of nodes deployed and the spatial distribution of the individual sensors and sensed
events. This redundancy can be exploited to reduce the number of transmissions
from individual sensors resulting in energy savings. Further, sensor readings
from multiple nodes can be aggregated at one of many possible AGs. An AG
collects sensor readings from surrounding nodes and forwards a single message
representing an aggregate of the individual values. Typically, AGs are regular
sensor nodes, and their selection is not necessarily static. AGs could be chosen
dynamically for each query or event. It is also possible that every node in the
network functions as an aggregation point, delaying transmission of an outgoing
message until a sufficient number of incoming messages have been received and
aggregated.
Sensor networks differ from other distributed systems in important ways. The
resource-starved nature of sensor networks pose greater challenges for security.
These devices have very little computational power; public-key cryptography is
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too expensive to be unusable, and even fast symmetric-key ciphers must be used
sparingly. With only 4 KB of Random Access Memory (RAM), memory is a
resource that must be husbanded carefully and hence practical security proto-
cols should not maintain much state. Further, communication bandwidth is
extremely dear, with each bit transmitted consuming the equivalent power to
execute 800/1000 instructions, and as a consequence, any message expansion
caused by a security mechanism comes at a significant cost. Power is the scarcest
resource of all, with each milliamp consumed being one milliamp closer to node
exhaustion, and it is important that every aspect of sensor network operation is
designed with the aim of optimizing the lifetime of nodes and the network.
2.2 Threat Models
Many attacks on WSNs have emerged in recent years (see [LNLP06] for a survey).
Most of the work in this area has concentrated on detection and identification
of the attacks rather than on recovery. The detection and recovery methods
developed in this project should be capable of dealing with the most important
of these, which we list here.
All attacks below are physical attacks on the nodes and data transferred in the
network. However, we will classify them into those where nodes inside the WSN
are compromised and taken over and those in which an attacker acts as a malicious
node working from the exterior of the network. In some sense, all attacks can be
classified as a ’denial of service’; that is, the objective is to stop the WSN from
functioning as intended.
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We shall consider an attack to be ’internal’ if a compromised node is initiating it
and ’external’ if a node outside the network is initiating the attack. This will be
important in terms of the response mechanisms needed for recovery.
  Flooding Attack
This attack floods the network with useless traffic [KW03]. This has two
effects on sensor networks. First, the attack traffic consumes network re-
sources, and prevents legitimate traffic from reaching the BS. More impor-
tantly, it causes sleep deprivation of sensor nodes and wastes their energy.
Such an attack is often combined with other attacks such as altering of rout-
ing information in order to maximize the effect of flooding. (An outsider
attack).
  Spoofing and Altering of Routing Information
Spoofing refers to an attacker impersonating a network node by falsifying
the identity field in routing messages [KW03]. This can enable an attacker
to create routing loops in the network, or increase the length of routes.
This in turn causes increased traffic congestion and deprives the network of
resources (An insider attack).
  Selective Forwarding
Selective forwarding occurs when a compromised node drops a packet bound
for a particular destination [DQW03]. In this way, an attacker can selec-
tively filter traffic from a particular part of the network. Other possible
variations of selective forwarding can involve dropping all packets or ran-
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domly dropping packets. Random dropping can be hard to reliably detect
and trace (An insider attack).
  Sinkhole Attack
The main purpose of the sinkhole attack is to lure all traffic from nodes in
a region to a compromised node [KW03]. This is achieved by forging or
altering route packet information to make a compromised node look very
attractive to the routing algorithm, causing neighbouring nodes to assume
that the compromised node is the best path to their destinations. Sinkhole
attacks can also act as a platform for launching other attacks. An example
would be to combine it with a selective forwarding attack. Since all traffic
basically flows through the compromised node, a selective forwarding attack
would thus become more effective and easier to achieve (An insider attack).
  Sybil Attack
In Sybil attacks [NSSP04], a malicious node pretends to be a number of
different nodes in the network. The malicious node can acquire identities
either by fabricating new ones or by learning the identity of other nodes. To
attack a network, the malicious node can use the impersonated identity to
communicate with legitimate nodes directly, or by indirect communication
where the malicious node advertises that it has a path to the impersonated
node (Both insider and outsider attack).
  Wormholes
In a wormhole attack, a malicious node tunnels messages between two dif-
ferent parts of the network via a high speed link [HPJ02b]. This can make
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distant nodes appear ’closer’ in the network, which can be useful as part
of a Sybil attack. Moreover, if the attacker is appropriately positioned, it
can disrupt the entire network by diverting traffic from the BS (An insider
attack).
The major risks in sensor networks are:
  loss of nodes because of physical damage.
  nodes compromised and the internal code altered in order to implement
functions of an attacker.
  attacks on the network from outside the network while the nodes function
normally.
We will not address the physical loss problem in this thesis as this relies on
an outside network to physically replace the node. Our focus will be on node
compromise and on attacks from outside the network (such as flooding) while
nodes still operate normally.
The WSN must be capable of determining that an attack has taken place and
assess what damage has been done before it can begin recovery.
2.3 Attack Scenarios
The standard attack scenarios in a WSN setting are known as the passive and
active attack [Opp96] models for communication compromises.
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2.3.1 Passive attacks
In a passive attack, the intruder is able to capture and interpret data, thus ex-
tracting information. The protocols described in the next section are not designed
to protect against a passive attack.
2.3.2 Active attacks
In an active attack, both the integrity and the availability of the communication
are threatened.
An intruder implementing an active attack may destroy the integrity of com-
munication in two ways: by changing the content of the communication and by
changing the authorship of the communication. (Message Content Changes and
Message Authorship changes.)
An intruder implementing an active attack may also
  capture a communication and delete it altogether (Message Deletion),
  resend it at a later time (Message Replay), or
  resend several communications a number of times during a flooding attack
(Flooding).
An additional active attack, which we will consider here, is a situation where
a compromised node that has received a reprogramming message sends an
acknowledgement without actually reprogramming. In other words, it lies
about being reprogrammed (A compromised node lies).
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2.4 Related Work
In this section, the literature review intends to give an overview of reclustering
protocols, reprogramming, authentication algorithm and mobile support respec-
tively in sensor networks. This helps us to develop an understanding of current
available technologies on the market which we can use to implement the recovery
mechanism and even compare the work of other researchers.
2.4.1 Re-Clustering
ZRP protocol HAPS, and the terminodes approach: for mobility management,
ZRP uses zones similar to clusters whereas the terminodes based approach uses
the concept of self organized virtual regions. Routing in both these approaches
involves two different schemes; a proactive routing scheme for nodes within a local
virtual-region or zone, and a reactive scheme for nodes located in remote virtual-
regions or zones. In mobile ad hoc networks, the availability of the network is
dependent on each user’s discretion, with incentive for cooperation by way of
virtual money called nuglets employed in the terminodes. However, in real life,
it is difficult to design and implement, as routing for nodes involves two different
schemes simultaneously.
Krishnan and Starobinski [KS03] present two algorithms that produce clusters
of bounded size and low diameter by having nodes allocate local growth budgets
to neighbours. Unlike the expanding ring approach, their algorithms do not
involve the initiator in each round and do not violate the specified upper bound
on the cluster size at any time, thus having a low message overhead. However,
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the cluster size can be very large which cannot provide efficient recovery at the
recovery stage.
Meguerdichian et al. [MKQP01] and [MKPS01] have formulated the exposure
and coverage properties of sensor networks using computational geometry-based
techniques such as the Voronoi diagram and the Delaunay Triangulation. The
sensor models used in their analysis include two concepts. One is that the sensing
ability diminishes with increasing distance. Second, noise bursts diminish the
sensing ability but the effect of noise can be minimized by allowing sensors to
sense over longer periods of time (exposure). However, a distributed and localized
algorithm measuring coverage and exposure of a sensor node or of a region of WSN
deployment is not discussed in the work of Meguerdician et al. This method asks
sensors to monitor over longer time periods which can cause the nodes to die
earlier.
Slijepcevic and Potkonjak [SP01] propose a heuristic that organizes the sensor
network by selecting mutually exclusive sets of sensor nodes that completely cover
the monitored area together. However the sensing zones are based on cumulative
(rather than individual) sensing coverage. In this way, for any target event (gen-
uine or spurious), the sensing zones either report individually or collaboratively
with some degree of fault tolerance. Since the sensors are deployed randomly
rather than deterministically, there may be regions of the monitored area that
are covered by a higher number of sensors. This redundancy in sensing coverage
could be utilized to save energy if the energy required for continuous sensing is
comparable to that consumed for message transmission. A thorough analysis of
increased energy savings achieved by utilizing redundant sensing coverage, and
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analysis of the overall lifetime of the network and its fault tolerant sensing ability
is needed. A higher number of sensors deployed in the same area can waste our
resource in this algorithm.
Heinzelman et al. [HCB00] proposed an alternative clustering-based approach,
called LEACH (Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy). This approach re-
lies on the following two main assumptions: (i) there exists a unique BS with
which all the sensors want to communicate; (ii) all the sensors have the ability to
communicate directly with the BS. In order to save energy, the LEACH protocol
selects a fraction p of the sensors to serve as cluster-heads, where p is a design
parameter that must be engineered off-line. Cluster-heads communicate directly
with the BS whereas other nodes forward their data through the cluster-heads
(typically, the one closest to them). In order to share the energy load, the LEACH
protocol implements a load-balancing procedure that allows different nodes to be-
come cluster-heads at different times. The assumption that all the sensors have
the ability to communicate with the BS directly is impractical for the large size
sensor network.
Other work related to LEACH includes the PEGASIS [LR02] protocol, in which
nodes form a chain to achieve further energy savings. The main idea in PEGASIS
is for each node to receive from and transmit to close neighbours and take turns
being the leader for transmission to the BS. This approach will distribute the
energy load evenly among the sensor nodes in the network. The nodes are initially
placed randomly in the play field, and therefore, the i’th node is at a random
location. The nodes are organized to form a chain, which can be accomplished by
the sensor nodes themselves using a greedy algorithm starting from some node.
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Alternatively, the BS can compute this chain and broadcast it to all the sensor
nodes. PEGASIS improves on LEACH by saving energy in several stages. First,
in the local gathering, the distances that most of the nodes transmit are much
less compared to transmitting to a cluster-head in LEACH. Second, the amount
of data for the leader to receive is at most two messages instead of 20 (20 nodes
per cluster in LEACH for a 100-node network). Finally, only one node transmits
to the BS in each round of communication. This approach cannot be used on
recovery as the roles of each sensor have to be specified when we start the recovery
and is also very expensive.
Subramanian and Katz [SK00] propose general architectural guidelines for de-
signing self-organizing WSNs; a self configuration architecture that leads to a
hierarchical network with address auto-configuration and a number of other use-
ful properties. Their self organizing algorithm lists four phases of operation.
These are the discovery phase, organizational phase, maintenance phase, and self
reorganization phase. Our method can be designed based on these four phases.
Tian and Georganas [TG02] propose to increase the system lifetime and at the
same time preserve original sensing coverage by using a node scheduling scheme
that turns off redundant sensor nodes in a network of wireless sensors. This
scheme allows nodes in the network to autonomously turn themselves on/off us-
ing local neighbour information. This local neighbour information is used to
determine if a node needs to be ON so as to cover a region of some neighbour
that is not being covered by any other neighbours. Sensing coverage determina-
tion employs geometrical techniques that calculate shared neighbouring sectors
modelled from a circular sensing region with central angles being interpreted from
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the AoA (Angle of Arrival) of incoming signals. AoA measurements need a multi-
directional antenna, which is very sophisticated hardware in sensor technology.
Nodes that find themselves redundant with respect to sensing coverage advertise
status advertisement messages (SAM) to neighbours. This SAM advertisement
employs a random back-off timer to avoid having all neighbours turning them-
selves off, in turn leaving a blind spot. This randomization may sometimes lead
to a situation where neighbouring nodes will come to know of a blind spot only
after some time has elapsed. Too much calculation is involved in this algorithm
which is also expensive to implement. However, turning the nodes on/off auto-
matically based on their local neighbour information is a useful action to take in
order to save the network life.
The Rapid algorithm presented in [KS04] has a low message complexity. In the
Rapid algorithm, the initiator is assigned a budget B, which accounts for itself
and evenly distributes B-1 among its neighbours by sending a message to each one
of them. An arbitrary subset is chosen if there are more neighbours than budget.
The neighbours that receive the message account for themselves and distribute the
remaining messages among all their neighbours except the parent. The messages
propagate until they reach a stage where the budget is exhausted. Each node
that receives a message sends an acknowledgment to its parent when either the
budget is exhausted or it has received acknowledgments from all its children. The
algorithm terminates when the initiator receives acknowledgments from all the
neighbours it sent a message to. The acknowledgments can be used to convey
the size and depth of the sub-tree and the maximum hop count reached. The
initiator can use this to determine the size and depth of the cluster. Furthermore,
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by including hop count information in the messages and acknowledgments, a
modified algorithm can limit the depth of the cluster, but this can restrict the
maximum cluster size achieved.
The Persistent algorithm [KS04] is a recursive elaboration of the Rapid algorithm
that significantly improves the worst-case behaviour in terms of the cluster size
produced. Using the Persistent algorithm, the initiator is provided a budget B,
which accounts for itself and evenly distributes B-1 among its neighbours via mes-
sages. An arbitrary subset is chosen if there are more neighbours than budget.
The neighbours that receive the message, account for themselves and distribute
the remaining among all their neighbours except the parent. The messages prop-
agate until they reach a stage where the budget is exhausted. In this algorithm,
each node that receives a message does not send an acknowledgment to its parent
immediately on receiving acknowledgments from all its children. It computes the
size of the sub-tree and compares it to the budget allocated to it. It distributes
the shortfall among its neighbours, which were either not explored previously or
met all previously allocated budgets. When either the budget is met or when
further growth is not possible, it returns an acknowledgment to its parent. The
algorithm terminates when the initiator determines that the bound has been met
or when no further growth is possible (for example, there are not enough nodes
adjacent to the clusters that are free to join this cluster). In the presence of a sin-
gle initiator, the Persistent algorithm produces a cluster of the specified bound.
When a cluster of the specified size cannot be constructed, because not enough
unclustered nodes are available, it attempts to build the largest cluster possible.
The clustering method applied in our WSN is based on the Enhanced Multi-point
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Relay (EMPR) algorithm that has been proposed by J. Wu [2]. This algorithm
efficiently partitions a WSN with a flat topology into a hierarchically network
consisting of a set of small-sized clusters. It can be shown that the selected AGs
are connected among each other and the AGs thus form a Connect Dominating
Set (CDS) 1 of network nodes. The proposed method determines in a distributed,
localized fashion, a set of AGs by firstly collecting 2-hop neighbourhood infor-
mation in each node v of the WSN, then selects the AGs by iteratively searching
for the best-suited set of MPR, and finally associates member nodes to an appro-
priate AG. Further details on the clustering algorithm are given in the following
subsections.
2.4.2 Reprogramming
The scenarios above indicate the need for the flexibility of options in terms of
reprogramming. In particular, localization of reprogramming within a cluster
ensures that no disturbances occur in the remainder of the network. Reprogram-
ming of an AG by the BS allows the BS to temporarily take on the role of the
AG, thus ensuring continuity of operation through the network. Reprogramming
methods for sensor networks can be broadly categorized into two types:
1. In-system reprogramming (ISP): ISP is the most common method of re-
programming sensor devices as it is supported by most microcontrollers.
The program code is developed in a powerful host machine and is loaded
1A CDS is defined as a subset of nodes of a network, where every node is either in the
subset or a neighbour of a node in the subset, and the graph introduced by the subset is fully
connected.
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onto the sensor device through the parallel or serial port through a direct
connection. Such a method does not allow the dynamic reprogramming of
sensor devices in-network which is a requirement if autonomous recovery of
sensor devices is to be achieved. Further, in terms of reprogramming time,
because only one node can be manually reprogrammed at a time, the time
taken for network-wide reprogramming of a large number of compromised
devices will be prohibitive.
2. In-network reprogramming (INP): INP enables the programming of sensor
devices over the wireless channel (i.e., over the air) and hence, are more
suited to large scale deployments and for recovery techniques. The process
of over the air reprogramming can be generalised into the following steps:
(1) encoding, (2) dissemination and (3) decoding [JC04]. In the first step,
the control node (BS or AG) prepares the code packets to be distributed.
The code is disseminated by the control node in the second step which
is followed by the sensor device receiving the code packets, then decoding
and storing the code packets. At this point within the node, the network
programming module rebuilds the program code and calls the boot loader
to load the code into program memory.
Current methods for over the air reprogramming include XNP from Crossbow
[WZC06], while Deluge [WZC06], MOAP [TSE03] and incremental programming
[JC04]. Each of these methods is designed for either multi-hop or single hop
reprogramming of all nodes in a deployment. XNP broadcasts the program code
over a single hop, Deluge makes use of epidemic dissemination over multi-hops
to reprogram all nodes in the network, and MOAP supports multi-hop program-
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ming. Incremental programming first targets components of the code in the node
to be changed, and then reprograms using only former or updated versions of
these components. In order to do this, it applies the Rsync algorithm [Tri99] to
sensor nodes. However, these methods do not enable the reprogramming of a
specific node either over a single hop or multi-hop, and hence, are not suited for
node recovery purposes.
As a basis for our design of a reprogramming protocol, we chose Deluge based
on the above considerations. Deluge aims to increase the transmission through-
put by using optimization techniques such as adjusting the packet transmission
rate and spatial multiplexing. As a starting point, we modified the Deluge pro-
tocol to selectively reprogram nodes that have been identified as compromised.
The performance of the redesigned Deluge protocol was evaluated through field
experiments using our test bed.
2.4.3 Authentication
Several methods for detecting DoS attacks in general networks have been pro-
posed. One solution [WS02] is to use a MAC admission control rate limit, so the
network can ignore excessive requests without sending expensive radio transmis-
sions. However, this limit cannot drop below the expected maximum data rate
the network supports. If nodes fail in one area, this could lead to high traffic
flow in another area because the sender can select different paths to transmit the
packets across, thus avoiding dead nodes. We do not use this method due to the
problem of high traffic flow.
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Perrig et al. [PST+02] proposed the TESLA protocol to securely broadcast mes-
sages in a WSN. This protocol uses a one-way hash chain (OHC) number broad-
cast message. A different OHC number is allocated for each time slot, and this
number is used to generate MACs for the packets sent in that time slot. To tol-
erate packet losses, TESLA has been extended by introducing multi-level OHCs
[LN03]. A higher-level OHC is used to bootstrap low-level OHCs. But this
method requires time synchronization which is not practical and uses a lot of
resources, which we cannot supply in a WSN.
Hu et al. [HPJ02a] proposed a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc
networks in which an OHC is used to thwart malicious routing request floods.
When an initiator node broadcasts a ROUTE REQUEST message, it attaches
an OHC number on the message. Other nodes can check the authenticity of the
packet by verfying the OHC number. OHC have been used in INSSENS to limit
broadcast floods for control routing updates in WSNs [DHM05]. In contrast, our
approach will employ OHCs to defend against PDoS attacks on unicast messages
that follow a path. Problems unique to unicast messages must be addressed,
e.g. maintaining OHCs when many packets are lost, and generating and storing
OHCs in a highly resource-constrained node.
More recently, en-route filtering schemes have been proposed for intermediate
nodes to filter false data generated by malicious AGs and also detect intruders
engaged in PDoS attacks [YLLZ04]. The basic idea is that the intermediate nodes
share some keys with the member nodes in a node group or cluster. Member nodes
generate MACs for the reported data using the shared keys, and intermediate
nodes can verify the MACs before forwarding packets [YYS03]. In the SEF
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scheme proposed by Ye et al. [YLLZ04], the Bloom filter [YLLZ04] is used to
reduce the size of MACs and ensure their security. The intermediate nodes and
member nodes use randomly pre-distributed keys to generate and verify MACs.
In this scheme, it is highly likely that the false data can be dropped by one of the
intermediate nodes and not reach the BS. However, there are several problems
with the SEF scheme. First, the SEF scheme uses a probabilistic approach. This
means it cannot guarantee that every spurious packet will be filtered out on the
path. In addition, statistically, a spurious packet will be forwarded to a certain
number of nodes before it is filtered out. Second, the message overhead of the
SEF scheme is still large. The size of the Bloom filter is 14 bytes long, which
is about half of the data payload of a TinyOS packet. This method is also too
expensive to be deployed in WSNs.
In the interleaved key scheme proposed by Zhu et al. [ZSJN04], member nodes
and intermediate nodes set up interleaved keys using randomly pre-distributed
keys. These interleaved keys and hop-by-hop authentication ensure that the
BS will detect any false packets when no more than a certain number of nodes
are compromised. The problem of the interleaved key scheme is that there is
no efficient mechanism to authenticate two nodes to each other through multiple
hops. In addition, the communication overhead of the pair-wise key establishment
for multi-hop nodes is large, and the process is slow.
Pires et al. [PFWL04] proposed a mechanism based on signal strength and ge-
ographical information for detecting malicious nodes staging HELLO flood and
wormhole attacks. The idea is to compare the signal strength of a reception
with its expected value and calculate using geographical position. A protocol for
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disseminating information about detection of malicious nodes is also proposed.
The detection rate of their solution depends on a number of parameters and this
mechanism is not available to detect path-based DoS attacks.
Parno et al. [PPG05] developed two protocols which seek to minimize power con-
sumption by limiting communication, while still operating within the extremely
limited memory capacity of typical sensor nodes for node replication attacks.
Randomized Multicast distributes location claims to a randomly selected set of
witness nodes. Line-Selected Multicast exploits the routing topology of the net-
work to select witnesses for a node’s location and utilizes geometric probability
to detect replicated nodes. As this method cannot cooperate with our clustering
algorithm we do not utilize it.
CODA [WEC03] uses a combination of past and present channel loading con-
ditions, along with the current buffer occupancy, to infer accurate detection of
congestion at each receiver with low cost. Sensor networks must know the state of
the channel, since the transmission medium is shared and may be congested with
traffic between other devices in the neighbourhood. Listening to the channel to
measure local loading incurs high energy costs if performed all the time. There-
fore, CODA uses a sampling scheme that activates local channel monitoring at
the appropriate time to minimize cost while forming an accurate estimate. Once
congestion is detected, nodes signal their upstream neighbours via a backpressure
mechanism. If congestion has occurred, it will be very hard for nodes to signal
their upstream neighbours. At the same time, the whole system relies on this
mechanism which is risky and can be compromised by attackers.
Hierarchical Sensor Network Debugging (H-SEND) [HLBL06] observes the health
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of a sensor network and repairs any error remotely by reprogramming through the
wireless network. At initiation, the programmers specify important properties
as ’invariants’ that should never be violated in the network’s operation. The
checking can be done locally or remotely, depending on the nature of the invariant.
If an error is detected at run-time, the logs of the observed variables are examined
to analyze and correct the error. After errors are corrected, new programs or
patches can be uploaded to the nodes through the wireless network. But this
approach is very expensive to implement as it costs too much in terms of power
in a real scenario.
Deng et al. [DHM05] developed a method of using OHCs to protect end-to-end
communications in WSNs against PDoS attacks. It prevents PDoS attacks from
compromised intermediate nodes or from outside sources capable of launching
PDoS attacks, because an adversary cannot generate the next valid OHC num-
ber. Any old, replayed OHC numbers will simply be dropped. Furthermore, the
memory and computational costs of OHC execution are quite lightweight. In
addition, this scheme tolerates packet losses. But there are also some obvious
disadvantages. One of these is that it cannot constrain PDoS attacks to compro-
mised nodes in WSNs, which can specifically penalize those nodes which store a
hash function.
All of the work using MAC results in high local computing costs and the sub-
sequent death of nodes. The inter-leaved key scheme has an extremely high
communication overhead. We therefore reject these but use the idea of Deng
et al., which is based on OHCs as it works to effectively prevent PDoS attacks
against WSNs. We extend their work in [LB07a] and [LB07b] to include detection
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of such attacks by efficiently employing an MA to detect if the sender of the hash
has been compromised.
General crypto methods, namely encryption and authentication using public-key
cryptosystems [MWS04] [WKC+04], are not reasonable because sensor nodes have
a very low calculation capability and small memory, and therefore are not able
to operate such crypto algorithms within sufficient time. Some researchers have
proposed solving such security problems in sensor networks [KSW04], however
TinySec [KSW04] does not specify any key pre-distribution method and it merely
assigns a global key to the system. Thus, an attacker seeking the TinySec key
need only target a well-known address or area of memory in advance, rather than
downloading the complete binary image of the operating system and applications,
thereby reducing the download further and enabling compromise in mere seconds
[HBH05].
2.4.4 Mobility Support
The mechanisms developed for recovering WSNs have focused on stationary sen-
sors. However, sensor nodes can be mobile when they are attached to personnel,
vehicles or equipment. Consequently, a critical requirement for a recovery proto-
col is to enable fast recovery taking into account the mobility of sensor devices. In
the literature, several mobility models have been proposed for mobile ad hoc net-
works (MANETs). Although none specifically exist for sensor networks, WSNs
can be generalised to MANETs to gain an understanding of the impact of mobility
on network communication and the flow-on effect on recovery procedures.
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A mobility model is defined as a set of rules used to generate trajectories for
mobile entities [SBM05]. In a mobile sensor network, one of the key characteristics
that needs to be modelled accurately, and which has a significant impact on the
effectiveness and performance of all mechanisms and protocols, is the mobility of
the network. Mobility models can be categorised into trace models or synthetic
models [SBM05]. Trace models are built on real world data (traces) gathered
over a period of time to model the mobility in the area while synthetic models
are based entirely on mathematics. Both model types suffer drawbacks. Trace
models, while having the advantage of being based on empirical data, cannot be
generalised to a large area outside the trace area without distorting its validity.
Synthetic models, though lacking in realism, can be uniformly applied to large
deployments without loss of generality. Due to the large scale and deployment
specific nature of sensor networks, trace models are not applicable and realistic
synthetic models are required.
Synthetic mobility models proposed for mobile ad hoc networks can be cate-
gorised as individual mobility models or group mobility models [SBM05]. The
individual mobility models such as the random walk [GLAM99], the random way-
point [JM96], random direction mobility [RMSM01], probabilistic random walk
[LH99] and Gauss-Markov [CG98] model, use mobility in an unrestrained fashion
and are highly individualistic. It can be argued that mobility of sensor devices
is restrained by a variety of factors such as terrain, nature of application, and
user/vehicle mobility capabilities (since sensors are perceived to be attached to
personnel/vehicles/equipment). Further, mobility of an individual sensor may not
always be independent of the motion of other sensors as in many applications of
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WSN’s, there will be some group mobility aspects observed (eg. [MY05]). Group
mobility models proposed for ad hoc networks such as reference point group mo-
bility [HGPC99], exponential correlated random mobility [HGPC99] and Pursue
mobility [SBM05], work on the underlying assumption that all nodes belonging to
a group travel towards a common destination. Clearly sensor node mobility will
not satisfy this assumption as there can be multiple subgroups identified within
a WSN that have a common objective.
The above discussion implies that a realistic WSN mobility model should inte-
grate both individual and group mobility characteristics. Such a synthetic model
for WSNs does not exist at this time. As the development of a new mobility
model is outside the scope of this research, we propose the use of the random
waypoint model which is the most widely used model in ad hoc network research
[SBM05]. In the random waypoint model, a mobile node randomly chooses a des-
tination within the network area and moves towards it with a fixed speed chosen
from a uniform distribution. On arrival at the selected destination, it waits for
a random amount of time before selecting a new destination within the network
to move towards.
[DW04] addresses the issue of mobility by increasing the transmission range of
BS and extending two-hop neighbourhood information to n-hop. This does not
resolve the issue completely as the solution is originally used to tackle the issues
in stationary sensor networks.
[AAA09] develops DARA, a Distributed Actor Recovery Algorithm, which opts to
efficiently restore the connectivity of an inter-actor network to its pre-node-failure
level. Depending on the type of connectivity considered, two algorithms, namely,
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DARA-1C and DARA-2C, are developed to address 1 and 2-connectivity require-
ments, respectively. DARA is a localized scheme that avoids the involvement of
every single actor in the network. DARA pursues a coordinated multi-actor relo-
cation in order to re-establish communication links among impacted actors. The
main idea of DARA-1C is to replace the dead actor with a suitable neighbour.
The selection of the best candidate (BC) neighbour is based on the node degree
and the physical proximity to the dead actor. The relocation procedure is re-
cursively applied to handle actors that get disconnected due to the movement of
one of their neighbours (e.g., the BC that replaced the faulty actor). Similarly,
DARA-2C identifies the nodes that are affected, i.e., lost their 2-connectivity
property due to the failed actor. Some of these nodes are then relocated in order
to restore 2-connectivity. Although both DARA-1C and DARA-2C pursue node
relocation to restore the desired level of connectivity, they fundamentally differ
in the scope of the failure analysis and the recovery.
[KAU10] presents a distributed PArtition Detection and Recovery Algorithm
(PADRA) to determine possible partitioning in advance and self-restoration of
connectivity in case of such failures with minimized node movement and message
overhead. The idea in the recovery is to find the closest dominating node and
use it as a replacement for the failed node so that connectivity is preserved. The
basic idea of their recovery mechanism is as follows: if there is a dominating
node among the neighbours of the cut-vertex, it will be designated as the node
to replace the cut-vertex upon failure since it will be the closest dominatee to
the failed node. Otherwise, the cut-vertex node designates its closest neighbour
to handle its failure. In case of such a failure, the closest neighbour will apply
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the same idea in order to find the closest dominatee to itself. That is, it picks
its closest neighbour and this continues until a dominatee is hit. The idea is to
share the load of movement overhead among the nodes on the path to the failed
cut-vertex node in order to extend the lifetime of each node and thus the whole
network.
[MYA10] demonstrates RIM, a distributed algorithm for Recovery through In-
ward Motion. RIM opts to efficiently restore the connectivity of a WSN through
repositioning some nodes. RIM is a localized scheme that limits the scope of
the recovery process. Basically, RIM orchestrates a coordinated multi-node re-
location in order to re-establish communication links in the neighbourhood of
the failed node. The main idea is to move the neighbours of a failed node ’f’
inward, toward the position of f so they can reach each other. The rationale
is that these neighbours are the ones that are directly impacted and when they
reach each other again, the network connectivity can be restored to its pre-failure
status. The relocation procedure is recursively applied to handle any node that
gets disconnected due to the movement of one of their neighbours (e.g., those
which move toward the faulty node). The main advantages of RIM are its sim-
plicity and effectiveness. RIM avoids sophisticated diagnostics for assessing the
effect of a node failure on the network connectivity, e.g., by checking whether
the failed node is a cut vertex or not. Instead, RIM employs a simple procedure
that recovers from both serious and non-serious breaks in connectivity. The en-
tire recovery process is distributed, enabling the network to self-heal without any
external supervision.
However [AAA09], [KAU10] and [MYA10] are too high-resource intensive and
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not suitable in low-resource sensor networks. Therefore, the recovery price can
be extremely expensive.
2.4.5 Route discovery
Determining a route through a WSN from a node to the BS so that information
collected can be delivered in a timely fashion is an important issue for stationary
WSNs, but a critical one for mobile WSNs.
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) is a widely used routing protocol in [Joh94],
where the source node specifies the complete ordered route in the packet header
before sending the packet data. It consists of two mechanisms: Route Discovery
and Route Maintenance. Route Discovery is the mechanism whereby a source
wishing to send a packet to a destination node obtains a source route to the
destination node; Route Maintenance is the mechanism whereby the source node
is able to re-establish a route if the network topology has changed. DSR is
commonly chosen because of its simplicity and performance [HLC+07].
Wu [Wu03] and [WLD04] solves the problem of connectivity and route discov-
ery simultaneously using CDS based on the EMPR algorithm. This algorithm
efficiently partitions a WSN with a flat topology into a hierarchical network con-
sisting of a small-sized cluster of nodes around an AG. It can be shown that the
selected AGs are connected amongst each other (in a graph-theoretical sense, this
means that there is a path between any two AGs comprising 1-hop neighbours)
and also that every node is either an AG or in range of an AG (a set of AGs is
called a CDS). This method determines in a distributed, localized fashion a set
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of AGs by firstly collecting 2-hop neighbourhood information in each node of the
WSN, then selecting by iteratively searching for the best-suited set of MPR, then
finally associating member nodes to an appropriate AG. The CDS is the basis
of our reclustering method, and a fundamental part of the recovery process, as
described in Section 3.
2.5 Summary
A critical issue for security in WSNs is how to detect and recover from attacks
on the network in an accurate and computationally efficient manner. In this
chapter, we have discussed the current detection and recovery methods used in
sensor networks or distributed networks and indicated which ideas were suitable
for use within our strategy.
In the next chapter, we shall introduce reclustering algorithms as a recovery
mechanism.
A good guide will take you through the more important streets more often
than he takes you down side streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. In
philosophy I’m a rather bad guide.
—Alois Pichler and Herbert Hrachovec
Chapter 3
Re-Clustering Protocols
In this chapter, we introduce a reclustering algorithm designed as a recovery
mechanism in sensor networks.
Network self organization and clustering are fundamental to our approach and
are the basis for the configuration of the WSN. If a node is to play the role
of member node in one network configuration and the role of an aggregator in
another, then it must be equipped with the appropriate code.
WSNs can be built in a number of ways depending on the desired application
[LR02]. Often, several types of nodes are present, classified in terms of the role
they play, such as gathering data, analyzing data, deploying applications etc.
Networks may be built with various power resources to assist in performing these
functions. Mobile components can be added to increase the functionality and
flexibility of the network (for instance mobile agents are used by [LB07b]).
Recent research [KS04] has found that significant energy savings can be achieved
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by dynamic management of node duty cycles in sensor networks with high node
density. In this approach, some nodes are scheduled to sleep (or enter a power
saving mode) while the remaining active nodes provide continuous service. A
fundamental problem is to minimize the number of nodes that remain active,
while still achieving an acceptable quality of service for applications. In partic-
ular, maintaining sufficient sensing coverage and network connectivity with the
active nodes are critical requirements in sensor networks.
WSN operations include data discovery, which is achieved by way of sensing
application specified target events. Additionally, the sensor network needs to
process this information in a distributed manner and then forward it to any
interested data sink or remote BS. These sensor network tasks can be managed
individually by a sensor node or by several nodes simultaneously.
Section 3.1 discusses the assumption of the reclustering protocols. Section 3.2 ex-
plores how reclustering is developed in sensor networks from a design perspective.
Section 3.3 addresses the issues reclustering protocols face. Section 3.4 presents
the experiments and evaluation of reclustering protocols on both hardware and
simulation platforms. Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
3.1 Assumptions
For the purposes of an attack situation in which nodes can be lost or compromised,
efficient detection and recovery can only take place if the network can function as
normally as possible. Therefore, we propose to therefore retain connectivity and
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maximize flexibility in the network. This is achieved by allowing each node to
play the role of either a member node or AG as appropriate under the conditions
arising, and also for the entire network to efficiently re-organize itself in order to
remain connected when a compromised node is detected.
We therefore assume that all nodes are programmed initially with exactly the
same code but only the code needed for the fulfillment of the role it is currently
playing.
To initiate the process, all nodes have the code of member node turned on. The
clustering algorithm is then run three times to identify member nodes and AGs.
The clustering algorithm we chose also provides a connected network and an
additional property that for any two clusters, aggregators in each cluster are only
one hop away from the other.
1. We assume the existence of a globally unique ID for each sensor node. We
assume that all node locations are fixed for the duration of their lifetime.
2. We do not assume that sensor nodes are tamper resistant. On the contrary,
we assume that if an adversary compromises a node, they can extract all key
material, data, and code stored on that node. While tamper resistance might be
a viable defense for physical node compromise for some networks, we do not see
it as a general purpose solution. Additionally, effective tamper resistance tends
to add significant per-unit cost, and sensor nodes are intended to be inexpensive.
3. We assume that the BS is trustworthy in the sense that it is never compromised
and always behaves correctly. Most, but not all routing protocols depend on nodes
to trust messages from BSs.
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3.2 Design
3.2.1 Objectives
Considering the power resources available in the network, any recovery strategy
should be designed based on the following:
Low memory usage. Memory and storage requirements should be minimized.
Energy efficiency. The energy used in code dissemination should be low so as to
minimally affect the network lifetime.
Speed. New program code should be propagated and installed quickly (i.e., within
seconds or minutes).
The cluster configuration of the network and the ability to self organize repeatedly
is critical to our recovery strategy. The detection algorithm will be run locally,
cluster by cluster and, if the clusters are still connected, a co-ordinated response
will be implemented. If the clusters have become disconnected, they will work
independently.
3.2.2 System Design
WSNs can be built in a number of ways depending on the desired application
[LB07a]. Often, several types of nodes are present, classified in terms of the role
they play, such as gathering data, analyzing data, or deploying applications.
An intuitive analysis of the sensor network activities of a simple network leads
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to mapping tasks to roles as follows:
  a member node senses and transmits data.
  an AG controls member nodes and senses, collects, aggregates, analyses and
transmits data.
  a BS controls the system and collects, analyses, transmits and stores data.
Our algorithm constructs relatively small connected clusters. This algorithm will
help to detect attacks in a reasonable time. A hop represents one portion of the
path between source and destination. When communicating over the Internet,
for example, data passes through a number of intermediate devices (like routers)
rather than flowing directly over a single wire. Each such device causes data to
’hop’ between one point-to-point network connection and another.
Pre-requirement: a set of connected nodes V so that each pair of nodes is joined
by a multi-hop path. Node ID is unique. Each node is programmed with an
identical code allowing it to play the role of a member node and an AG. At
set-up, each node is assigned aggregator mode.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the topology of the envisioned WSN. It comprises a large
number of low-resource sensor nodes that are connected to a BS in order to
analyze the sensed data. By partioning the WSN topology into a set of clusters,
a hierarchical network topology is obtained that is power-efficient, scalable, and
resilient to security attacks.
Each cluster comprises one aggregator and in general, several member nodes.
Each member node is always connected to a single associated aggregator to ex-
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Figure 3.1: Clustered Topology of WSN
change data and control packets. The communication between member nodes and
the aggregator is controlled by establishing synchronization between the involved
nodes and the use of a cyclic superframe structure of length tP as proposed, for
example in [LB07a]. At the beginning of a superframe, the aggregator sends
a beacon message to wake-up sleeping member nodes and coordinate the intra-
cluster communication within the active period of the superframe in a TDMA
based manner. During the inactive period of the superframe, member nodes are
sent to sleep to preserve battery energy. A aggregator gathers the data sensed
by the member nodes of its cluster and transmits the aggregated data to the BS.
For this purpose, aggregators are connected among each other to form an overlay
network that manages itself in a distributed fashion. The aggregators commu-
nicate with each other by using a CSMA/CA Medium Access Control (MAC)
scheme and employing multi-hop packet transmissions. Therefore, aggregators
also act as relays to forward packets on behalf of other aggregators to the BS.
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3.2.2.1 Neighbourhood Information Collection
After establishing a WSN with a flat network topology, each node v of the WSN
collects 2-hop neighbourhood information by exchanging HELLO messages with
its 1-hop neighbour nodes. For this purpose, each node v broadcasts a HELLO
message at a random time instant within the superframe time interval tP . Each
message carries the ID of the transmitting node v, the IDs of all currently known
1-hop neighbours of the transmitting node, and the metric values M that char-
acterize the capabilities of the node v and its neighbours to act as an AG.
The metric M(v) of node v is defined in Equation 3.1 as
M(v) = a
e(v)
emax
+ (1− a) d(v)
dmax
, a ∈ [0, 1] (3.1)
where e is the available battery energy of the node and emax its maximum value,
d is the node degree that should not exceed a pre-defined value dmax, and a is
a pre-defined weighting parameter. To successfully distribute all neighbourhood
information between the involved network nodes, broadcasting of HELLO mes-
sages has to be repeated with the updated neighbour node list and metric values
in at least two succeeding time intervals tP . After the exchange of the HELLO
messages, each node v knows the IDs of all 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours, the
connectivity between these nodes and their corresponding metric values M. We
denote the set of all 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours as N1(v) and N2(v), respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Formation of C(v)
3.2.2.2 MPR Selection
After collecting the neighbourhood information, each node v selects a set of MPR
that can be viewed as candidate aggregators. This set comprises a small subset
of nodes C(v) from the 1-hop neighbour set N1(v) of node v that fully covers the
2-hop neighbour set N2(v) of node v. Thus C(v) is also called the coverage set
of node v, and it can be shown that the C(v) ∪ v forms a CDS for N2(v). The
coverage set C(v) is obtained by executing the modified EMPR algorithm given
below, which takes into account the known metric values M of the involved net-
work nodes. The formation of C(v) is also shown in Figure 3.2. Those nodes with
larger metrics are the favored candidates for the aggregators. This preferential
choice is employed in the modified EMPR algorithm.
After the MPR have been selected, each node broadcasts its coverage set C(v) to
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Algorithm 1 The Modified EMPR
Add all free neighbours of N1(v) to the coverage set C(v). Node u is a free
neighbour of v if v is not the highest metric neighbour of u.
Add node u ∈ N1(v) to the coverage set C(v), if there is an uncovered node
in N2(v) that is only covered by u. Any node in N2(v) that is not covered by
C(v) is called an uncovered node.
Add node u ∈ N1(v) to the coverage set C(v), if u covers the largest number
of uncovered nodes in N2(v). Use metric M of the nodes to break a tie when
two nodes cover the same number of uncovered nodes.
Repeat step 3 until all nodes in N2(v) are covered.
its 1-hop neighbours at a random time instant in the next time interval tP .
3.2.2.3 Cluster Forming
A node v decides to act as an AG if it has never been compromised, and
1. it has a larger metric M(v) than all of its 1-hop neighbours and has at least
two unconnected neighbours, or if
2. it is in the coverage set formed by its neighbour with the largest metric M
When the nodes have decided on their role in the network, the aggregators broad-
cast their newly accepted role to its 1-hop neighbours at random time instants
in the next time interval tP . After a member node has received this status mes-
sage from all of its candidate aggregators in its neighbourhood, the member node
selects the best-suited aggregator by sending an associate-request message. The
aggregator acknowledges successful association with an associate-confirm mes-
sage. The cluster forming process is completed after all nodes in the network
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Figure 3.3: Schemata of the reclustering algorithm
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have taken on their appropriate roles in the network. For understanding pur-
pose, the schemata of the reclustering algorithms are presented in Figure 3.3.
The proposed hierarchical network topology offers several significant advantages
compared to a flat topology in terms of network energy consumption and recovery
from network security attacks. Using a clustered topology reduces the energy
consumption in the network because, firstly, member nodes can transmit with
a lower power than AGs and, secondly, member nodes can sleep while the AGs
manage and control the network. Moreover, AGs can aggregate data before
forwarding the aggregated data which in turn reduces the overall size of the
relayed packets to the BS. Using a clustered topology also helps to recover faster
and more reliably from security attacks on the WSN. Recovery from security
attacks on one or several member nodes can be locally performed by the associated
AG without affecting the operation of other clusters, while the recovery from
security attacks on AGs or several member nodes belonging to separate clusters
requires cooperation of all AGs in the WSN.
3.2.3 Network Design
In order to standardize the clustering algorithm, Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4/Zigbee protocol stack is followed for develop-
ment.
While the IEEE 802.15.4/Zigbee protocol stack is considered as a promising tech-
nology for low-cost low-power WSNs, several issues in their specifications are still
questionable. One of those ambiguous issues is how to build a synchronized
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cluster-tree network. In fact, the current IEEE 802.15.4/Zigbee specifications
restrict the synchronization in the beacon-enabled mode (by the generation of
periodic beacon frames) to star-based networks, while they support multi-hop
networking using the peer-to-peer mesh topology, but with no synchronization.
Even though both specifications mention the possible use of cluster-tree topolo-
gies, the description of how to effectively construct such a network topology is
missing.
The ZigBee Network Layer is developed on top of our implementation IEEE
802.15.4 for nesC/TinyOS. The Hurray project [Pro] has implemented and en-
abled the cluster-tree network topology with their proposed mechanism for bea-
con scheduling in order to enable an efficient use of synchronized cluster-tree
networks. This implementation induces minor changes to IEEE 802.15.4 imple-
mentation, and the open-ZB [SC06] in order to implement the Time Division
Beacon Scheduling approach. However, in our algorithm, we are going to use
the CDMA/CA approach for time synchronization purposes because there are
no clusters formed after node deployment. Once the nodes complete running our
proposed clustering algorithm, each coordinator in its cluster can start sending a
beacon message to manage the cluster traffic and avoid the collision.
3.2.4 Scenario
We assume a network architecture, as in Figure 3.4, with options for the BS and
AGs as indicated. In this case, all AGs are in one hop range of the BS.
25 nodes are set in fixed positions alongside an earthquake table 15mx15m es-
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tablished over a known geological fault likely to be the location of an earthquake
within the next three years. Every few months the network is checked and mal-
functioning nodes are replaced. A BS is located in a reasonably secure location
20 metres from the table and within direct range of a majority of the sensors.
The nodes are placed in a fixed position alongside the table and can detect move-
ments in the table in three directions: two perpendicular horizontal directions,
labelled X and Y, and one vertical direction, labelled Z [APSS06]. After set-up,
there are nine AGs, all in direct reach of the BS. The BS is supplied with bench-
mark data indicating those figures deemed to be ’normal’ and those indicating
an earthquake tremor.
2008
July 5 11:32 - An earthquake tremor hits the table damaging seven nodes includ-
ing four AGs. Data received by the BS from the nodes is reduced to half the
usual amount. The BS issues an alert.
July 5 11:35 - The BS initiates tests to determine which nodes are possible re-
programming targets.
July 5 11:45 - The BS broadcasts a reprogramming message to the network re-
questing those nodes with identified IDs to reprogram.
July 5 11:50 - Three of the damaged AGs and two of the member nodes are now
functioning again. The BS is receiving a normal load of data.
July 5 11:55 - The BS initiates the clustering algorithm in order to ensure that
maximum data is being received.
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Figure 3.4: Scenario A
The network continues to operate successfully for several months.
3.3 Technical Problems and Experience of Im-
plementation
In this section, I will list and describe several technical problems I encountered
during development.
We chose to use TelosB for all reclustering work because the size of reclustering
code cannot be supported by MicaZ, hence in this section. Later in the thesis,
we use MicaZ to do the comparison, specifically reprogramming (Chapter 4) and
authentication (Chapter 5) as MicaZ can store for the code size.
As TinyOS has few debugging options, we decided to use the printf to test our
algorithms by printing messages over the serial port. The printf formats the
given arguments according to the format string, and writes them to the standard
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output.
The TinyOS printf library provides this terminal printing functionality to TinyOS
applications through motes connected to a pc via their serial interface. Messages
are printed by calling printf commands using a familiar syntax borrowed from the
C programming language. In order to use this functionality, developers simply
need to include a single component in the top level configuration file (PrintfC),
and include a ’printf.h’ header file in any components that actually call printf().
Currently, the printf library is only supported on msp430 and atmega128x based
platforms (e.g. mica2, micaZ, telos, eyesIFX). Even for now, this only available
debugging tool on TinyOS without proper GUI support can be stil very difficult
and challenging for TinyOS learners.
When I implemented one-hop neighbour information exchange and two-hop neigh-
bour information exchange by storing the mote addresses into neighbour tables
for the clustering algorithm, We designed the neighbour table data structure for
this purpose. It can be a difficult job to manage the relationship between one-
hop neighbour tables and two-hop neighbour tables. The design objective was to
make sure the neighbour tables are clear to each node and also the designers so
applications can be built on top of them. We have modified the data structure
by using one one-dimensional array and one two-dimensional array instead of one
two-dimensional array. The idea of using both arrays is explained as follows.
The one-dimensional array (Array[]) is used to store the one-hop neighbour in-
formation. For example, if Node A (Node ID 2) has one-hop neighbours, Node B
(Node ID 3) and Node C (Node ID 4). Node A receives the Hello message from
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Node C first, then it will store the Node C address in the Array[1]=4 and Node B
address in Array[2]=3 later. Array[0]=2 is reserved for TOS LOCAL ADDRESS
for future use.
The two-dimensional array (Array[][]) is used to store the two-hop neighbour
information. From the above example, we extended the scenario. If Node C has
one-hop neighbours, Node D (Node ID 5) and Node E (Node ID 6). Basically,
Node C should have its one-hop neighbour table like Array[1]=5, Array[2]=6 and
Array[3]=2 if the order to receive the Hello message is Node D, Node E and Node
A. Node C injects its neighbour table information in the packet to send to Node
A. Node A compares its current one-hop neighbour and two-hop neighbour table
it receives from Node C to eliminate the redundant address information (i.e. one
address could appear in one-hop neighbour table as well as two-hop one). How
to store the two-hop neighbour information in Node A’s two-hop neighbour table
will be very easy. We put the node ID as the first dimension and the order of
neighbour nodes in Node C as the second dimension in the array. Figure 3.5
describes how this process works.
Currently, the TinyOS Core Working Group supports TinyOS on two platforms:
Cygwin which runs on Windows and Linux. Installing a TinyOS environment
has five basic steps. Windows requires an extra step, installing Cygwin, which
is a UNIX-like environment as this provides a shell and many UNIX tools which
the TinyOS environment uses, such as perl and shell scripts. Our telosB platform
uses a USB port instead of a COM port as a result because it can be slightly
difficult to manage the COM ports on occasion. The COM management can cause
an error you can’t install or load the program on the nodes The recommended
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Figure 3.5: An Example of Storage Format on neighbour Tables
solution can be the following:
1. Restart the computer.
2. Use the software called FTClean to reset the PORT configuration in your
PC in order to let Windows assign the PORT again.
3. Switch the USB to a different one.
As Cygwin is not a real UNIX environment, these problems can not be avoided
as far as we are aware of. Some basic knowledge of UNIX is also required for its
development.
At the beginning of forming the clusters, we have to avoid traffic collision during
the message broadcasting if all the nodes start at the same time. However, we
can’t use the Time Division Beacon Scheduling approach because there are no
coordinators yet. Therefore, we decided to choose a random timer to broadcast
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the message. This method is a relatively random approach because the random
number is still seeded based on the node ID and there is no complicated powerful
random number generator that has been developed in TinyOS due to the hard-
ware restrictions. Normally we resend the message at least three times in order
to make sure nodes can receive all the incoming messages. However, we still can’t
avoid packet loss since broadcasting is the only way to spread the message.
Another problem we discovered at the development stage is data consistency. Our
clustering algorithm has been divided into four stages: one-hop neighbour infor-
mation exchange, two-hop neighbour information exchange, metric information
exchange and coverage set information exchange. Nodes have to strictly follow
the stages and can’t skip any of the stages in order to make the collected infor-
mation consistent. For example, Node A, Node B and Node C are one hop from
each other. Node A and Node B has completed the one-hop neighbour informa-
tion exchange but Node C is still at the stage of one-hop neighbour information
exchange and only receives the information from Node B. If Node A doesn’t have
the information of Node C, Node C could become the two-hop neighbour of Node
A because it is the one-hop neighbour of Node B. We can extend the waiting
time of Node A and it could involve a more global information exchange such as
retransmission time of a node, since Node A, Node B and Node C do not have
knowledge of each other. This can make network traffic much worse, and because
of this, we do not take this approach. What we do is let nodes resend the packet
at least five times to wait for a late incoming message. However the nodes still
don’t know if another node has moved to the next stage or not and this method
can’t resolve the problem effectively. This is the trade-off to using our algorithm.
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3.4 Experiments and Evaluation
We work on the open-sourced TelosB research platform. We assume a small
(several cubic inch) sensor/actuator unit with a CPU, power source, radio, and
several sensing elements. The processor is a 8 MHz TI MSP430 microcontroller
with 16 KB of instruction memory, 10 KB of RAM for data, and 48 KB of flash
memory. The CPU consumes 1.8 mA (at 3 volts) when active, and 5.1uA power
when sleeping. The radio is a 2400 MHz to 2483 MHz globally compatible ISM
band, delivering up to 250 Kbps high data radio bandwidth on a single shared
channel and with a range of up to a few dozen meters or so. The RFM radio
consumes 4.8 mA (at 3 volts) in receive mode, up to 12 mA in transmit mode,
and 5A in sleep mode. The whole device is powered by two AA batteries.
Our implementation involves a sensor network of 25 nodes that are deployed
within one building. The range of these devices varies from 25m to 40m in
indoor and outdoor environments respectively. The network has a heirarchical
structure with one BS node and multiple sensors connected through multihop
paths via AGs to the BS as shown in Figure 3.6.
The simulation is developed in NS-2 with up to 1000 nodes running. It is easier
to manage a large scale of sensor networks on NS-2 simulation platforms.
3.4.1 Hardware Implementation
In running the clustering algorithm, we assume that the network has been set
up and is running in a stable situation. If the BS identifies a compromised
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Figure 3.6: The network comprises a hierarchical structure of the BS, clusters,
aggregator and member nodes
AG, it will trigger a command to re-cluster. At this point, all nodes have the
ability to become aggregators. Each node sends out an invitation to join it in
a cluster. When a node decides to be an aggregator because nodes have joined
it, it reports this to the BS. Thus, at the start of clustering, there are several
clusters and aggregators with each node belonging to a cluster. At the end of a
cluster algorithm run, there may be a different number of clusters and AGs.
The clustering algorithm is installed on each TelosB mote. We test the time it
takes a network to re-cluster from the time the command is issued to re-cluster
to the time that each node has joined a cluster. In our test scenarios as shown in
Figure 3.7, we start by manually powering each node, with start time being the
time at which each node has power. We use LED lights to indicate when each
node has joined a cluster; a red LED indicates that the node has become an AG;
a blue LED indicates that a node is a member node. We take the stop time to
be the point at which each node is lit.
We test four scenarios. In the first two, nodes are all one hop from each other
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Figure 3.7: Experimental Set-up on Re-Clustering Protocols
and each node is one metre from a fixed point. In the next two scenarios, nodes
are either one or two hops from other nodes. In scenario 3, the maximum node
distance is 60 metres and in scenario 4, the maximum node distance is 42 metres.
The following shows how we deployed the nodes in the experiments.
I implemented a WSN testbed with Crossbow’s TelosB motes [Cro]. In our
testbed, up to 20 sensor nodes were located on a regular grid of 10 (5x2), 15
(5x3), and 20 (5x4). The closest distance between nodes was set to 1 m and the
radio transmission range of each node was set to approximately 1.5 m.
The proposed recovery mechanism was implemented on a TinyOS v2.1 based
TelosB programming platform. The metric M was always computed with a pa-
rameter value set to 0.5, while the values for e(v) and d(v) were pre-specified at
each run. Therefore, we incorporated both the energy and degree metrics to en-
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sure that the AG selection maintains energy-efficiency and network connectivity.
In our experiments, we ran 15 tests for each network size. We considered two
cases: (1) energy levels in all nodes are the same (i.e., the metric M is fixed), and
(2) energy levels across nodes are variable (i.e., the metric M is node-dependent).
Further, since the network topology is fixed, the node degree does not vary with
time.
The focus of the experiments was to test the performance of the reclustering
and reprogramming methods with respect to fast recovery from security attacks,
while at the same time maintaining reasonable battery energy levels. In our
experiments, we assumed that the network was capable of detecting compromised
nodes, and any compromised node which cannot be recovered will be deleted
from the re-clustered network. We assessed the performance of our method by
measuring the following performance metrics:
  Average clustering time: Average time for reclustering to be completed.
The clustering time for each run is calculated from the time the BS issues
a ’recluster’ command to the time that all nodes are included in a cluster.
  Average battery energy level of all WSN AGs.
  Average battery energy level of all WSN member nodes.
In addition, we also recorded the number of AGs elected by the algorithm. The
expected number of AGs for a given network varies with the number of nodes in
the network as shown through simulations in [Wu03].
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Scenario 1 03’07 03’09 02’58 03’39 03’27 03’16 14.86
Scenario 3 06’11 05’46 05’31 06’18 05’53 05’56 14.44
Table 3.1: Testing results 1
3.4.2 Data Collection
Because our clustering algorithm needs to use information about hops between
the nodes in our stationary network, we stored a table containing this information
in the algorithm. For each node, a table containing the IDs of each node in the
network (at most two hops away) is dynamically constructed and stored in the
node at network set-up. Each row in the table corresponds to a node and its
ID. Thus, if a network has thirty nodes, each table will have size thirty. When
reclustering, a node searches through its table to identify nodes with which it can
cluster. The larger the table, the longer this is expected to take.
Therefore, we ran tests with 3-entry neighbour tables, corresponding to scenarios
1 and 3, where these are assumed to be the entire network. With 30-entry
neighbour tables, the nodes in the four scenarios above are assumed to be more
than two hops away from any other nodes in the network. This is in order to
compare reclustering where table size is expected to impact on the speed.
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the results:
We saw, as expected, that using a 3-entry neighbour table took less time to run
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Scenario 1 11’07 11’23 11’28 11’30 11’02 11’18 11.37
Scenario 2 11’53 11’57 12’20 12’05 12’09 12’05 9.48
Scenario 3 13’21 13’39 14’41 13’58 14’20 14’00 28.45
Scenario 4 16’29 16’47 16’20 16’06 16’39 16’30 17.47
Table 3.2: Testing results 2
Network Size
Clustering Time
(secs)
Std. Dev.
(secs)
Average No.
of AGs
10 nodes 162 1.49 2
15 nodes 167 1.42 3
20 nodes 175 1.47 5
Table 3.3: Performance of the reclustering algorithm
the clustering algorithm than a 30-entry neighbour table. The data indicates that
the completion time to run the algorithm increases when the network structure
is more complicated and the network size is bigger.
Table 3.3 shows the performance results of the reclustering algorithm. In terms
of the number of AGs elected, these results compare well with the simulations
of Wu [Wu03], in which the transmission range is relatively high compared to
the density of the nodes in the WSN. Wu’s work, however, assumes no collisions,
while in our implementation one node per run was lost on average, either because
of collisions or because of data errors when 1- and 2-hop neighbour tables were
being compiled.
Table 3.4 shows the average metric value per network versus that of the selected
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Network Size
Average M(v)
for Network
Average M(v)
for AGs
10 nodes 5.5 5.6
15 nodes 8 8.25
20 nodes 10.5 13.95
Table 3.4: Energy levels of clusters and AGs
AGs. In calculating M(v), floating point errors were avoided by using Equa-
tion 3.2
M(v) = e(v)dmax + d(v)emax (3.2)
.
The results support the energy efficiency of the proposed clustering method as
the average energy levels of AGs is above that of member nodes across the net-
work. Further, we note that the proposed method works on localized (2-hop)
information to form clusters. This ensures that the method is scalable and the
clustering times obtained for the 10, 15 and 20 node networks prove this.
In a large scale sensor network, energy-efficient techniques will limit the number
of active nodes to a subset of all nodes so the network area is fully covered and
the network remains fully connected. This observation means that the number
of active two-hop neighbours for a given node will tend to remain fairly con-
stant. This, in conjunction with the two-hop localised nature of the reclustering
algorithm, will ensure that the reclustering time remains fairly constant and is
independent of the total number of nodes in the network, as only active nodes
will participate in the reclustering process. However, we do note that since a
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command to re-cluster from the BS is passed through AGs to nodes which are
not necessarily in range of the BS, this transmission time is likely to increase as
the network grows while the clustering time remains fairly stable.
One of the important differentiators between our work and that of Wu [Wu03]
is that the set of chosen AGs will vary over time as we take into account the
state of individual sensors with respect to their energy levels and node degree.
This is especially useful because the number of active nodes available to join a
cluster diminishes with time as nodes lose all energy or are compromised beyond
recovery. It is also useful in terms of the proposed scheme being extensible to
mobile sensor networks where each sensor will have a periodically changed node
degree.
3.4.3 Simulations
We tested reclustering protocols on the NS-2 simulator as our experimental
testbed platform. NS-2 is regarded as the most popular network simulator. The
results are presented in Figure 3.8 and 3.9. We used different network sizes in
order to test the performance of the algorithm.
We deployed the nodes in a 9x20 metre area. The network size was increased by
10 nodes starting from the 20 nodes. In each different network size, the simulation
experiment was conducted 50 times.
From Figure 3.8, we can see the average metric value per network versus that
of the selected aggregators. The results are also consistent with our hardware
implementation. The average metric of AGs is always higher than the average
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Figure 3.8: Simulation energy levels of clusters and aggregators
metric of networks. The average metric of AGs ranged from 8.5 to 11.5, while
the average metric of networks ranged from 9.2 to 10.5. This can prove our
reclustering protocols perform better for energy efficiency.
Figure 3.9 presents the average performance of the clustering algorithm on sim-
ulation. The result was averaged and plotted on the graph. We observed that
the aggregator number increased with the network size as well. The aggregator
number is roughly between 16 nodes and 110 nodes for the network size from 20
nodes to 180 nodes. In particular, we also tested the network size in 10 and 15
nodes with the same results as in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.9: Simulation Performance of the clustering algorithm
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have made important contributions to the recovery problems.
We have presented a self organization plan and clustering procedure for sen-
sor networks which is used to form closely connected small-size clusters and to
connect clusters with each other. This structure can detect and respond to at-
tacks effectively. In case some nodes die or are compromised, we can run this
algorithm to reform the structure. In addition to this, we have also proposed a
cluster partnership detection algorithm which uses the ’overhearing’ features of
nodes to detect compromise or attacks from inside or from outside the clusters.
To identify the best-suited AGs for the reconfigured network, the clustering algo-
rithm incorporates a metric that takes into account the energy levels of individual
sensors as well as their connectivity to other nodes. This detection or ’voting’
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algorithm is also applied to quickly make a decision on which node or cluster
has been compromised. Our cluster configuration is also amenable to efficient re-
covery techniques, ensuring that the network remains connected and that, where
necessary, compromised nodes are recovered.
We have proposed a recovery mechanism for WSNs that enables fast and reli-
able recovery from security attacks by applying dynamic network reclustering.
To identify the best-suited AGs for the reconfigured network, the clustering algo-
rithm incorporates a metric that takes into account the energy levels of individual
sensors as well as their connectivity to other nodes. Since the reclustered net-
work does not include compromised nodes, the network can be kept operational.
We have demonstrated that the proposed recovery mechanism comprising reclus-
tering can be efficiently implemented on a sensor network testbed using TelosB
motes. Our experimental results show that our recovery mechanism is suitable
for low resource sensor devices and efficient both in terms of recovery time and
scalability due to its decentralized approach.
The reprogramming techniques used to recover the compromised nodes are dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.
The little prince, who asked me so many questions, never seemed to hear
the ones I asked him. It was from words dropped by chance that, little
by little, everything was revealed to me. . .
—‘The Little Prince’ by Antoine de Saint-Exupe´ry
Chapter 4
Reprogramming Protocols
In earlier chapters, we discussed the decision making process which assists the
network in determining when a node has been compromised. A decision then
occurs at the associated AG, or at the BS, to determine the response. In general,
once a node has been identified as being compromised, a network will attempt to
recover it by reprogramming it with the original code. If the node is presumed
to be irretrievable because it is being managed by an attacker, it can then be
quarantined from the rest of the network.
In order to maintain network life for as long as possible, many implementations
use redundancy. The argument is, that deploying several times more nodes than
needed (redundancy) ensures that necessary data continues to be gathered as
nodes drop out of the network for various reasons (break-down, damage, attack
etc.) [PP06]. Redundancy may be effective in a situation where nodes are cheap,
deployment is in a remote, inaccessible area and the network lifetime is bounded
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with stable deterioration. However, there are many situations in which one or
more of these conditions does not hold. For example, in a deployment of thou-
sands of nodes over a large geographic area, an entire section of nodes at a site
may be wiped out by a natural disaster resulting in no further data from that area
reaching the BS and no data critically needed at that time is provided. In this
section, we describe in detail two situations in which maintaining the network by
recovering nodes is a superior approach to redundancy.
The reprogramming methods described in this chapter are capable of implemen-
tation in stationary, limited-resource networks.
Section 4.1 demonstrates the scenarios where the reprogramming could be used
and how the reprogramming works. Section 4.2 shows the testing results of how
the reprogramming performs. Section 4.3 summarizes the reprogramming work
we have done.
4.1 Design
Deluge [YYS03] is a reliable data dissemination protocol for large objects, such
as program binaries. Together with a bootloader, Deluge provides a way to re-
program sensor motes in a network. Since Deluge only supports network wide
reprogramming, we modified the dissemination engine of the protocol to individu-
ally address sensor nodes. This was done by replacing AM BROADCAST ADDR
parameter in the engine with the node ID of the node to be recovered. This mod-
ification allowed Deluge to disseminate the program binary to a specific compro-
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mised node. The compromised node in our scenarios can still listen to the BS
and respond to the messages. This will make the compromised node accept the
reprogramming commands from the BS.
4.1.1 Scenario
Forty-five (45) nodes are distributed at ceiling points in a commercial tent com-
plex set up for food during a large political rally. The sensors detect sound levels
(a gunshot or explosion would be picked up as being exceptional) and vibration
(a fight or someone running would be detected). Information is relayed to a BS
computer in a building 15 metres from the complex. All sensors are within a 25
metre range and one hop of this BS. Figure 4.1 shows the set-up for scenario B.
The tent complex has seven sections:
  One main area where traffic is high and food is regularly being served (15
sensors).
  Three service areas; one used as a pantry, one as a kitchen and one as a
food pick-up area for serving staff (3, 5 and 7 sensors respectively).
  Two smaller meeting room areas for private caucus by officials (5 sensors
in each).
  One press area (5 sensors).
At set-up, the sensors are in the physical positions indicated while the clustering
algorithm has logical clusters cutting across the tents.
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The main tent has two AGs, M1 and M2, while each of the other tents has a
single AG n, each case with subscript 1.
The event runs for three days. During the third day, someone reprograms three
of the sensors in the main tent area to stop transmitting information.
The description below details the response of the sensor network. In the previous
section, the entire set of sensor nodes was reprogrammed which possibly resulted
in the loss of reliable data from uncompromised nodes. In this scenario, only
those nodes identified as compromised are reprogrammed.
Day 3
9:25 - The BS assesses data received from the network and notices a diminished
amount of data from the main tent. It requests the two AGs in this tent to
initiate the voting algorithm in the cluster in order to determine the damage.
9:27 - M1 and M2 initiate the voting algorithm whose results identify that three
member nodes have become inactive.
9:30 - One of the three nodes in the cluster managed by M1 and the other two in
the cluster are managed by M2. Each aggregator then initiates a reprogramming
of the suspect nodes.
9:31 - The three member nodes are functioning again.
The network resumes normal operations.
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Figure 4.1: Scenario B
4.1.2 AG Reprogramming
This section introduces the network-based reprogramming algorithm for AGs.
Recall that each node carries a unique ID which identifies it to the rest of the
network.
Once a decision is reached by the BS to reprogram an AG with, for example, ID
A, a message is broadcast to the network requiring that any node with ID A must
reinstall the original AG. (In a normal situation, this code is the same used for all
nodes but there may be exceptional circumstances where it is different for AGs).
While all nodes receive the broadcast, only those identified by ID implement the
reprogramming.
Several AGs can be reprogrammed simultaneously using this method, so that the
cost of reprogramming is a flat rate, independent of the number of nodes involved.
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Figure 4.2: AG reprogramming
4.1.3 Member Node Reprogramming
This section introduces the cluster-based reprogramming algorithm for member
nodes.
Once a decision is reached by the BS or AG A to reprogram a member node of
A’s cluster having ID T, for example, a message is then broadcast by A to the
cluster requiring that any node with ID T must reinstall the original member
node code in a normal situation, this code is the same used for all nodes but
there may be exceptional circumstances where it is different for member nodes).
While all nodes in the cluster receive the broadcast, only those identified by ID
implement the reprogramming.
Several member nodes can be reprogrammed simultaneously by A using this
method, so that the cost of reprogramming is a flat rate, independent of the
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Figure 4.3: Member node reprogramming
number of nodes involved.
4.2 Experiments and Evaluation
We again tested networks with various sizes in terms of the speed of reprogram-
ming on TelosB. In the tests, the BS issued a reprogramming command to 1
node, 5 nodes and 10 nodes respectively. Start time was recorded at the instant
the BS issued the reprogramming command. Finish time was recorded when
the program was fully installed on the last node, which was indicated by rapidly
flashing LEDs. Note that the entire set of nodes is reprogrammed in these tests.
Although at this point in the project, we are able to identify and reprogram a
single node in a cluster. These results will be presented shortly.
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Reprogramming Time
(1 node)
58.54 61.86 61.01 57.45 60.34 59.84 1.62
Reprogramming Time
(5 nodes)
54.14 56.27 54.41 56.54 54.47 55.17 1.02
Reprogramming Time
(10 nodes)
59.40 59.61 65.29 56.28 63.93 60.90 3.28
Table 4.1: Reprogramming the nodes with BlinkM.nc 2 metres from BS
We tested reprogramming with code of two different sizes. We chose the BlinkM.nc
and GoldenImage.nc applications packaged with the TinyOS code. BlinkM.nc is
a standard application used in reprogramming and was chosen because its size,
with 50 lines of code, is indicative of the size of a program that would actually
be used. The GoldenImage application, with 5 lines of code, provides support for
network programming and was chosen for its size in order to compare with the
program with more code.
We tested nodes placed at 2 meters, 11 meters and 21 meters, but assumed all
were one hop away from the BS. For each distance, five rounds of testing were
implemented in order to collect more accurate experimental data.
Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for GoldenImage.nc Application (5 lines of
code).
Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 for Blink application (50 lines of code).
The tables show the results of the reprogramming tests on TelosB; the first three
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(1 node)
60.32 64.71 72.74 79.19 65.93 68.58 6.63
Reprogramming Time
(5 nodes)
62.42 55.76 60.63 58.39 56.28 58.70 2.53
Reprogramming Time
(10 nodes)
54.78 59.75 56.37 60.03 57.48 57.68 2.00
Table 4.2: Reprogramming the nodes with BlinkM.nc 11 metres from BS
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(1 node)
58.13 66.84 61.03 58.54 58.07 60.52 3.34
Reprogramming Time
(5 nodes)
53.64 55.89 55.89 55.48 54.38 55.06 0.96
Reprogramming Time
(10 nodes)
67.23 70.91 63.85 55.34 62.32 63.93 5.22
Table 4.3: Reprogramming the nodes with BlinkM.nc 21 metres from BS
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(1 node)
60.81 62.76 60.96 61.28 62.73 61.71 0.86
Reprogramming Time
(5 nodes)
55.14 56.32 54.41 55.38 55.94 55.44 0.66
Reprogramming Time
(10 nodes)
57.90 63.42 68.92 58.52 57.39 61.23 4.53
Table 4.4: Reprogramming the nodes with GoldenImage.nc 2 metres from BS
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(1 node)
65.87 64.17 67.54 73.66 71.38 68.52 3.51
Reprogramming Time
(5 nodes)
61.98 57.28 57.12 57.38 58.62 58.48 1.84
Reprogramming Time
(10 nodes)
58.78 58.03 56.03 59.09 57.67 57.92 1.07
Table 4.5: Reprogramming the nodes with GoldenImage.nc 11 metres from BS
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Reprogramming Time
(1 node)
58.38 58.18 56.25 59.43 59.21 58.29 1.12
Reprogramming Time
(5 nodes)
56.26 58.83 62.93 58.51 58.23 58.95 2.18
Reprogramming Time
(10 nodes)
67.43 80.31 67.22 59.25 55.56 65.95 8.52
Table 4.6: Reprogramming the nodes with GoldenImage.nc 21 metres from BS
with the smaller code and the last three with the larger code. In each case, the
average reprogramming time and standard deviations are computed in the last
column.
Ad hoc testing of reprogramming over more than 22 meters from the BS revealed
that reprogramming is possible up to a maximum of approximately 55 meters. A
natural assumption is that reprogramming should depend on the size of the code
and the distance from the BS (or from the AG initiating the reprogramming). In
these tests, all nodes were one hop from the BS, but the distances varied between
2 and 21 metres. The reprogramming protocol appears to be independant to
difference of code size. In any event, it is unlikely to be useful to test with much
larger code sizes, because in practice they would not be used.
However, other factors including reflection of the transmission off objects, tem-
perature, humidity etc. might have also affected the results. In addition, the
accuracy of the time clock, again a standard stopwatch, must also be considered
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a factor.
In any event, the average times in the above tables are very close, and we conclude
that neither distance nor the number of nodes to be reprogrammed affects the
essential reprogramming time of a single node.
Table 4.7 shows the results for the reprogramming tests on TelosB using the
modified Deluge method. The performance tests were conducted using similar
network topologies as the reclustering set up. However, for reprogramming, we
assume that each node in the WSN is within range of the BS, while the converse
is not necessarily the case. This is a much stronger assumption than that needed
for reclustering. In the tests, the BS issued a reprogramming command to a single
compromised node that was chosen at random in the network. Reprogramming
time was calculated from the time the command was issued by the BS to when
the node was fully functional. The results have been obtained by averaging over
30 runs with the compromised node being chosen at random from the network.
Table 4.7 indicates no impact on reprogramming time as a function of network
size.
Based on the observed reprogramming and reclustering times, we propose that
network wide reclustering is triggered only when an AG is compromised. In
the event of a member node being compromised, recovery can be restricted to
isolating the node and reprogramming without the need for reclustering. Such an
approach is both energy-efficient and minimizes the disruption of normal network
operation.
In each case, time starts when the BS issues its first message and stops when
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Network Size Reprogramming Time (secs) Reclustering Time (secs)
10 nodes 63.20 87.67
15 nodes 85.33 87.79
20 nodes 99.54 87.21
Table 4.7: Reprogramming and reclustering the network using modified deluge
Network
Size
Execution Time
on TelosB (secs)
Execution Time
on MicaZ (secs)
Std. Dev.
on TelosB
(secs)
Std. Dev.
on MicaZ
(secs)
3 nodes 87.12 90.48 0.34 0.43
6 nodes 87.28 90.29 0.36 0.39
10 nodes 87.67 90.27 0.38 0.41
Table 4.8: Performance of standalone reprogramming on TelosB and MicaZ
the last node verifies the hash message. The authentication time increased as
the network size. Depending on the network size, the whole protocol can be
completed in a reasonable time period between 150.87 seconds and 186.75 seconds.
4.3 Standalone Modified Deluge on TelosB and
MicaZ
We would not expect the network size to affect the speed of standalone repro-
gramming on different hardware platforms. However in order to demonstrate it,
we do a comparison on the reprogramming time with different network sizes. Ta-
ble 4.8 shows the results for the reprogramming tests using the modified Deluge
method on both TelosB and MicaZ.
In the tests, the BS issued a reprogramming command to a single compromised
node that was chosen at random in the network. Reprogramming time was
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calculated from the time the command was issued by the BS to when the node
was fully functional. The results have been obtained by averaging over 30 runs,
with the compromised node being chosen at random from within the network.
We again observed that the reprogramming time is fairly stable.
The above results indicate that TelosB motes are a better overall choice for imple-
menting our recovery algorithms than MicaZ motes. Our requirements for speed
and sufficient RAM to execute appropriately appear to be the deciding factors.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a recovery mechanism for WSNs that enables
fast and reliable recovery from security attacks by applying reprogramming. Since
the reclustered network does not include compromised nodes, the network can
be kept operational while the comprised nodes can be recovered by executing the
node reprogramming procedure. We have demonstrated that the proposed recov-
ery mechanism comprising reclustering and reprogramming can be implemented
on a sensor network testbed using TelosB motes. Our experimental results show
that our recovery mechanism is suitable for low resources sensor devices and is
efficient both in terms of recovery time and scalability due to its decentralized
approach.
We derive the requirements and design for running the authentication protocols
which are used to secure the recovery communication, in the next chapter.
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My belief is that a program, in the absolute, means absolutely nothing. A
program only means something relative to a certain intention, that must
predate it, in one form or another.
—Jean-Raymond Abrial
Chapter 5
Authentication Protocols
In this chapter we add authentication, showing how the addition of hash func-
tion checks can prevent several types of attacks aimed at interfering with recovery
mechanisms. Complete descriptions of the authenticated recovery and recluster-
ing protocols are given, along with a discussion of what type of security is added.
We then discuss options for hash functions and compare the performance with
the standard SHA-1 with a little used hash function, Rabin, based on an idea of
Shamir. We also compare the performance of our protocols with that of other
researchers in the area.
In sensor networks, generally the sensor nodes communicate effectively with
broadcast communication in short-range space. The wireless broadcast com-
munication is exposed to security risks, or to put it more directly, an adversary
can eavesdrop and alter communication messages, and insert malicious messages.
For preventing these attacks, encryption of the communication data and mutual
84
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authentication between sensor nodes is needed.
In our whole recovery system, both reclustering and reprogramming require the
nodes to send the command respectively in order to initiate either of the processes.
To prevent the replayed attacks, a cryptographically strong hash function has to
be implemented to protect data integrity. The receiver verifies the packet was
not modified in transit using the same hash function and then proceeds to the
next recovery step.
In this chapter, I implement security components for message hash and authen-
tication using Rabin hash function instead of using SHA-1, which is offered in
[LCK05] and [KHYM08].
Section 5.1 discusses the design of authentication protocols. Section 5.2 presents
the Rabin hash function used in our authentication. Section 5.3 documents the
issues and restrictions encountered during the implementation. Section 5.4 evalu-
ates the authentication protocols on both TelosB and MicaZ hardware platforms,
and Section 5.5 concludes the authentication protocols.
5.1 Design
5.1.1 Objectives
Due to the development of many existing authentication methods, we decided to
simply choose one as our authentication scheme. Basically we have to compare
a few authentication methods in order to decide which one is low cost and high
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efficiency. In the context of the recovery, we have to consider if this authentication
can quickly address attacks. In the mean time, we investigate the energy efficiency
of the authentication protocols especially for a sensor network. The standard
interfaces for the Rabin and SHA-1 are developed for the programmers to use in
the future development based on those two hash function protocols.
Besides several prior objectives, there are also four main aims for the design
architecture:
  Access control
Only authorized nodes should be able to participate in the network. Au-
thorized nodes are designated as those nodes that possess the shared group
key.
  Integrity
A message should only be accepted if it was not altered in transit. This
prevents, for example, man-in-the-middle attacks where an adversary over-
hears, alters, and re-broadcasts messages.
  Confidentiality
Unauthorized parties should not be able to infer the content of messages.
  Ease of use
Taking into account the diversity of sensor network users, the hash function
should not be difficult to use.
We hope to provide a communication interface that provides the above four goals
and are compatible with other security applications.
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5.1.2 Assumptions
In order to implement recovery, we have a set of assumptions regarding the make-
up of the network. In order to ensure that the recovery protocols are effective
against attacks which try to prevent them, we add an authentication procedure to
both the reprogramming and reclustering protocols. Authentication is established
by means of secrets shared by each node and the BS.
1. We assume the existence of a globally unique ID for each sensor node. The
BS keeps track of all IDs.
2. We assume that every node in the WSN is in transmission range of the BS,
while it is not necessarily the case that each node can transmit to the BS.
Because some nodes may not be in range of other nodes, all reprogramming
and reclustering commands will therefore be run through the BS.
3. We assume that each sensor node has a secret value which can be used for
authentication. This secret is known only to the BS and the node, and
is allocated when the WSN is set up. We also assume that this secret is
stored in a tamper-resistant section of the node. (Note, that while tamper
resistance might be a viable defence for physical node compromise for some
networks, we do not see it as a general purpose solution. Thus, we assume
that an attacker may be capable of retrieving the entire set of codes residing
in the node. However, in order to implement authentication, it is impor-
tant to have some item residing on the node which cannot be retrieved or
identified as being a ’secret’).
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4. We assume that the BS is trustworthy in the sense that it is never compro-
mised and always behaves correctly. (Most, but not all routing protocols
depend on nodes to trust messages from BSs).
5. We assume that an essentially infinite timer is available to each of the nodes
and the BS. (In practice, timers on nodes may overflow and re-use previous
times which invalidate our protocol).
6. We assume that the same hash function code is programmed into each node
at set-up. This code will be used for authentication.
5.1.3 Attack Scenarios
In our threat model, we assume that an attack can be as powerful as a desktop PC
and therefore, is capable of unlimited computation, can compromise nodes and
can introduce malicious nodes. An attacker may also eavesdrop on the network,
picking up and changing un-encrypted messages. In case the BS broadcasts a
message to the entire network, an attacker will not be able to stop receipt of the
message by the network. However, it may stop receipt by several nodes.
Our focus in this chapter is on ensuring that the recovery process runs smoothly,
unimpeded by attacks. In recovering a network, we therefore consider the follow-
ing attacks:
1. Replay of reclustering or reprogramming messages.
Because we add a timer to these messages, any replayed message will be
discarded.
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2. Obfuscation and Denial of Service via unauthorized commands.
The authentication procedure implemented for the recovery protocols reclus-
tering and reprogramming, ensures that only the BS can send these com-
mands, or in the case of an AG request to the BS, ensures that the AG is
indeed legitimate.
3. Impersonation attack.
An attacker attempting to impersonate the BS or an AG will not have
the appropriate secret (shared with the BS) and so will not be able to
authenticate itself.
5.2 Approaches
Hash functions are used in our protocols in the areas below and here we discuss
some options for such functions which can be used in a limited resource situation.
At set up, a hash function is employed to hash the program code in each sensor
along with its ID. This value is divided between two other nodes in the network.
The hash function chosen will be SHA-1 as a preferred hash in government au-
thentication protocols [IC07a]. SHA-1 was used by [SV06] in their paper on node
recovery to detect compromised nodes. In addition, a hash chain was imple-
mented by [LB08] for detection, and SHA-1 is an appropriate function for this
chain.
A recent proposal by A. Shamir [Sha08b], and implemented by [GSQ08], is a
hash function which is a variation of the RSA scheme, designed specifically for
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implementation with low resource RFID technologies. From [GSQ08]: ”SQUASH
is based on the one-way function c = m2 mod n coming from the Rabin cryp-
tosystem. To make it secure, the binary length of n must be at least 1000 bits
long. [Sha08b] suggests that using a 64-bit non-linear feedback shift register to
generate m, a not yet factorized Mersenne’s number (2x−1) as modulus n, and to
send out the bits of c without storing them. This process avoids storing three
1000-bit long numbers. The multiplications are achieved by on-the-fly convolu-
tions, sending each bit as soon as it is computed. Consequently, the only needed
memory aims to store the carry of the previous steps in the convolution. For the
output, a window of 32 or 64 (or more) bits is used. It yields a hash function
with inputs of 64 bits that is scalable in output.
In this chapter, we propose implementations designed in order to minimize the
resources, possibly at the cost of an increased execution time. The target device
is a Xilinx Virtex-4 XC4VLX200-10 FPGA. The algorithm recommended by Adi
Shamir has 64 bits in input and 32 in output, and n = 21277 - 1. To reduce the
hardware cost, we minimized the number of registers in the implementation data
and control part. On the XC4VLX200, the design results require 377 slices.
The full execution time to produce 32 bits is 63,250 clock cycles at 222 MHz,
so we reach a throughput of 112,300 bits per second. We also implemented the
algorithm with other size numbers. For 128 bits in input and 64 in output, we
get 619 slices and 104,114 clock cycles at 206 MHz. In general, the length of the
output influences the execution time, while the length of the input influences the
number of registers and slices.”
We will examine the implementation of this hash function as a comparative al-
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ternative to SHA-1.
5.2.1 Rabin Algorithms
In order to implement the Rabin and SHA-1, we also have to understand the
authentication and hash function [ZFB05].
The authentication scheme is shown as follows:
  Sender and receiver share a 64 bit secret S.
  A 64 bit challenge R is issued by the Sender.
  Sender returns H (R xor S).
  Receiver verifies sender’s knowledge of S by computing H (R xor S).
By simplifying the Rabin hash function, a few steps have been summarized as
follows:
Algorithm 2 The Rabin Hash Function
Returns a subset of bits from c where c = m2 mod n.
Words of m are generated from an IV = R xor S using a LFSR with a length
of processor word.
A modulus of the form 2k−1 allows the calculation or m2 mode n with no
modular operations since 2k−1 mod n.
Calculating a bit requires carry-in which is approximated by computing the
carries of up to 11 previous bits. In addition, to carry some shifts is required
to align the bits in chunks.
However, we are unable to provide a powerful LFSR in order to implement the
SQUASH protocol due to the limited resource of sensor nodes. We decided to
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implement a simple version of the SQUASH instead. Our authentication protocol
is only used in two areas of the communication: the BS to the member nodes and
the AGs to the BS involving a third party. When the BS sends the commands
to the nodes, it transmits the part of the hash value H(R, S, CMD) where H
is some publicly known hash function, the command CMD and random number
R respectively to the nodes. The command CMD and the random number R
has to be sent because the adversaries could play replayed attacks by capturing
the whole hash value without doing any computation. After that, the receiver
simply calculates the hash value in the same way as the sender does to verify the
message it receives. Once the authentication process is successful, the appropriate
recovery methods can be taken afterwards. If the nodes to be recovered are not
covered by the transmission range of the BS, the AG in charge will report to the
BS. It transmits the part of the hash value H (R, S, CMD), the command CMD,
random number R and the IDs of the nodes to be reprogrammed. When the BS
verifies the message from the AGs, it will either recluster or reprogram the nodes
accordingly.
The simple version of the Rabin is described as follows:
  Generate a message m by using a particular choice of mixing function M=H
(R,S,CMD). The R, S and CMD are all 64 bit variables as the 64 bit is the
maximum bit variable which is supported by TelosB motes and most sensor
nodes.
  Use the numbers of the modulus form n=2k−1 with k =59 which can make
sure the n is 64 bit value. k=59 would be fractionally more difficult to
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factor in a reasonable of 0 to 64 bits.
  Compute the cipher text c = m2 mod n.
  Extract a subnet of 32 bits (10th bit to 42nd bit) from c, as we know
the exact location of this window within c is not important, and send this
window of consecutive bits to the receiver later.
5.2.2 SHA-1 Algorithms
SHA-1 has been implemented by researchers previously. However, we are unable
to acquire the NesC source code from them so we developed this algorithm on
our own based on the C source code on the Internet [SHA].
5.3 Technical Problems and Experience of Im-
plementation
In this sections, I will discuss a few technical problems I received during the devel-
opment and some experience related to authentication development in TinyOS.
First of all, the standard random number used in TinyOS, like many in computer-
science, are pseudo-random. That is, they use some feedback of previous state(s)
to generate a new state. There are some rather complex approaches, such as
Mersenne-Twister [MN98], but there are also some rather simple approaches like
RandomLfsrC component in TinyOS.
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In TinyOS 2.x, the random number generation is to start at ’new places’ in the
sequence generated by the random number generator. Looking at RandomMl-
cgC, it is seeded with TOS NODE ID. That is, each time it starts, it uses the
TOS NODE ID to get the initial state. At least multiple nodes should start with
the same sequence.
Since we use the node ID, also known as TOS NODE ID in TinyOS as the seed
for the random number generator, we will keep getting the same random number
over and over again if the TOS NODE ID remains the same. As our assumption
is every node has a fixed node ID. After all, we have to decide to use local time
instead. The local time can be activated after the node is booted. We assume
the time is infinite in the system, so every time you call the LocalTime.get()
command in TinyOS, the system will acquire a different time stamp. This time
stamp is also sent to the receiver to calculate the H (R, S, CMD) value due to
no synchronized time mechanism on the LocalTime component in TinyOS.
Secondly, Unsupported Math.h library on TelosB platform is another serious
problem in our Rabin authentication implementation. Even if math.h library is
included in TinyOS, the TelosB platform doesn’t support it. The function such
as MOD(), SQRT(), POW() etc. cannot be used in the code. It could be another
possible direction for TinyOS Alliance to focus on in the future. I implemented
our own math functions which can be used in the Rabin protocol.
Thirdly, the limitations of the message structure in TinyOS, also refered as
message t, needs to be increased n as the default size of a message is 28 bytes
including 11 bytes header data. Therefore, only 17 bytes can be used for data
payload. In both SHA-1 and Rabin protocols, the message to be sent exceeds the
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default size. It can raise some serious problems during compilation time and can
be very hard to detect. This means the default size of the message needs to be
adjusted in order to proceed with larger message size.
Next, some knowledge of bit operations, for example, bitwise operation, is also re-
quired in order to implement the hash function. It is very common for developers
to manipulate the bits frequently in order to work on low-power hardware.
Furthermore, the basic debugging tool, printf(), doesn’t work well in printing the
64 bits message. The solution to this problem is to print out the high 32 bit
and low 32 bit respectively. The default printing configuration used to print out
debuggingthe message in which the message size is bigger than the default size
is only to print the low bits in default. So when the system needs to display the
high bits, it has to shift the message 32 bit left and then call the printf() function.
The last problem I encountered during the development is a bug triggered by the
nesc hton uint64 (conversion used for nx uint64 t) when you want to transmit
an nx uint64 type of message data over the networks. This is an internal compiler
bug of msp430-gcc 3.2.3. It only happens to the MSP430 compiler. As far as we
am aware of, this bug has not been officially fixed. So we am constrained to only
using the maximum 32-bit message size in order to test protocol versions of hash
functions.
To sum up, there may be still a lot of issues related to TinyOS, especially in au-
thentication, as this operating platform is still in development. In our project, we
have, however, found some workarounds to bypass the above unresolved existing
technical issues. With all the experience we had, it will definitely benefit other
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researchers when they develop any authentication protocols in TinyOS.
5.4 Experiments and Evaluation
We use two well-known functions, SHA-1 and Rabin, for the purposes of compar-
ison.
5.4.1 Hash Function Performance
SHA-1 is a preferred hash in government authentication protocols [IC07b], [oST02]
and has been employed by several researchers in TinyOS applications [KHYM08],
[LCK05]. Our second choice is the Rabin encryption system [Opp96] adapted for
use as a hash function, as proposed by Shamir in [Rab79]. While Shamir suggests
an adaptation of Rabin’s scheme to what he calls SQUASH, based on improved
methods of computing the hash output, our implementation is constrained by
TinyOS requirements, thus we use smaller values than those proposed to ensure
the security of SQUASH. These smaller values do not warrant use of the im-
proved SQUASH computations, and so we use Rabin’s scheme as proposed in
[Opp96]. Shamir points out [Rab79] that, when used as a hash function, the Ra-
bin encryption scheme can be implemented securely on fewer bits than needed for
encryption. The drawback of Rabin’s scheme is that up to four input messages
can result in the same ciphertext. Since we use the scheme only for authentication
based on a small set of standard message inputs, this does not pose a problem
for us.
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Primitives
Execution Time
(sec)
RAM
(bytes)
ROM
(bytes)
SHA-1 (8 bits) 7 126 3892
SHA-1 (32 bits) 7 126 3896
SHA-1 (64 bits) 7 126 3900
Rabin (64 bits) 2 46 1870
Table 5.1: Comparison of the Rabin and SHA-1 hash functions
It is worthwhile to compare, independently of the protocols, the performance
of our two hash functions. While SHA-1 is a standard choice, it is clear from
Table 6.3 that Rabin is faster with smaller RAM and Read-only Memory (ROM).
SHA-1 and Rabin are implemented as follows on TinyOS Version 2.1. For com-
parison, we take a data input of 8 bits, 32 bits and 64 bits for SHA-1 and 64
bits for Rabin. As shown in Table 5.1, for SHA-1, the code consumes 126 bytes
of RAM, 3892 bytes for 8 bits, 3896 bytes for 32 bits and 3900 bytes for 64 bits
of ROM, and takes approximately 7 ms to produce a 160-bit hash of different
message sizes. Rabin produces a consecutive 32-bit hash window for a 64-bit
calculated hash. The code consumes 46 bytes of RAM and 1870 bytes of ROM,
and takes approximately 2 ms to hash a message of 64-bits.
Lee, Choi and Kim [LCK05] have introduced a Hash component for TinyOS,
designed to be used as an independent hash module with TinySec. According
to Lee, Choi and Kim, this hash module accepts any hash function, and can be
implemented on 8, 16 and 32 bit words.
We compared time and memory for our implementation of SHA-1 against theirs
and also against an implementation in [KHYM08]. While we found that our
results, from Table 6.3, are better than those in [LCK05] and [KHYM08], for 8
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or 32 bit input, we note that their research does not specify the TinyOS version
used. We believe that the difference is due to their use of an earlier version of
TinyOS or different coding structure or techniques.
5.4.2 Hash Function Comparison on TelosB and MicaZ
It is worthwhile to independently compare the performance of the protocols for
our two hash functions on different platforms.
SHA-1 and Rabin are implemented alone as follows on TinyOS Version 2.1. For
comparison, we take data input of 8 bits, 32 bits for SHA-1 and 32 bits for Rabin.
As shown in Table 5.2, on TelosB motes, for SHA-1 the code consumes 126 bytes
of RAM, 3892 bytes for 8 bits, 3896 bytes for 32 bits and 3900 bytes for 64 bits of
ROM, and takes approximately 7 ms to produce a 160-bit hash of different sizes
of messages. On MicaZ motes, the SHA-1 code consumes 130 bytes of RAM and
4234 bytes of ROM for both 8 bits and 32 bits, and takes approximately 8 ms.
Rabin produces a consecutive 32-bit hash window for a 32-bit calculated hash. On
TelosB, the code consumes 46 bytes of RAM and 1870 bytes of ROM, and takes
approximately 2 ms to hash a message of 32-bits. The code of Rabin on MicaZ
consumes 302 bytes of RAM and 4980 bytes of ROM, and takes approximately 3
ms to hash a message of 32-bits.
While SHA-1 is a standard choice, it is clear from Table 5.2 that Rabin is faster
on both platform studies, and uses less ROM and RAM than SHA-1 when imple-
mented on TelosB motes. Since MicaZ has less RAM than TelosB, Rabin would
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SHA-1 (8 bit) 7 8 126 130 3892 4234
SHA-1(32 bit) 7 8 126 130 3896 4234
Rabin(32 bit) 2 2 46 302 1870 4980
Table 5.2: Performance of standalone hash functions on different platforms
appear to be an unsuitable choice for implementation on MicaZ motes.
5.4.3 Performance Comparison with the Work of Other
Researchers
In this section, we compare our results with those who have developed authen-
tication protocols for a similar situation. While hash functions have been im-
plemented in authentication by a number of authors, the protocols used vary
significantly and for the most part are not comparable.
However, Benenson, Gedicke and Raivio in [ZBR05], establish an authentication
protocol for a WSN, which in many ways has the same goals as our reprogram-
ming protocol without a key-discovery phase; that is a user in a fixed location
broadcasts their identity and a certificate, then a node responds with a nonce.
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Primitives
Execution
Time (sec)
RAM
(bytes)
ROM
(bytes)
Benenson, Gedicke,
Raivio [ZBR05]
440 2000 45500
Our protocol III
with SHA-1
30 1454 26340
Our protocol III
with Rabin
30 1220 21686
Table 5.3: Comparison of two implementations of protocol III
The user replies with a hash. Theirs is based on elliptic curve cryptography, but,
like ours, the hash function SHA-1 on 64 bits was used to hash the identities of
the sender and receiver along with a random number.
We assume the BS can be trusted indefinitely. 1 hash and 2 verifications are
needed while in our protocol only 1 hash and 1 verification were needed. The
authors of [ZBR05] rely on the existence of a third party trusted certificate au-
thority while we assume that only the BS is trusted. In summary, we avoid the
need for a trusted third party and reduce the number of verifications.
Benenson, Gedicke and Raivio implemented their protocol on five TelosB motes
using TinyOS. The hash function SHA-1 on 64 bits was used in [ZBR05] to
hash the identities of the sender and receiver along with a random number. We
see in Table 5.3 that our protocol is more than 10 times faster and requires
almost 50% less in terms of memory requirements. Their execution times and
the space needed are shown along with ours in Table 5.3. They point out that
the execution time is disappointing due to the long execution times of the elliptic
curve cryptography routines. Note also, that in their protocol, motes must be
capable of executing both symmetric and public key cryptographic protocols and
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must be able to securely store secret keys. Thus, our protocol provides the same
level of authentication with a more lightweight approach.
In all schemes, the use of authentication needs some kind of key and the question
of key storage is critical to maintaining a WSN. In virtually all known schemes
for WSNs, keys are stored on nodes and thus require a tamper resistant location
or an assumption that an attacker is unable to retrieve the keys. An exception to
this is given, for example in the paper [DHCC05], where the authors use public
key cryptography for authentication in which the private key is stored on a PC.
A hash chain is produced by the PC and the nodes must verify all messages from
the PC itself. This is a time-consuming undertaking and needs each node to be
able to communicate with the PC at all times. In addition, it is important that
messages be received sequentially so that they can be reconstructed. In an attack
scenario, this is not an assumption that can be made.
In low resourced networks which are deployed in remote areas without the possi-
bility of energy renewal or node replacement, the best one can achieve is relatively
longer life. However, in situations where it is possible to refresh the network, the
secrets used for authentication or encryption should also be refreshed.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we focus on recovery after an attack has been detected and provide
lightweight protocols for reclustering and for reprogramming nodes in a WSN.
We provide a message authentication protocol for limited resource sensor net-
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works enabling the network to securely implement recovery strategies efficiently
and effectively. The protocol is based on hash functions and we compare the
performance of two well-known lightweight hash functions, SHA-1 and Rabin.
We demonstrate that our authentication protocol can be implemented efficiently
with TelosB motes in comparison with existing protocols.
The next chapter illustrates how to integrate the three techniques we have dis-
cussed in this chapter into a recovery mechanism.
I conclude that there are two ways of constructing a software design:
One is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies and
the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious
deficiencies.
—Tony Hoare
Chapter 6
Recovery Protocols in Stationary
WSNs
In this chapter, we describe each of the following recovery protocols in detail.
  Reprogramming Protocol from the BS to a Compromised Node.
  Reprogramming Protocol from an AG to the BS on Behalf of a Compro-
mised Node.
  Re-Clustering Protocol from the BS to the Network.
Section 6.1 discusses each of the recovery protocols in details. Section 6.2 follows
with the comprehensive experiments and evaluation. Section 6.3 gives a summary
on recovery protocols.
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6.1 Recovery Protocols
In this section, we describe each of the protocols in detail. In each case, a node
with ID n contains secret Sn. R represents a random value but is in fact the
local time obtained from the LocalTime.get() command in TinyOS. M represents
a message to reprogram or re-cluster, or a request that another node be repro-
grammed. All messages transmitted include node ID of both sender and receiver,
including that of the BS.
A simple hash function check achieves authentication of a message. We use two
well-known functions, SHA-1 and Rabin for the purposes of comparison. SHA-1
is a preferred hash in government authentication protocols [IC07b], [oST02] and
has been employed by several researchers in TinyOS applications [KHYM08],
[LCK05]. Our second choice is the Rabin encryption system [Rab79] adapted for
use as a hash function as proposed by Shamir in [Sha08a]. While Shamir suggests
an adaptation of Rabin’s scheme to what he calls SQUASH, based on improved
methods of computing the hash output, our implementation is constrained by
TinyOS requirements, and so we use smaller values than those proposed to en-
sure the security of SQUASH. These smaller values do not warrant use of the
improved SQUASH computations, and so we use Rabin’s scheme as proposed in
[Rab79]. Shamir points out [Sha08a] that, when used as a hash function, the Ra-
bin encryption scheme can be implemented securely on fewer bits than needed for
encryption. The drawback of Rabin’s scheme is that up to four input messages
can result in the same ciphertext. Since we use the scheme only for authentication
based on a small set of standard message inputs, this does not pose a problem
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for us.
We take data input of 8 bits, 32 bits and 64 bits for SHA-1 and 64 bits for Rabin.
6.1.1 Reprogramming Protocol from the BS to a Com-
promised Node
Because the BS monitors network communications, it is able to detect an attack.
The BS deals with it in the early stages by authenticated reprogramming and
reclustering, with the objective to prolong the life of the WSN. If over 50% of the
nodes were compromised, this would be deemed a failure.
In Figure 6.1, the BS has determined that node with ID n needs reprogramming.
If a set of nodes is to be reprogrammed, each node must receive a separate message
as each contains the secret known only by that node and by the BS. H represents
a hash function. We assume that n, M and R are the appropriate size for input
to H. Figure 6.2 explains the following steps in the message diagram.
1. BS XORs the secret Sn, the reprogramming message M and the local time
R to obtain m.
2. The BS computes H(m) = c.
3. The BS transmits c, M and R which are received by n.
4. The node n recomputes H of the XOR of n with Sn, M and R and checks
that it is c.
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Figure 6.1: Authenticating a reprogramming request
Figure 6.2: Message diagram of authenticating a reprogramming request
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5. If the check is ’true’ AND the time R has not been used in a reprogramming
request earlier, the node reprograms.
6. The node updates its secret to Sn = m.
7. The node informs the BS that it has successfully reprogrammed and the
BS then updates the node’s secret in its table.
6.1.2 Reprogramming Protocol from an AG to the BS on
Behalf of a Compromised Node
In Figure 6.3, an AG A has determined that one of the nodes in its cluster must
be reprogrammed. Since reprogramming is intensive from the initiator side, only
the BS can implement it. Thus, node A requests reprogramming from the BS.
The following steps are also interpreted in Figure 6.4.
1. A retrieves the ID n of the node to be reprogrammed.
2. A XORs n, its own secret SA, the request for reprogramming message M
and the local time R to obtain m.
3. A computes H(m) = c.
4. A transmits c, n, M and R to the BS.
5. The BS retrieves SA, recomputes the hash and checks if it is c.
6. If the check is ’true’ AND the time R has not been used in a reprogramming
request earlier, the BS initiates Protocol 6.1.1.
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Figure 6.3: Message diagram of authenticating a reprogramming request from an
AG
Figure 6.4: Authenticating a reprogramming request
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6.1.3 Re-Clustering Protocol from the BS to the Network
Reclustering may need to be implemented after an attack on a WSN in case
several nodes are no longer trustworthy. The BS makes this decision based on
information gathered from the network. Once it has been made, it sends a reclus-
tering message to all AGs to begin the procedure. In this protocol, we describe the
authenticated message to re-cluster which must be sent to each node separately,
identifying it by its ID and its secret. The following steps are also illuminated in
Figure 6.5.
1. The BS retrieves the secrets S1, Sc of each node and for each node ID n,
XORs its secret Sn, the reclustering message M and the local time R to
obtain mn.
2. The BS then computes H(mn) for each n and transmits it with M and R to
the corresponding node n.
3. Each node XORs its secret Sn, M and R to obtain mn.
4. Each node computes H(mn) and compares with the messages received from
the BS. If there is a match AND if no such message with time R has been
used in a reclustering request earlier, n accepts this as a valid reclustering
message.
5. Once all nodes have received and verified such a message, reclustering com-
mences.
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Figure 6.5: Authenticating a reclustering request
6.2 Experiments and Evaluation
When running this protocol, the timing must be managed. A Timer.startOneShot(2000)
command is set to fire in 2000 ms from the time of invocation at the BS. This
cancels any previously running timer and will only fire once then stop. This gives
enough time for the node in the network to receive and verify the hash message
before the BS starts another timer. The protocol is complete when the last node
verifies the hash message.
We tested all three protocols on TinyOS Version 2.1, with the results presented
in the following tables. Table 6.1 shows the time, ROM and RAM used by the
reprogramming protocol for four applications of the hash function. Although the
execution time does not vary, Rabin uses only 83% to 85% of the RAM and ROM
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Primitives Execution Time (sec) RAM (bytes) ROM (bytes)
SHA-1 (8 bits) 6 1230 19802
SHA-1 (32 bits) 6 1262 20178
SHA-1 (64 bits) 6 1334 21034
Rabin (64 bits) 6 1100 17972
Table 6.1: Performance of a reprogramming protocol from the BS to a compro-
mised node
Primitives Execution Time (sec) RAM (bytes) ROM (bytes)
SHA-1 (8 bits) 10 1262 20556
SHA-1 (32 bits) 10 1296 20948
SHA-1 (64 bits) 10 1368 21796
Rabin (64 bits) 10 1142 18830
Table 6.2: Performance of a reprogramming protocol from an AG to the BS on
behalf of a compromised node
used by SHA-1 on 64 bits.
The same distinctions are apparent when running Protocol 6.1.2. Again, while
execution time does not vary, ROM and RAM for Rabin are only 84 to 86% that
of SHA-1 on 64 bits.
Protocols 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 were run 100 times with almost identical results. Ta-
ble 6.1 and Table 6.2 average these results. For Protocol 6.1.3, because the
distribution of messages needs to be associated with timers, the implementation
is significantly more complex than that for the previous protocols, therefore we
ran this protocol only five times. Table 6.3 presents the average results of running
Protocol 6.1.3 five times with a set of 5 TelosB motes. In each case, time starts
when the BS issues its first message and stops when the last node verifies the
hash message.
Once again, execution time does not vary. We believe this is due to the actual
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Primitives Execution Time (sec) RAM (bytes) ROM (bytes)
SHA-1 (8 bits) 30 1350 22978
SHA-1 (32 bits) 30 1382 23968
SHA-1 (64 bits) 30 1454 26340
Rabin (64 bits) 30 1220 21686
Table 6.3: Performance of a reclustering protocol from the BS to the network
execution time of the hash function being significantly smaller than the rest of
the protocol and therefore has negligible influence. It may be that in a large
network with thousands of nodes, the execution time of the hash function begins
to play a role.
6.3 Implementation Platform Comparison
All of the protocols developed in our work to date were performed on the TelosB
platform with 16 bit processors. Since one of our targets is low-resource recovery,
we proposed to compare the TelosB platform with the smaller MicaZ one to see
where problems in implementation might occur. Table 6.4 shows the difference
in resourcing of these two platforms. MicaZ does not support 64 bit computa-
tion as it has only 8 bit processors. It also has a much smaller RAM size. In
compensation, its ROM size is significantly larger than that of TelosB. Thus, we
might expect that some of our protocols might be adaptable to MicaZ by reducing
computational overhead and increasing storage in ROM.
We attempted to implement the reclustering algorithm on MicaZ and found that
it requires approximately 12620 bytes of RAM. This is not feasible due to the
low RAM size. In contrast, TelosB can run reclustering results within the 10K
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Platforms Processor Bits
Integer Computation
Bit Support
RAM (KB) ROM (KB)
TelosB 16 64 10 48
MicaZ 8 32 4 128
Table 6.4: Hardware performance comparison of TelosB and MicaZ motes
RAM space since it only consumes 9870 bytes.
It is also clear that we were unable to test the 64 bit hash function on the MicaZ
platform, so this is not included in the results below.
We tested all three protocols on TinyOS Version 2.1 and on MicaZ with the
results presented in the following sections.
6.4 Protocol Comparison between TelosB and
MicaZ
Table 6.5 shows the time, ROM and RAM used by the reprogramming protocol
for three applications of hash function on both TelosB and MicaZ platforms. In
each case, the execution time on TelosB is approximately 20% less than on MicaZ.
This is to be expected because of the TelosB capacity.
Rabin uses only 83 to 85% of the RAM and ROM used by SHA-1 on 32 bits on
TelosB, while on MicaZ, more RAM is needed for Rabin than for SHA-1, while
marginally less ROM size is needed.
Comparing SHA-1 on 8 bits and 32 bits, the RAMs used on TelosB are 29 bytes
and 31 bytes more than on MicaZ respectively, thus MicaZ is using approximately
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SHA-1 (8 bit) 6.26 7.51 1230 1201 19802 20798
SHA-1(32 bit) 6.35 7.53 1262 1231 20178 21336
RABIN(32 bit) 6.22 7.46 1100 1265 17872 20636
Table 6.5: Performance of a reprogramming protocol from the BS to a compro-
mised node on different platforms
98% of the RAM used by TelosB. Since MicaZ has much less RAM than TelosB,
this is not a particularly useful situation.
Similar distinctions are apparent when running Protocol 6.1.2, the reprogram-
ming protocol (see Table 6.6). In all cases, the execution time on TelosB is
appropriately 13% less than on MicaZ.
For SHA-1, slightly more RAM, but slightly less ROM are needed for TelosB
than for MicaZ. This is a good situation for MicaZ’s capacity. For Rabin, a
different situation exists; TelosB needs less RAM (87.5%) and less ROM (83%)
than MicaZ.
Protocols 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 were run 50 times with no substantial difference in
results. Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 are the averages of the results.
For protocol 6.1.3, and BS reclustering, the distribution of messages needs to be
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SHA-1 (8 bit) 10.23 11.65 1262 1229 20556 21390
SHA-1(32 bit) 10.39 11.89 1296 1263 20948 22130
RABIN(32 bit) 10.27 11.74 1142 1305 18830 22588
Table 6.6: Performance of a reprogramming protocol from an AG to the BS on
behalf of a compromised node on different platforms
associated with timers because the implementation is significantly more complex
than that for the previous protocols, therefore we only ran this protocol five
times. Table 6.7 presents the average results of running protocol 6.1.3 five times
with a set of 5 TelosB or 5 MicaZ motes. In each case, time starts when the BS
issues its first message and stops when the last node verifies the hash message.
In all cases, TelosB performs better than MicaZ. We believe this is because the
actual execution time of the hash function is significantly smaller than that of
the rest of the protocol and therefore has negligible influence. It may be that
in a large network with thousands of nodes, the repeated execution time of the
hash function begins to play a role, however, this was never apparent in our
experiments.
The execution time on MicaZ is appropriately 10% greater than on TelosB. On
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SHA-1 (8 bit) 30.34 33.37 1230 1309 19802 23600
SHA-1(32 bit) 30.28 33.31 1262 1339 20178 25176
RABIN(32 bit) 30.23 33.27 1100 1433 17972 26190
Table 6.7: Performance of a reclustering protocol from the BS to the network on
different platforms
SHA-1, RAM and ROM, differences are approximately 6.3% and 19-25% greater.
On Rabin, these differences grow to 30-46%. Comparing Rabin and SHA-1 di-
rectly, Rabin uses less memory, RAM and ROM on TelosB than SHA-1, but
uses more RAM and ROM on MicaZ. These differences could be due to different
hardware architecture and compilation tool chains.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented well-defined authentication protocols to secure the
message exchange during the recovery processes. A extensive number of experi-
ments have been conducted to evaluate the performance of hash functions. Our
work has been regarded as very efficient in terms of computation. Compared to
the work of other researchers, it is also a more secure and reliable process for
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implementation in low-resource WSNs.
The contributions from this chapter are:
  An efficient authenticated reprogramming request protocol from the BS to
a compromised node.
  An efficient authenticated reprogramming request protocol from an AG to
the BS on behalf of a compromised node.
  An efficient authenticated reclustering protocol from the BS to the network.
  A comparison of two lightweight well-known hash functions used in the
authentication protocols and implemented with TelosB motes.
The next chapter extends the recovery work we have done and thereafter intro-
duces a mobilily support mechanism to be applied in mobile sensor networks.
A common mistake that people make when trying to design something
completely foolproof is to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools.
—Douglas Adams
Chapter 7
Mobility Support on Recovery
In this chapter, we develop our work in two new directions.
First, we consider the situation of mobile networks. We describe our approach
to support recovery of WSNs that are mobile and we consider the impact on the
previous recovery protocols in this situation. We show that, with some small
changes to the key set-up assumptions, it is easy to adapt our current protocols
to this situation.
Secondly, since one of our targets is low-resource recovery, we compare the TelosB
platform with the MicaZ platform to see where problems in implementation might
occur. Our tests show that MicaZ motes have too little power and insufficient
memory to implement attack recovery to the level achieved by TelosB motes.
In our work, WSNs can be divided into three types:
  Stationary, limited-resource networks;
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  Stationary well-resourced networks; and
  Mobile, well-resourced networks.
Thus far, we have considered only the first two types. However, all of our proto-
cols have been designed taking into account possible deployment in mobile WSNs.
In this chapter we specifically analyse the impact on node mobility on the design
of the recovery procedures. In addition to this, impact of node mobility on both
network reclustering and node reprogramming is also considered.
While stationary WSNs have been studied from a recovery viewpoint [LDBS09],
a more difficult problem is recovering WSNs that are mobile. There are numerous
scenarios in which mobility can occur. One such scenario is the deployment of a
WSN in a coal mine subject to collapses as studied in [MY05]. In this case, motes
fell into holes or moved towards a hole and transmission paths were reconnected.
Other mobile situations see motes deployed in vehicles or on people or animals.
The main problem distinguishing this situation from the stationary one, is finding
and maintaining transmission paths.
In extending our recovery work to large, mobile sensor networks, it is necessary
to formalize the mobility support mechanisms. In this chapter, we establish
the mobility support needed to ensure the speedy recovery of a mobile WSN
and analyze the impact of mobility on the recovery procedures developed in our
earlier work. We discuss mobility of member nodes and of AGs in the cluster
model, and also identify triggers for reclustering of the network based on loss of
connectedness due to mobility. The challenge is to provide mobility support to a
mobile WSN which produces the same recovery performance as a static WSN.
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We demonstrate the effectiveness of our recovery protocols on low-resourced
WSNs with up to 1000 nodes using the NS-2 simulation platform. We show
that our method successfully identifies those nodes with higher energy levels and
a greater number of neighbours than those of the average node in the network.
These nodes are then used as effective local data AGs in the recovery process.
In addition, our results indicate that the recovery protocols we have introduced
for mobile WSNs are as efficient for a mobile WSN as for a static WSN in pro-
ducing a connected set of AGs capable of maintaining communication with the
BS. Indeed, for networks in which most nodes are mobile at any time, our results
clearly indicate that the network is unable to recover from natural breakages of
the CDS due to motion. Furthermore, a mobile network under attack has no
chance of survival without mobility support.
In this chapter, we focus on, and compare, recovery in both static and mobile
WSNs after an attack has been detected. We assume that the network, compris-
ing a fixed BS and mobile sensor nodes, is low resourced but has the capability
to detect an attack on the nodes and determine which nodes have been compro-
mised (with high probability). Thus, we may assume that the BS can set target
operational levels for the WSN and determine what steps need to be taken to
return to these target levels.
Section 7.1 discusses a scenario of the traffic in Shanghai, China in which the
mobile WSNs are introduced. Section 7.2 gives a theoretical overview on the re-
covery protocols in mobile WSNs and introduces the mobility support developed
for both AGs and member nodes. Section 7.3 focuses on the impacts introduced
by mobility support in sensor networks. Section 7.4 provides the testing results
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with mobility support and presents the performance difference between the sta-
tionary and mobile WSNs. Section 7.5 provides the summary of this chapter.
7.1 A Motivating Scenario
Here we introduce a scenario which motivates the decisions and assumptions
made in setting up our mobile WSN. We assume that WSN nodes are distributed
on taxis in a large metropolitan centre (such as Shanghai as used in [LSL+08]).
There is a single BS residing in an office in the centre. All nodes are in range of
the BS, but the BS is not always in range of all nodes. The nodes collect data
about the state of the road (potholes and so forth) and the state of the traffic.
In order for this information to reach the BS, a hierarchical topology is used
by means of AG selection and cluster set-up. A CDS is required to ensure that
all data transmitted by the nodes reaches the BS. The CDS must be regularly
maintained, and, in order to prevent denial of service attacks, reprogramming and
reclustering messages sent between nodes and the BS must be authenticated.
Due to taxis travelling along streets at varying speeds, we represent this topo-
logically as a grid pattern in which waypoints (fixed points) are street corners at
which taxis can turn in one of four directions (at boundary points there may be
fewer than four options). We simplify the topology to a grid pattern in which all
vertical and horizontal travel segments between waypoints have the same length.
However, in application, these lengths may in fact vary and, consequently, we
lose no generality in also assuming a constant travel speed for nodes in our ex-
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periments.
In this scenario, the BS can support node mobility, and consequently also CDS
availability, by controlling the location of the taxis based on information sent to
it. It is, of course, in the best interests of the taxi service to ensure that taxis
are distributed across the domain in order to have the best response to customer
needs. In our experimental set-up, we therefore implement the random waypoint
mobility model [SBM05], which has been shown to spread nodes across a given
convex domain better than other mobility models.
A final point to be made here is that mobility of the nodes is provided by the
taxis themselves. There are many WSN mobility scenarios in which the nodes are
moved by other objects (the nodes reside on animals or people for example, or
are moved in a mine collapse by falling debris). Thus in measuring node energy,
we do not take into account any energy loss due to motion. The only energy loss
we consider is that due to data transmission.
7.2 Theoretical Overview
7.2.1 Assumptions
We follow the same approach as in [LDB10]. Our set-up comprises a single, secure
and trustworthy BS along with nodes capable of operating as either member nodes
or AGs. The WSN is clustered into groups of nodes each monitored by an AG.
An AG node stores identifying information about those nodes in its cluster. All
messages transmitted in the WSN identify the message source. Member nodes
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gather data which is then sent to AGs. AGs both gather data and aggregate
collected data before sending it to the BS. The BS analyses and stores data and
keeps logs of this process. We program the same reprogramming, reclustering
and hash function code into each node at set-up and so it does not have to be
transmitted during network operation.
We make four assumptions about our environment. Each is listed below and the
impact of each is discussed as needed throughout the chapter.
  We assume the existence of a globally unique ID for each sensor node.
The BS keeps track of all IDs and uses them to identify nodes which need
to be reprogrammed. Maintenance of a unique ID is necessary for general
WSN business and has no additional impact on resources required to deploy
the network for its essential business, thus, this assumption is natural.
  We assume that the BS shares with each WSN node a common secret not
known by any other node, which is allocated when the WSN is set up.
These secrets are used to implement authentication when messages are sent.
Unauthenticated reclustering and reprogramming messages could be used
in a denial of service attack.
  We assume that secrets are stored in a tamper-resistant section of the node
and that calculations involving it are executed in this tamper-proof section.
The use of a tamper-proof or secure area for storing secrets and executing
computations with them is a standard solution to key management. In
addition to keys, we pre-store all necessary code in this section of the mote.
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However, it is difficult to design and implement such a secure area on a
small device such as a mote.
  We assume that, at any time, some node is within range of the BS; however,
many nodes may not be in range of the BS.
The sensors are permitted to move around a convex area which we refer to
as the sensor domain.
7.2.2 Comparison on Recovery with Other Researchers
The requirements of the clustering algorithm to achieve complete connectedness
across the static network were based on the following target conditions identified
earlier in this thesis. Conditions T1 and T2 below were assumed for the static
WSN recovery situation described in [LDBS09]. Condition T3 was added for the
mobile TinyOS motes in [LBD09].
  T1. Each node be no more than two hops away from an AG,
  T2. The AG set be connected, enabling transmission of data along the AGs
to the BS, and
  T3. At least one AG be one hop away from the BS.
In Table 7.1, we summarize the major points of difference between the algorithms
developed in other papers and the one we present in this work. The features
appearing in the table were used in [16] for comparison. The properties studied
are the following:
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  Variable AG period: if nodes sometimes act as AGs and sometimes not.
  Conditions of AG election: the factors used in determining when a node is
eligible to be an AG.
  Capability: if all nodes are supplied with the same capabilities.
  Messaging complexity: the number of messages transmitted in order to
restore connectivity to the WSN.
  Non-messaging costs of connectivity restoration: costs to the network other
than messaging.
  Synchronization: If transmission needs to be synchronized for the restora-
tion process.
  Global information: whether a node requires information about the entire
network in order for the restoration protocol to succeed.
Protocols DARA, RIM and PCR use the mobility of the network as a solution.
Thus, the non-messaging cost is that mobility which is not part of the designated
mandate of the network, but which detracts from that mandate. In all three of
these cases, 1-hop or 1-and 2-hop neighbour information suffices to support the
protocol; this information includes the node ID and its location. In all three
protocols, information about cut-vertices in the graph of the network is required
(see Table 7.3). For example, in DARA, 2-hop neighbour information is used
to generate a breadth-first search spanning the network in order to locate cut-
vertices.
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In the other three protocols, the restoration costs are all associated with messag-
ing, and, except in [Bas99], that cost is the order of the number of nodes present
in the network. In the case of [Bas99], it is a function of the distance across
the domain covered by the network. The authors of [DW04] need at least 3-hop
neighbour information, and in some cases require global information, in order to
ensure that restoration occurs, while [Bas99] and the current paper only require
localized information about neighbours.
The DMAC protocol of Basagni [Bas99] satisfies T1 of our conditions above, but
does not satisfy T2 or T3. We argue that a WSN based on a protocol without
these conditions is susceptible to failure more quickly than is a WSN using a
protocol in which all three conditions hold. This is substantiated by Figures 7.17
and Figures 7.18 of Section 7.5.2, which indicate that in the absence of T2 and
T3, the number of nodes able to join a cluster diminishes rapidly as the speed of
the nodes increases, and also by Table 3 of the same section, which shows that
without T2 and T3, a CDS breaks more quickly.
Our proposed protocol has no associated costs other than that of messaging,
needs only 1- and 2-hop neighbour information at each node and does not require
synchronization to restore connectivity. We show that, in addition to T2 and T3,
a weakened version of T1 can still hold and provide support to the mobile case
that compares with support to a stationary network.
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7.2.3 Mobility Support for the Re-Clustering Algorithm
The clustering method applied in our WSN is the modified EMPR algorithm pro-
posed by the research team and detailed in the paper [LDBS09]. This algorithm
efficiently partitions a WSN with a flat topology into a hierarchical network con-
sisting of a set of clusters that are grouped with an AG. It can be shown that the
AGs chosen are connected among each other and thus form a CDS of network
nodes. The proposed method determines in a distributed, localized fashion a set
of AGs by firstly collecting 2-hop neighbourhood information in each node v of
the WSN, then selecting the AGs by iteratively searching for the best-suited set
of MPR, and finally associating member nodes to an appropriate AG.
The connectedness of the WSN to the BS in order to ensure regular operation
of the data sensing tasks is assured by the connectedness of all nodes through
the AGs. In addition, we aim for energy-efficiency by choosing AGs with high
battery energy levels.
We consider the impact of mobility after the clustering has been completed with
the target condition achieved. We firstly consider AG mobility.
In order to re-cluster the WSN, the BS retrieves the secrets Sn of each node n
and computes the hash function h(Sn⊗M⊗R)=cn, where M is the message to re-
cluster and R is a time stamp or random nonce which is used to avoid re-use of
the message in a denial-of-service attack. The BS then transmits cn with M and
R to the corresponding node n through the CDS formed by the AGs. Each node
n computes h(Sn⊗M⊗R) in its tamper-proof area to confirm that the message is
authentic. If there is a match AND if no such message with time R has been used
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Figure 7.1: The BS sends an authenticated reclustering command
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Figure 7.2: The network re-clusters
in a reclustering request earlier, n accepts this as a valid reclustering message.
In the process, the BS sends the messages to the corresponding nodes one by one,
each node needs to verify the hash and reply to this message. The BS then makes
sure it receives all the messages by checking the node ID and counting the number
of received message. Once all nodes have received and verified such a message,
reclustering commences. In order to select the AGs and thus determine the CDS,
each node starts sending 1-hop hello messages to their 1-hop neighbours. Any
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node receiving a 1-hop hello message from a neighbour then stores the sender ID
in its 1- hop neighbour table. Figure 7.1 presents how the BS sends authenticated
reclustering command in flow chart.
The process will be repeated three times to improve the number of the messages
the nodes receive from their neighbours so that the neighbour tables can be fully
established. Once the neighbour tables are established, nodes start exchanging
their 1-hop neighbour lists with 1-hop neighbours in order to establish a 2-hop
neighbour list. Based on the neighbour information and energy level, each node
can now compute its metric and hence its coverage set information and exchange
this information with neighbouring nodes. A node becomes an AG if the particu-
lar conditions are met. AGs then send the message ’I am AG’ to their neighbours.
Nodes which receive such a message become member nodes. This is described in
Figure 7.2.
7.2.4 Constructing CDS
We adopt Wu’s method [Wu03] of determining a CDS and, in order to support
resiliency requirement R2, employ both the battery energy level and the number
of neighbours of each node in deciding which should be AGs. Values associated
with each of these features are used to construct a metric M(v) used below.
This adaptation of Wu’s algorithm was presented in [LBD09] and is once again
presented below.
A 1-hop neighbour of a node v is a node within range of v. A 2-hop neighbour
of v is a node within range of a 1-hop neighbour of v.
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After collecting the neighbourhood information, each node v selects a set of MPR
that can be viewed as candidate AGs. This set comprises a small subset of nodes
C(v) from the 1-hop neighbour set N1(v) of node v that fully covers the 2- hop
neighbour set N2(v) of node v. A set S fully covers N2(v) if every node of N2(v)
is in range of some node of S. C(v) is thus also called the coverage set of node v,
and it can be shown that the C(v)∪v forms a CDS for N2(v).
The coverage set C(v) is obtained by executing the modified EMPR algorithm
[LBD09] which takes into account a known metric value M(v) associated with
each node v. M(v) is a function of the energy level of the node and of the number
of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours of the node. The higher each of these values is,
the greater the chance of the node being chosen as an AG. In our experiments,
each node is assigned the same initial energy level of 2500 units, as in practice,
we would assume that each deployed mote would start out at maximum energy.
We again adopt EMPR [Wu03] as the basis of our reclustering algorithm and
employ both the battery energy level and the number of neighbours of each node
in deciding which should be aggregators; values associated with each of these
features are used to construct the metric M(v) introduced below. Because our
mobile WSN requires 2-hop neighbour information, we must adapt the metric
used in the static case to this new situation. We also move from a real interval to
a set of integers to facilitate computations in NS-2, our experimental platform.
We therefore define M(v) for a node v to be a function of the energy level of the
node and of the number of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours of the node. The higher
each of these values is, the greater the chance of the node being chosen as an AG.
In our simulation experiments, each node is assigned the same initial energy level
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of 2500 units, as in practice, we would assume that each deployed node would
start out at maximum energy. In addition, as indicated in Section 1.3, we include
the BS as a node in the construction of the CDS in order to ensure that M3 holds.
The following Equation 7.1 is then used to calculate M(v) at any fixed time t:
M(v) = e(v)dmax + d(v)emax + ε(v) (7.1)
where
ε(v) = 2500− St(v) (7.2)
and St(v) is the energy expended by v between initialization of the network
and time t at which the metric is being calculated. Thus, ε(v) keeps track of
the remaining energy at v over time. The radio transceiver of a sensor node
is always in one of the three states; transmit, receive or idle. To simplify our
measurements, nodes in the idle state consume zero energy, nodes in the transmit
state consume 1 energy unit and nodes in the receive state consume 2.5 energy
units [YHE02]. Thus, setting our initial energy level at 2500 units ensures that we
can run reclustering a number of times before the energy of a node is expended.
After the MPR have been selected, each node broadcasts its coverage set C(v) to
its 1-hop neighbours at a random time instant in the next time interval. At this
point, A node v decides to act as a AG if
  it has a larger metric M(v) than all its 1-hop neighbours and has at least
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two non-1- hop neighbours, or
  it is in the coverage set formed by its neighbour with the largest metric M.
The set of all such AGs forms a CDS [Wu03], [WLD04] for the WSN. It is
important for the recovery protocols that at least one member of the CDS be
able to communicate directly with the BS; that is, the BS is within its range. If
this is not the case, one additional mote which can reach the BS is added to the
CDS. This additional mote is chosen to have maximum metric from among all
motes which can reach the BS. The CDS properties are still held by this new set.
7.2.5 Mobility of AGs
AG mobility will be a problem for the clustered network structure only if it leads
to a breaking of one or more of the target conditions. Conditions T2 and T3
are related to AGs and can be impacted by AG mobility. Condition T2 can be
violated as a result of AG mobility resulting in the breaking of the CDS formed
by the AGs. If the CDS is broken, then data from a cluster will not be able
to reach the BS. Hence, it is imperative that any disconnection of the CDS is
detected as early as possible.
For the purpose of detection of disconnection in the CDS, a simple solution is
to implement a ’keep alive’ mechanism that requires all AGs to periodically ex-
change a small beacon with the neighbouring AGs. The time period can be tuned
according to the level of relative mobility expected between nodes. Hence if rela-
tive mobility is high then the time period is small and vice versa. Using the keep
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Figure 7.3: An AG moves out of range of its neigbour AGs
alive mechanism, when one of the AGs leaves the CDS, its neighbours will be able
to detect the disconnection of the CDS and can report this to the BS through the
remaining AGs that will still have a connected path to the BS. Figure 7.3 displays
this situation; the AG in the dotted circle moves out of range of its neighbours
disconnecting itself and the AG feeding data into it from the CDS. The BS will
then be required to initiate networkwide reclustering procedures to establish a
new a set of AGs that satisfy CDS target requirements.
However, it is possible that conditions T2 and T3 are violated concurrently. This
can occur if the CDS of AGs chosen is at most one AG within one hop of the BS
(note that all nodes in the WSN are within the broadcast range of the BS). As
a result, even when the neighbours of the AG that has caused a disconnection of
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Figure 7.4: No AG is in range of the BS
the CDS are able to detect the violation of T2, the concurrent violation of T3
prevents them from reporting this to the BS to initiate reclustering procedures
as in Figure 7.4. Figure 7.4 shows that only the AG which was within range of
the BS has now moved out of range (the AG with the dotted circle) and, as a
consequence, the CDS can no longer function.
In Figure 7.4, the keep alive mechanism allows the neighbours of the AG to detect
the disconnection. However, since the neighbours are not within reach of the BS
they are unable to report the disconnection to the BS. Hence, it is proposed that
in mobile WSNs, target condition T3 be modified as below:
  M3. At least two AGs be one hop away from the BS.
This will ensure that a successful report of a disconnection of the CDS can be
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Figure 7.5: Checking for a broken CDS
communicated to the BS and reclustering procedures can be initiated as shown
in Figure 7.5.
In order to ensure that a broken CDS is detected, each AG sends ’alive’ beacon
messages periodically to the neighbouring AGs. An AG then compares the mes-
sages received from other AGs within its neighbourhood and determines if any
AG is missing. A missing AG is reported to the BS and once an AG has been
reported missing three times to the BS, the BS initiates reclustering.
7.2.6 Mobility of Member Nodes
We now consider mobility of the member nodes. A node that is within the
range of one cluster may as a result of its mobility, move out of the range of
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the cluster and move into the range of one or more clusters. This change in the
membership of clusters needs to be detected and can be done using simple keep
alive mechanisms as outlined earlier. To account for mobility it is required that
all nodes in the network send out periodic beacons to allow neighbours to detect
their connectedness within a cluster. The periodic beaconing can also serve the
purpose of allowing a member node that is moving out of the range of a cluster to
learn about other clusters that it can join. To ensure that the target conditions
are maintained as much as possible, it is proposed that nodes include in their
beacons hop count information with respect to distance from the AG. This will
allow a member node receiving beacons from multiple clusters to join the cluster
that gives it the least number of hops to an AG. It is easily observed that node
mobility will make the maintenance of target condition T1 almost impossible to
achieve during network operation. Hence, it is proposed that in mobile WSNs,
target condition T1 be relaxed during network operation to allow member nodes
to join clusters even if AGs are more than 2 hops away.
When a node joins a cluster, the one hop neighbour table of its parent node (i.e.,
a node that it is directly connected to) is updated and the information of the new
member node is propagated to the AG. It is sufficient to do this and not update all
neighbour tables in the entire cluster as it is only the AG that requires accurate
knowledge of the member nodes during network operation. When reclustering is
required, the neighbour tables can be updated as part of the neighbour discovery
phase of the reclustering algorithm for each node in the network. Hence mobility
does not impact on the reclustering process. However, we do assume that the
mobility of the nodes does not result in a change of the neighbour tables during
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Figure 7.6: A member node moves out of ranges of its cluster
the reclustering process.
Based on the above discussion the target conditions for a mobile WSN are:
  M1. Each node be on a hopping path to at least one AG,
  M2. The AG set be connected enabling transmission of data along the AGs
to the BS, and
  M3. At least two AGs be one hop away from the BS.
As nodes are mobile, these target conditions will be violated during network
operation. However, periodic reclustering can be done to ensure that target con-
ditions are maintained. The mobility of nodes generates this additional overhead
in terms of maintaining the target structure.
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If all the nodes are involved in determining whether an AG has moved out of the
CDS, the additional messaging will significantly increase network collisions and
be detrimental to WSN function. Therefore, we limit this determination to AGs.
Figure 7.3 describes the method.
7.3 Mobility Impact
7.3.1 Clustering and Re-Clustering
A major part of network resiliency deals with recovery after accidents or attacks.
In [LDB10], we introduced protocols to reprogram compromised nodes and to
re-cluster when routes between nodes and to the BS are broken or may become
broken.
By ensuring that the BS is always in range of at least one member of the CDS,
network operation is maintained while the recovery procedures of reclustering and
node reprogramming are carried out. Our experiments show that the proposed
approach is robust enough to minimise the impact of both AG and member node
mobility on the recovery process.
In using the NS-2 platform, we are unable to capture node data relevant to
the reprogramming and authentication protocols, whose times were measured on
hardware in [LDBS09]. We therefore focus on the reclustering component of the
recovery operation. The authenticated reclustering protocol used is in [LBD09].
In each case, a node with ID n contains secret Sn (shared with the BS), R
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represents a random value but in practice is the local time obtained from the
LocalTime.get() command in TinyOS, and M represents a message to reprogram
or recluster or a request that another node be reprogrammed. All messages
transmitted include node ID of both sender and receiver, including that of the
BS. A hash function check achieves authentication of a message. The two hash
functions SHA-1 [oST02] and Rabin [Rab79] were chosen and were both used in
each protocol to compare their performance.
7.3.2 Impact of Mobility on Re-Clustering, Reprogram-
ming and Authentication Procedures
The reprogramming and authentication procedures are not affected by node mo-
bility since both reprogramming and authentication are accomplished directly
between the BS and the AG and member nodes. This requires that the broad-
cast range of the BS be such that it can cover the entire network area. The
required broadcast range can be derived from the beacon ranges of the individual
nodes in the network. Since any node sending a beacon needs at least one other
node to be able to receive it, the worst case scenario is when all nodes in the
WSN are strung out in one line, each just a beacon range apart. Thus, if n is the
number of nodes in the WSN (excluding the BS), and r is the beacon range in
metres, r ∗ (n-1) metres is the largest distance that the nodes can be distributed
across while maintaining the ability to execute network protocols. This implies
that the BS range R must also cover this distance, and, allowing for some overlap
or malfunction, we enlarge the requirement to R ≥ r ∗ n.
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We have thus defined a network area within which nodes in the WSN are assumed
to move relative to the range of the BS. This is a reasonable assumption, as a
mobile network cannot move in an unrestrained fashion while still maintaining
protocol operation.
As long as all nodes are within the broadcast range of the BS and are connected
to an AG through one or more member nodes, reprogramming and authentication
can be carried out using similar techniques as in a stationary WSN. This condition
could be further relaxed to require that only the CDS set be within the range of
the BS and routing all BS to member nodes communication through the CDS set
of AGs. However, since the CDS set changes regularly, this would have a major
impact on the choice of new AGs in reclustering mode, and is not recommended.
The protocol descriptions for the mobile WSN are presented in the next section.
We note that the confirmation step in these procedures required the node to be
able to send a confirmation message to the BS. Hence, there is the requirement
that a reprogrammed node be able to send a message to the BS which it can
through its AG. However, a compromised AG can drop this confirmation. Hence,
in terms of recovery, accurate detection is imperative to ensure that if an AG
is compromised, the AG is reprogrammed first, followed by a reclustering of the
WSN which is then followed by reprogramming of any compromised nodes.
The reclustering algorithm can be affected by the mobility of nodes in that the
coverage set calculated at the end of the neighbour discovery phase can be in-
accurate as a result of node mobility during the reclustering process. It will be
infeasible to ensure that the coverage sets are accurate when nodes exhibit indi-
vidual mobility characteristics. However, as long as the relative mobility between
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nodes is such that it does not cause changes in the coverage set, the calculation of
the CDS of AGs is expected to be accurate. As noted earlier, since nodes exhibit
group mobility characteristics, we expect the relative mobility between nodes to
be such that any changes in the coverage set do not have a great impact on the
calculation of the CDS of AGs.
It is also possible that M3 is violated only two AGs connected to the BS are
simultaneously disconnected from the BS. We note that the scheme is robust
enough to handle this situation with the added requirement that the BS monitors
the ’keep alive’ messages from the AGs. Since the keep alive interval is relatively
small, a BS will be able to detect a disconnected CDS almost immediately and
then re-cluster.
To summarize the points of difference between the static and mobile cases, we
list the key features here:
Static
  1- and 2-hop neighbour information is gathered only once after a re-cluster.
  A compromised AG generates reclustering.
Mobile
  1-and 2-hop neighbour information is gathered regularly between re-clusters.
  Nodes keep track of hopping path distances from AGs (when available).
  The BS send keepalive messages regularly to its neighbour AGs.
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  Loss of contact between the BS and any AG node generates reclustering.
  Theorem 1: under the proposed mobility support protocol, M1, M2 and
M3 hold.
  Proof: When reclustering takes place, each node updates its 1- and 2-hop
neighbour tables. Wu [Wu03] proved that a set of nodes satisfying two
conditions listed in Section 3.2.2.3 forms a CDS; that is, the set of AGs
constructed forms a communication path of 1-hop neighbours and every
node is either an AG or a 1-hop neighbour of an AG. In this case, both M1
and M2 are satisfied. Because we have allocated the BS the highest metric
in connection with Equation 7.1, the BS is part of the CDS and so one hop
away from some AG node. Thus, M3 is satisfied.
While the network moves, paths between nodes may change. When it gathers
new table information, a node may recognize that it no longer has an AG in its 1-
or 2-hop neighbour table. It continues to transmit however, and its messages are
carried along any existing path to an AG and hence to the BS. The BS fails to
receive messages from a node if that node is a member node that can no longer
connect to the CDS or if that node is an AG which has become disconnected from
the CDS. In either of these cases, the BS recognizes the situation and initiates
reclustering in order to establish a new CDS. Hence, M1, M2 and M3 hold.
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7.3.3 The Impact of Mobility on Recovery Procedures
In this section, we present an analysis on the impact of mobility on the recovery
procedures developed in the first few chapters. We assume a single, secure BS
along with nodes capable of operating as either member nodes or AGs. The
WSN is clustered into groups of nodes each monitored by an AG. The AG stores
identifying information about those nodes in its cluster. All messages transmitted
in the WSN identify the message source. Member nodes gather data which is then
sent to AGs. AGs both gather data and aggregate collected data before sending
it to the BS. The BS analyses and stores data and keeps logs of this process.
Thus, the goals of the network are to:
  Collect data of several pre-specified types from member nodes and AGs.
  Collate this data via the AGs which then transmit to the BS.
  The BS analyses and stores data, logs network functions and activities and
transmits this information regularly to a location beyond the network.
In our architecture, the following components are used to assist in achieving
recovery:
  Several algorithms for logical clustering of the network, each playing an
important role under certain specified conditions.
  All nodes able to take on the role of member nodes or AGs depending on
the clustering algorithm applied.
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  A decision-making process in the network which correctly identifies those
nodes which have been compromised.
  A decision-making process in the network which determines what action to
take with compromised nodes.
  A reprogramming mechanism enabling the network to reprogram compro-
mised nodes.
7.4 Mobile WSN Protocol Description
7.4.1 Mobile Reprogramming Protocol from the BS to a
Compromised Node
  BS XORs the secret Sn, the reprogramming message M and the local time
R to obtain Sn⊗M⊗R = m.
  BS computes h(m) = c.
  BS transmits c, M and R through the CDS of the AGs which are then
received by n.
  Node n re-computes h(Sn⊗M⊗R) in its tamper-proof section, and checks
that it is c.
  If the check is ’true’ AND time R has not been used in an earlier repro-
gramming request, the node initiates reprogramming procedures.
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  The node confirms that it has reprogrammed to the BS by computing
h(Sn⊗M) = c’ and sending c’ to the BS through the CDS formed by the
AGs.
7.4.2 Mobile Reprogramming Protocol from an AG to the
BS on Behalf of a Compromised Node
  The AG retrieves the ID n of the node to be reprogrammed.
  The AG computes h(n⊗SA⊗M⊗R) = c in its tamper-proof section.
  The AG transmits c, n, M and R to the BS through the CDS of AGs.
  The BS retrieves SA, re-computes the hash and checks if it is c.
  If the check is ’true’ AND the time R has not been used in a reprogramming
request earlier, BS initiates Protocol 7.4.1.
7.4.3 Mobile Re-Clustering Protocol from the BS to the
Network
  The BS retrieves the secrets S1, Sc of each node and for each node ID n,
and computes h(Sn⊗M⊗R)=cn.
  The BS then transmits cn with M and R to the corresponding node n
through the CDS of AGs.
  Each node n computes h(Sn⊗M⊗R) in its tamper-proof area to confirm
that the message is authentic.
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  If there is a match AND if no such message with time R has been used in an
earlier reclustering request, n accepts this as a valid reclustering message.
  Once all nodes have received and verified such a message, reclustering com-
mences.
The proposed approach to handle mobility and its impact on the recovery proce-
dure is simple and with the introduction of the keep alive mechanism, can ensure
that the target goals of the recovery process are achieved. We recall that the
target goals are:
  R1. Restore the network functions to a target level established by the BS.
  R2. Maintain the network for as long as possible.
By ensuring that the CDS is connected as far as possible, network operation is
maintained while the recovery procedures of reclustering and node reprogram-
ming are carried out. The proposed approach is robust enough to minimise the
impact of both AG and member node mobility on the recovery process.
7.5 Experiments and Evaluation
In this section, we describe our experimental results. In previous work, our re-
covery algorithms were implemented on TelosB motes and we summarize that
implementation briefly. We then describe in detail the simulation implementa-
tion.
CHAPTER 7. MOBILITY SUPPORT ON RECOVERY 149
7.5.1 TelosB Experiments
The TelosB testbed involved a sensor network of up to 20 nodes deployed within
one building. Initial tests showed that the range of these devices varied from 25m
to 40m in indoor and outdoor environments respectively. The network was de-
ployed with a flat structure including one BS node and multiple sensors connected
through multihop paths to the BS. Once clustering was completed, the network
was organised into a hierarchical architecture with a BS, AGs and member nodes.
We tested our recovery protocols on TinyOS Version 2.1 using the Crossbow
TelosB research mote as our experimental testbed platform as described in [LDBS09],
[LBD09] and [LDB10]. More than 2000 lines of code were written to implement
the reclustering. The program was installed on the TelosB motes an the recluster-
ing protocol was triggered by the BS sending a ’start’ command. This solved the
time synchronization issue and ensured the nodes all started at the same time.
We tested using 10, 15, 20 stationary motes and then the same number of mobile
motes, in order to demonstrate the time differences between the two cases. In our
experiments, up to 20 sensor nodes were located on a regular grid of 10 (5x2), 15
(5x3), and 20 (5x4) uniformly at 2 metres apart in both dimensional directions
in a rectangular area of 10 metres by 8 metres. Each node had a radio power
range of 2.5 meters and so, in the initial set-up, was within range of several nodes
in the grid. In the mobile case, we moved the sensors using the waypoint model
discussed in the previous section, with at most 10% of the nodes in motion at any
time, with each node having an opportunity to move. Since there were no com-
plex routing requirements, broadcasting was used to transmit the messages and
CHAPTER 7. MOBILITY SUPPORT ON RECOVERY 150
no routing table was maintained during the reclustering process. Two neighbour
tables were created to store 1-hop and 2-hop neighbour list.
In the mobile case, motes were mounted on top of remote-controlled toy car
models. As the code remained constant in both situations, there was no difference
in RAM or ROM size between the stationary and mobile scenarios. Different
motes were chosen to start moving in each experiment. When in motion, nodes
moved towards waypoints at an average velocity of 0.5 metres per sec. When
a waypoint was reached, the mote stopped for a short interval of between 0.5
and 3 secs in order to determine its next direction before moving on to the next
randomly chosen waypoint. Mote direction was based on the grid pattern. Motes
moved towards nearest waypoints up to 2 metres away. This allowed up to 4
directions of movement for a given mote and randomness was introduced by
blind choice of one of 4 counters indicating the next move. If the move chosen
was not possible (as for a mote on a side of the grid for instance), it was discarded
and a second choice made.
For reclustering, we applied the random waypoint model and ran twenty tests.
Several nodes were in motion at any time when authentication was used but all
nodes were left stationary when the reclustering process started in order to ensure
a correct neighbour table. The results can be found in [LDB10].
For Protocols 7.4.1 and 7.4.2, we used a rectangular area of 10 metres by 8 metres
with, as an initial set-up, 20 sensor nodes distributed in a grid pattern inside it
uniformly at 2 metres apart in both dimensional directions. We moved the sensors
using the waypoint model discussed previously. Waypoints were established in
a uniform grid pattern along and within the boundary of the area at 2 metre
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Figure 7.7: 20-node grid topology for the experiments of Protocols 7.4.1 and 7.4.2
Figure 7.8: 10-node grid topology for the experiments of Protocol 7.4.3
intervals in both dimensional directions.
Each node had a radio power range of 2.5 meters and so, in the initial set-up,
was within range of several nodes in the grid. Nodes were moved by sitting them
on top of remote-controlled toy car models. Due to frequency interference, we
were able to move at most, two cars at any given time. When in motion, nodes
moved towards waypoints at an average velocity of 0.5 metres per sec.
Testing this set-up for each protocol twenty times resulted in an average CDS
size of 4 AGs. The smallest CDS achieved was 3; the largest was 6.
For Protocol 7.4.3, we have three different set-ups for using a set of 10, 15 and 20
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Figure 7.9: 15-node grid topology for the experiments of Protocol 7.4.3
Execution Time
for Authentica-
tion (secs)
Execution Time
for Reclustering
(secs)
Total Pro-
gram Size
(bytes)
Primitives Stationary
WSNs
Mobile
WSNs
Stationary
WSNs
Mobile
WSNs
RAM ROM
10 Nodes 58.13 63.23 87.67 87.63 9904 46118
15 Nodes 79.20 85.37 87.79 87.82 9904 46118
20 Nodes 93.46 99.58 87.21 87.57 9904 46118
Table 7.2: Comparative performance of Rabin authentication and reclustering
from BS to network
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TelosB nodes. As described for Protocols 7.4.1 and 7.4.2, we used a rectangular
area of 10 metres by 4 metres for 10 nodes, and 10 metres for 15 node networks
respectively. 18 and 24 waypoints were marked as shown in Figure 7.8 and
Figure 7.9.
In each run of the experiments, we started with different motes on the grid as
our mobile nodes. The mobile nodes moved over all the waypoints at least one
time on the grid. When the waypoint was reached, the node stopped and stayed
for a randomly chosen time between 0 seconds and 3 seconds. Then it randomly
chose another waypoint and began to move again.
We expected additional resource costs in the mobile case compared to the static
case. Indeed, the additional percentage performance for the mobile case over the
stationary case was 8.77 with 10 nodes, 7.79 with 15 nodes and 6.55 with 20
nodes as shown in Table 7.2. For 10 nodes an average, CDS had a size of 5 AGs;
the smallest CDS achieved was 4 and the largest was 5. For 15 nodes an average
CDS was the size of 6 AGs; the smallest CDS achieved was 5 and the largest
was 7. For 20 nodes an average CDS was the size of 6 AGs; the smallest CDS
achieved was 5 and the largest was 8.
All experiments related to mobility produced results slightly slower than in the
stationary case. The cost of reprogramming mobile motes was no more than an
additional 25% additional to that of reprogramming static motes. The percentage
increase relative to reclustering was at most 9% [LDB10]. All in all, the results
in the mobile case remain acceptably close to those in the stationary situation.
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7.5.2 Simulation Experiments
To extend the physical results, we ran our modified EMPR Algorithm on the NS-
2 simulation platform [NS-], the most popular network simulator, in order to test
the performance of the reclustering methods with respect to fast recovery from
security attacks, while at the same time maintaining reasonable battery energy
levels.
We run every experiment for at least 30 times to ensure the reliability and con-
sistency of the design of our protocols.
In this algorithm, the choice of AG is based on the value of M(v), which is a
function of the energy level of the node and of the number of 1-hop neighbours
of the node. We assessed the performance of our method by measuring and
comparing the following performance metrics both in physical and simulated
environments:
  Average battery energy level of all WSN AGs.
  Average battery energy level of all WSN member nodes.
If our algorithm was working well, we expected that the AGs chosen would have
a higher value of M(v) than those of their member nodes.
In addition, we recorded the number of AGs elected by the algorithm. The
expected number of AGs for a given network varies with the number of nodes in
the network as shown through simulations in [Wu03], and we expected that this
variation was represented by linear growth.
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In our simulation tests, waypoints were established in a uniform grid pattern along
and within the boundary of the area at 30 metre intervals in both dimensional
directions in general, waypoints might be distributed in any uniform configuration
across the sensor domain. The random waypoint mobility model was generated
by executing the ’setdest’ (set destination) command in the NS-2 environment.
The mobile nodes were set to move at varied speeds in each experimental scenario.
Nodes moved according to the random waypoint model with a speed of 2-3 m/s,
3-5 m/s or 5- 10 m/s and a stop period of 2 sec or 5 sec. The destination and
direction of nodes were chosen randomly and independently of other nodes. The
nodes started moving after AGs were elected and stopped when the simulation
was finished. We deployed the nodes in a grid formation within a 700 x 700
metre area with the mobile network size ranging from 100 nodes to 1000 nodes
(deployed in 10 nodes x 10 nodes, 10 nodes x 20 nodes, 15 nodes x 20 nodes, 20
nodes x 20 nodes, 20 nodes x 25 nodes, 24 nodes x 25 nodes, 25 nodes x 28 nodes,
20 nodes x 40 nodes, 30 nodes x 30 nodes and 25 nodes x 40 nodes respectively).
Each node had a radio power range of 40 meters and so, in the initial set-up,
was within range of several nodes in the grid. In each deployment, the simulation
experiment started when the nodes ran the protocols and ended within 30 minutes
of the simulation time. Reclustering was triggered when the CDS was broken and
the BS initiated the reclustering after it received confirmation that the CDS was
broken.
[CM09], compared several routing protocols for mobile networks using parameters
such as speed of node movement and length of stopping times. They indicated
that the standard flooding protocol does particularly bad in terms of packet loss
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as the speed of the nodes increase. This would have an adverse impact on the
ability of the WSN to elect a CDS. We were therefore interested in seeing how
CDS selection was affected by speed in our protocol as well as by the percentage
of nodes which were mobile at any time.
Figure 7.10: Number of AGs chosen: The static case and the mobile cases with
20% of the nodes mobile with a 2 sec pause at waypoints
Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 show the average number of AGs selected in a sensor
network with 20% of nodes mobile and 2 secs pause time at waypoints and 5 secs
pause time at waypoints respectively. Network size varies from 100 to 1000 nodes
and speeds vary through 0m/sec (the static case), 2-3 m/sec, 3-5 m/sec and 5-
10m/sec. Each case was tested 20 times and the average taken. While in both
graphs the static case produces marginally more AGs than any of the mobile
cases, there is no significant difference between the results from the different
speeds or the different stopping times at waypoints.
Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13 show the average number of AGs selected in a sensor
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Figure 7.11: Number of AGs chosen: The static case and the mobile cases with
20% of the nodes mobile with a 5 sec pause at waypoints
network with 40% of nodes mobile and 2 secs pause time at waypoints and 5
secs pause time at waypoints respectively. Network size varies from 100 to 1000
nodes and speeds vary through 0m/sec (the static case), 2-3 m/sec, 3-5 m/sec
and 5-10m/sec. Each case was tested 20 times and the average taken. Again,
while in both graphs the static case produces marginally more AGs than any
of the mobile cases, there is no significant difference between the results from
the different speeds or the different stopping times at waypoints. These results
compare well with the conclusions of [CM09].
Finally, to test the protocols when a majority of nodes are mobile, we tested
the case with 80% of the network in motion. Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15 show
the average number of AGs selected in a sensor network with 80% of nodes
mobile and 2 secs pause time at waypoints and 5 secs pause time at waypoints
respectively. Network size varies from 100 to 1000 nodes and speeds vary through
0m/sec (the static case), 2-3 m/sec, 3-5 m/sec and 5-10m/sec. Each case was
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Figure 7.12: Number of AGs chosen: The static case and the mobile cases with
40% of the nodes mobile with a 2 sec pause at waypoints
Figure 7.13: Number of AGs chosen: The static case and the mobile cases with
40% of the nodes mobile with a 5 sec pause at waypoints
tested 20 times and the average taken. Again, while in both graphs the static case
produces marginally more AGs than any of the mobile cases, there is no significant
difference between the results from the different speeds or the different stopping
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times.
Figure 7.14: Number of AGs chosen: The static case and the mobile cases with
80% of the nodes mobile with a 2 sec pause at waypoints
The 80% mobility case is close to a worst case scenario in any deployment, such
as the taxi scenario described in Section 7.2. At any given time, some of the taxis
would be stationary with drivers waiting for passengers or taking a rest break.
In mobile deployments the task of isolating compromised nodes by localizing to a
specific cluster is challenging. To effectively do so in mobile deployments, efficient
mobility support that can enable fast recovery is essential. An important require-
ment for this in our approach is CDS maintenance. It therefore, is imperative
that the performance of the reclustering algorithm is not negatively impacted by
node mobility and the speed of node movement.
From the results presented in Figure 7.10 to Figure 7.15, we observe that the
mobility support procedures are efficient and ensure that performance of the
reclustering algorithm is not degraded as a result of node mobility. We observe
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Figure 7.15: Number of AGs chosen: The static case and the mobile cases with
80% of the nodes mobile with a 5 sec pause at waypoints
that the number of AGs elected (i.e., clusters established) in the mobile case,
compares well with the static case, which is the benchmark. This shows that
the impact of node mobility is minimized on the clustering algorithm and it
performs as well as in the static case. We also observe that the performance of
the reclustering algorithm is not impacted by the speed of node mobility. In low
mobility deployments (2m/sec) and in high mobility deployments (10m/sec), the
performance of the reclustering algorithm again compares well with the static
case once again being the benchmark.
Further, from Figure 7.16 we observe that the metric of the CDS is always higher
than that of the full network. This proves that the choice of AGs by the recluster-
ing algorithm proceeds in an energy-efficient fashion. This also has the advantage
of reducing the occurrence of CDS breakage as a result of energy exhaustion in
AGs, thereby reducing the need for excessive triggering of reclustering procedures.
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Figure 7.16: Comparative metrics of CDS and network on 1000 nodes
The results presented prove the scalability of the proposed scheme both in terms
of the proportion of mobile nodes in the network and the size of the network.
We observe that the proportion of nodes required for the CDS is independent of
network size and is approximately 20-25% of nodes deployed. It is also observed
that the proportion of mobile nodes has a negligible impact on the size of the
CDS.
These observations show that the proposed mobility support procedures are effi-
cient to enable fast recovery in mobile network deployments.
The final experimental work in this section demonstrates the fact that the mo-
bility support infrastructure proposed in this chapter is significantly superior to
the basic mobility model without it. In order to demonstrate the impact of our
mobility support on the recovery methodology, we ran the same code as described
in this section but with conditions M1, M2 and M3 replaced by T1, T2 and T3,
thus defaulting to the typical static case. The experiments were established in
the same way as with the mobility model, running each size network 20 times for
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30 minutes and determining the number of nodes left out of the cluster arrange-
ments. We did this for node speeds of 2-3 m/sec, 3-5m/sec and 5-10m/sec, and
also for the two different pause times of 2 secs and 5 secs. The results are shown
in Figure 7.17 and Figure 7.18.
Figure 7.17: Percentage of nodes included in a cluster in mobile WSN without
mobility support and with a 2 sec pause
With the mobile support, we achieved 100% coverage of nodes, that is, each node
in the network was included in some cluster after each reclustering. The constant
line on the top of each figure indicates this situation. As the speed increases,
the loss of mobility support results in an increasing number of nodes left outside
clusters in the recovery process. In the case where 80% of the network is mobile,
the WSN is essentially not functioning and would be considered ’dead’.
With mobility support, a break in the CDS is detected and reclustering is trig-
gered to reconfigure the CDS. Without mobility support, a CDS break goes unde-
tected and hence both network function and the recovery process fail. Thus, we
measured the times at which the CDS broke when there was no mobility support.
The results are shown in Table 7.3.
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Figure 7.18: Percentage of nodes included in a cluster in a mobile WSN without
mobility support and with a 5 sec pause
As expected, in each case, an increase in speed produces an earlier CDS breakage.
An increase in the percentage of nodes which are mobile produces a similar result.
However, increasing the pause time, which gives nodes a greater opportunity for
assembling neighbour tables correctly, slows down CDS breakage. In Table 7.3,
we ran each experiment 20 times and averaged the results for each case.
7.6 Resource Needed to Implement Our Proto-
col
In determining the efficiency of our approach, we note that restoring communica-
tion connectivity is based only on messaging between nodes and so determining
the number of messages in a single re-cluster operation is a suitable measure of
the cost to the network.
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200 Mobile
Nodes
400 Mobile
Nodes
800 Mobile
Nodes
2-3 m/s
with 2s Pause
1’44 1’37 1’28
3-5 m/s
with 2s Pause
1’36 1’28 1’21
5-10 m/s
with 2s Pause
1’24 1’21 1’12
2-3 m/s
with 5s Pause
2’04 1’56 1’41
3-5 m/s
with 5s Pause
1’53 1’48 1’34
5-10 m/s
with 5s Pause
1’30 1’24 1’20
Table 7.3: Times of first CDS break in mobile WSN without mobility support
To this effect, we state and prove the following.
  Theorem 2: the WSN mobility support protocol described in Section 7.2.3
restores connectivity of a broken communication in the WSN with message
complexity O(N) where N is the total number of nodes.
  Proof: the fact that the mobility support protocol restores connectivity
follows from Wu [Wu03] as explained in the proof of Theorem 1. In order
to determine the message complexity, we count the number of messages
needed to re-cluster as indicated in the protocol:
1. Each node sends one message in order to establish a 1-hop neighbour table
(N messages).
2. Each node sends one message in order to establish a 2-hop neighbour table
(N).
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3. Each node sends one message in order to establish a metric table (N).
4. Each node sends one message in order to establish a coverage set table (N).
5. Each potential aggregator sends one message of invitation (between N/2
and N).
6. Each node accepts one offer (N minus the number used in 5). This step is
optional.
In total, there are approximately 5N messages, and so the total message com-
plexity is O(N).
  Corollary: If N is the total number of nodes in the WSN, then 5N messages
is the maximum number needed in order to re-cluster the network.
  Proof: this computation was made in the proof of the Theorem.
In our protocol, there is no other type of cost in restoring connectivity. However,
as described in Table 7.1, there are also non-messaging costs associated with some
protocols. The papers [KAU10], [MYA10] and [IYSH10] share similarities with
our work in that their aim is reconnection of a broken communication path in a
mobile WSN. In both their work and ours, a metric is integrated into the recovery
procedure in order to assist in reducing the cost, in terms of energy used, to the
network. The major distinction between our work and theirs is that in all three of
these papers, nodes are moved into position to cover a break in communication,
whereas our solution is to logically re-organize the network. In comparing cost,
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we consider the number of messages sent between nodes as both solutions rely on
this. For our work, this is the entire solution; for theirs, we must add the actual
cost of node movement.
The paper [MYA10] compares its protocol RIM with those in [KAU10] and
demonstrates the superiority of RIM both in terms of number of messages used
and number of nodes and total distance moved. The paper [IYSH10] introduces
the protocol PCR which the authors then show is superior to RIM in terms of all
three of the above-mentioned criteria. In this paper, the authors note that, when
a node fails, the RIM protocol moves all the 1Chop neighbours towards it until
they become connected. In contrast, PCR only moves non-critical nodes to avoid
cascaded relocations; cascaded relocations are invoked only when non-critical
nodes are not available. These authors also argue that as the communication
range grows, RIM runs the risk of moving most of the WSN towards the failed
node and so leaving the network periphery uncovered.
All three papers, ours, [IYSH10] and [MYA10] make use of a keepalive mechanism
to detect a failed node.(see Section 7.2.4). The last two papers do not include
these messages in the determination of the total message count for re-connectivity;
thus, neither do we. Theorem 5 of [MYA10] indicates that, like us, the complexity
of message use is O(N) where N is the size of the network.
In Table 7.4, we list the attributes of the AG nodes needed in the three papers
in order to accomplish communication re-connection.
Table 7.4 indicates the high cost of using mobility as a solution to broken com-
munication. We point out that in situations where motion is not controllable,
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such as nodes falling or moving in a collapsing mine shaft, or in an earthquake,
the solutions of [MYA10], [IYSH10] and [AAA09] are untenable. In situations
where motion is necessary for the deployment task, such as gathering information
as taxis cover the city, or collecting information about migratory patterns where
motes are attached to birds, moving the nodes deliberately to fill communication
gaps is not an option. Thus, our solution is not only significantly less expensive,
but also more useful in a much wider range of situations.
7.7 Summary
A stationary WSN under attack can be supported by recovery mechanisms which
are built on the regularity and stability of the reporting platform. However, many
WSNs are deployed in situations which require their mobility and so lose the
underlying stability which assists in maintaining message connectivity. A number
of recent papers have dealt with this problem by leveraging the mobility itself and
enabling nodes to move into communication holes in order to restore connections;
however, to implement this solution, the nodes must be well-resourced and be able
to move independently, which is not the case in all WSNs. In addition, there are
many situations in which motion is an integral part of the deployment and cannot
be re-allocate to form a solution.
In this chapter, we present a mobility support mechanism for mobile WSNs based
only on node messaging, which is designed to restore communication connectivity.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of this mobility support, we simulate
a mobile environment with up to 1000 nodes. In this setting, we show that our
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mobility support is more suitable in a low-resource environment than current
state-of-the-art methods. We also demonstrate that it is as efficient for a mobile
WSN as for a static WSN in maintaining communication throughout the network
and, consequently, in restoring communication in the WSN.
In comparing our work with that of authors who have used mobility as the solu-
tion for re-connecting a broken network, we argue that that solution has several
drawbacks that make it impractical in many situations. In addition, we argue
that our solution is significantly less expensive than theirs and so more appropri-
ate in supporting low resourced WSN.
The next chapter summarizes the body of work presented in Chapters 3 to 7,
and also provides a comparison with the work of other researchers on recovery
in sensor networks. A new recovery standard is also proposed in Chapter 8 for
future reference.
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The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein
Chapter 8
Recovery Standards
8.1 Background
In this chapter we provide general recovery standards which can certainly be used
in the sensor networks.
8.2 System Assumptions - A Review
As described in previous chapters, we assume a single, secure BS along with
nodes capable of operating as either member nodes or AGs. The requirements
for enabling a fast recovery scenario are:
  The BS is capable of determining when a node needs reprogramming.
  The BS is capable of reprogramming specific nodes in the WSN in an au-
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thenticated manner.
  The BS is capable of determining when the WSN needs to re-cluster.
  The BS is capable of initiating authenticated reclustering.
  AGs are capable of determining when a member node needs reprogramming.
  AGs are capable of initiating an authenticated member node reprogram-
ming request to the BS.
The WSN is initially clustered by the BS into groups of nodes each monitored by
an aggregator as shown in Figure 3.1.
We chose to use MicaZ and TelosB sensor nodes for implementation as both are
supported by open source TinyOS [WC06]. Both are IEEE 802.15.4 compliant,
a standard in implementing security protocols on motes, while the former is
also ZigBee compliant. 802.15.4 defines the physical and MAC layers, whereas
ZigBee defines the network and application layers. Long battery life, low cost,
small footprint and mesh networking in supporting communication between large
numbers of devices have driven the specifications for 802.15.4 and ZigBee.
As shown in Table 8.1, the MicaZ processor has a 4 MHz 8-bit Atmel AT-
MEGA103 CPU which consumes 5.5 mA (at 3 volts) when active, and about
0.06 mA when sleeping. The radio is a 916 MHz low-power radio from RFM,
delivering up to 40 Kbps bandwidth on a single shared channel with a range of
up to a few dozen meters. The RFM radio consumes 4.8 mA (at 3 volts) in
receive mode, up to 12 mA in transmit mode, and 5A in sleep mode.
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MicaZ TelosB
CPU
4 MHz 8-bit
Atmel ATMEGA103
8 MHz
TI MSP430
Radio 916 MHz
2400 MHz
to 2483 MHz
Bandwidth 40 Kbps 250 Kbps
CPU Energy
Consumption
in Active Mode
5.5 mA 1.8 mA
CPU Energy
Consumption
in Sleep Mode
0.06 mA 5.1 uA
RFM Energy
Consumption
in Receive Mode
4.8 mA 4.8 mA
RFM Energy
Consumption
in Transmit Mode
12 mA 12 mA
RFM Energy
Consumption
in Sleep Mode
5 uA 5 uA
Table 8.1: Specification comparison of MicaZ and TelosB
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TelosB has an 8 MHz TI MSP430 microcontroller processor with 16 KB of in-
struction memory. The CPU consumes 1.8 mA (at 3 volts) when active, and
5.1uA power when sleeping. The radio is a 2400 MHz to 2483 MHz globally
compatible ISM band, delivering up to 250 Kbps of bandwidth on a single shared
channel and with a range of up to a few dozen meters. The RFM radio consumes
4.8 mA (at 3 volts) in receive mode, up to 12 mA in transmit mode, and 5A in
sleep mode.
The main parameters of both motes can be seen in Table 6.4. MicaZ only sup-
ports 32 bit computation while the 16 bit processor of TelosB supports 64 bit
computation.
8.3 Summary of the Needed Protocols - Sta-
tionary Case
In [LDBS09] and [LBD09], we presented protocols for reprogramming, recluster-
ing and authentication as part of the recovery process in a WSN. We assume that
the WSN is structured hierarchically with component roles as follows:
  Member node - senses and transmits data.
  AG - controls member nodes and senses, collects, aggregates, analyses and
transmits data.
  BS - controls the system and collects, analyses, transmits and stores data.
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As explained in detail in the research mentioned, to optimize the recovery process,
we propose to retain connectivity and maximize flexibility in the network by
allowing each node to play the role of either a member node or AG as appropriate
under the conditions arising, and also at the same time, for the entire network
to efficiently re-organize itself in order to remain connected. Authentication is
implemented both in reclustering and reprogramming in order to avoid several
typical attacks.
Each node v broadcasts a HELLO message at a random time instant within a
fixed time interval. Each message carries the ID of the transmitting node v, the
IDs of all currently known 1-hop neighbours of v, and the metric values M that
characterize the capabilities of the node v and its neighbours to act as an AG.
The metric M(v) of node v is defined in Equation 8.1 as
M(v) = a
e(v)
emax
+ (1− a) d(v)
dmax
, a ∈ [0, 1] (8.1)
where e is the available battery energy of the node and emax its maximum value,
d is the node degree that should not exceed a pre-defined value dmax, and a is
a pre-defined weighting parameter. The key parameters e and d are chosen to
maximize WSN energy and connectivity respectively.
  Re-Clustering
A node v decides to act as a AG if it has never been compromised, and
1. it has a larger metric M(v) than all its 1-hop neighbours and has at
least two unconnected neighbours, or if
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2. it is in the coverage set formed by its neighbour with the largest metric
M.
  Reprogramming
Deluge is a reliable data dissemination protocol for large objects, such as
program binaries. Together with a boot-loader, Deluge provides a way to
reprogram sensor motes in a network. Since Deluge only supports network-
wide reprogramming, we modified the dissemination engine of the proto-
col to individually address sensor nodes. This was done by replacing the
AM BROADCAST ADDR parameter in the engine with the node ID of the
node to be recovered. For reprogramming, we assume that each node in the
WSN is within range of the BS, while the converse is not necessarily the
case. This is a much stronger assumption than that needed for reclustering.
  Authentication
In each case, a node with ID n contains secret Sn, known only to itself
and the BS. R represents a random value (but is in fact the local time
obtained from the LocalTime.get() command in TinyOS), M represents a
message to reprogram or recluster or a request that another node needs to
be reprogrammed. H represents a hash function and we assume that n,
M and R are the appropriate size for input to H. All message requests to
reprogram or to re-cluster between nodes and nodes, or between the BS and
nodes, include the node ID of both sender and receiver and a hash of data
including the secrets known only to the sender and BS, and of the current
value for R. This ensures the authenticity of the content and its sender, and
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prevents resending of legitimate messages at a later time by an attacker.
For comparison purposes, we chose two hash functions in implementing
the authentication protocol. SHA-1 was chosen as it is used in many
government standards. Our second choice was the Rabin encryption sys-
tem [Rab79] adapted for use as a hash function as proposed by Shamir in
[Sha08a]. While Shamir suggests an adaptation of Rabin’s scheme to what
he calls SQUASH, our implementation is constrained by TinyOS require-
ments and therefore, we use smaller values than those proposed to ensure
the security of SQUASH. Such smaller values do not warrant use of the im-
proved SQUASH computations, and so we use Rabin’s scheme as proposed
in [Rab79]. The details can be found in [LBD09].
We make the assumption that keys are stored in a tamper resistant location
and that an attacker is unable to retrieve them.
8.4 The Integrated Recovery Protocol - Modi-
fied EMPR and Reprogramming with Au-
thentication
Given a WSN deployed in an environment in which the protocols of Chapter 7
are activated, the following procedures are followed as needed:
1. The BS determines, from information collected from the network, that re-
programming is required and initiates an authenticated reprogramming pro-
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tocol.
2. The BS determines, from information collected from the network, that
reclustering is required and initiates an authenticated reclustering proto-
col.
3. The BS determines that the data being received from the network has dete-
riorated below a pre-determined quality target and that neither reprogram-
ming nor reclustering improves this target. The BS shuts down operation.
8.5 Implementation Issues
In this section, we describe our integrated recovery protocol and the technical
issues involved with the integration. This discussion should assist other imple-
menters of WSNs with some of their decisions.
  Re-Clustering
We found that the hardware of our two platforms had an impact on program
size after compilation. For the MicaZ platform, the reclustering algorithm
requires about 126KB of RAM making it impossible to run due to the 4KB
RAM limitation. However, TelosB consumes only 9.87KB after success-
ful compilation of reclustering and so can comfortably accommodate the
reclustering algorithm within the 10KB of RAM available.
  Reprogramming
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, we needed to modify Deluge to reprogram indi-
vidual sensors. This was done easily by replacing the AM BROADCAST ADDR
parameter in the engine with the node ID of the node to be recovered. This
allowed us to implement the reprogramming protocol effectively.
  Authentication
In order to transmit an authentication message using the IEEE 802.15.4
MAC protocol, 64 bit data is required to be fragmented on the sender side
(the BS) and re-assembled on the receiver side (at the node) since a payload
unit is only 8 bits. Use of either 64-bit SHA-1 code or 64-bit Rabin code
consistently resulted in error responses.
We have discussed this problem with developers from the TinyOS com-
munity and believe that it could be occurring due to a bug in the GCC
compiler or could be due to some unidentified hardware constraints. The
problem disappeared on both platforms when we reduced our transmitted
data size to 32 bit Rabin authentication.
  Integration.
We encountered several problems during the integration phase Firstly, Del-
uge reprogramming methods use the original CC2420 driver from TinyOS
Official, while our reclustering algorithm was designed based on a MAC
protocol which uses a modified CC2420 chip driver in order to incorpo-
rate it into the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. In developing TinyOS, the driver
set was not designed to be compatible with the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
and because Deluge reprogramming was also designed based on this driver
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set, Deluge is not compatible with IEEE 802.15.4, and therefore, also not
compatible with our reclustering algorithm.
In addition, Deluge requires large volumes of RAM and ROM on both our
platforms; at least 1.13KB RAM and 31.95KB of ROM on MicaZ; 1.31KB
of RAM and37.40KB of ROM on TelosB.
There are several possible solutions to these problems, including develop-
ment of a new CC2420 chip driver set based on the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol
in the first instance, and revising Deluge to significantly reduce the mem-
ory requirements in the second instance. Both of these solutions require
resources, time and people and are beyond our project scope at the mo-
ment and therefore, they are for future projects.
We also mention here two issues that arise from the hardware that had an
impact on our protocols.
  Clock skewing.
In implementing the reclustering algorithm, we encountered time latency
due to the limited processing capacity on both platforms and also due to
network traffic collisions. We were unable to directly deal with time laten-
cies caused by the processing capacity, but covered this problem by allowing
larger time intervals than might otherwise be used when dealing with traffic
collisions. This process is described under the heading ’collision resistance’
below.
  Collision resistance.
Traffic collisions occur when a mote attempts to receive more than one
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message simultaneously. The Medium Access protocol (MAC) supported by
the underlying TinyOS operating on both platforms, includes the standard
CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance) to manage
the network traffic in an optimal way and so reduce the packet loss rate as
much as possible.
CSMA/CA is the channel access mechanism used by most wireless LANs,
specifying how the node uses the medium, for example when to listen, when
to transmit etc.
In addition to employing the MAC with CMSA/CA, we added a method
similar to node beaconing used in [KCA07]. To improve collision avoidance
and allow for clock skew caused by the hardware, we set a small random
variation for the time interval to prevent multiple nodes from broadcasting
messages simultaneously.
Some of the implementation issues which arose were due to hardware ca-
pacity, while some were due to the associated standards embedded in their
design: TinyOS, MAC, Zigbee and IEEE 802.15.4.
Table 8.2 summarizes the capacity of the two platforms to deal with the
protocol components.
  Standards integration.
There is a lack of support in the motes themselves for proper integration
with standards defined by MACs, Zigbee and IEEE 802.15.4, thus making
integration across some platforms difficult, if not impossible. Dealing with
this is still an open question in the research community, though [KCA07]
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Algorithms TelosB MicaZ Reasons for ’No’
Deluge Reprogramming Yes Yes
Authentication protocols Yes Yes
Standalone 8bit SHA-1 Yes Yes
Standalone 8bit Rabin Yes Yes
Standalone 16bit SHA-1 Yes Yes
Standalone 16bit Rabin Yes Yes
Standalone 32bit SHA-1 Yes Yes
Standalone 32bit Rabin Yes Yes
Standalone 64bit SHA-1 Yes No Limited computing capacity
Standalone 64bit Rabin Yes No Limited computing capacity
Reclustering Yes No Limited RAM size
Deluge Reprogramming +
SHA-1 authentication
Yes Yes
Deluge Reprogramming +
Rabin authentication
Yes Yes
Reclustering +
Rabin authentication
Yes No Limited RAM size
Deluge Reprogramming +
reclustering
No No
Different sets of
CC2420 chip driver
Deluge Reprogramming +
authentication +
reclustering
No No
Limited RAM size
and different sets
of CC2420 chip driver
Table 8.2: Capabilities of the two platforms
(’Yes’ means the algorithm is fully supported by a platform; ’No’ means the
algorithm is not supported by the platform.)
offers a partial solution in case reclustering is not needed (see the next
section).
8.6 Comparison with Other Work
In this section, we compare our implementation with those of other researchers
who have developed recovery protocols for a similar situation. The difficulties
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encountered in implementation and the work-arounds developed are a particular
focus, as these are integral to our recommendations. There are three recent
papers which have implemented protocols on low resource motes.
[LL07] implements 27 Crossbow MicaZ motes in a coal mine to detect collapsed
areas and to maintain system integrity, especially in case motes are moved or
destroyed in a collapse. In [WBLS07], the authors implement data delivery
mechanisms on MicaZ motes to determine performance limitations in obtain-
ing ’accurate modeling of wireless signal propagation behaviour and erroneous
device behaviour’. Finally, the paper [KCA07] discusses the use of Zigbee to-
gether with IEEE 802.15.4 standards, and highlights they do not support time
synchronization to support clusters. They propose a work-around for this, and
perform testing on MicaZ motes. We describe the work in each of these papers
in more detail below, commenting particularly on the implementation problems
they had and how they worked around them.
The paper [LL07] implements 27 Crossbow MicaZ motes in a coal mine to de-
tect collapsed areas and to maintain system integrity, especially in case motes
are moved or destroyed in a collapse. Thus, they needed to allow for frequent
re-verification of neighbour nodes. As the neighbour table method we use is
extremely expensive in such a situation, they replace this by a beacon method
whereby nodes regularly report their existence to the network. In addition, since
a collapse initiates a flurry of correspondence within the network, the authors
must deal with a serious collision message problem; in fact flooding through the
network can occur. In order to reduce collisions, they employ two methodologies:
randomized forward latency to hold back messages from the less important areas
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of the WSN after a collapse and data aggregation is the second method applied,
with C motes at the edge of a collapse collecting messages from the area and
aggregating the data in them into a single report message to the BS. Data ag-
gregation is a major component of our own methodology as the AGs of clusters
perform this regularly.
In [WBLS07], the authors implement data delivery mechanisms on MicaZ motes
to determine performance limitations in obtaining ’accurate modeling of wireless
signal propagation behaviour and erroneous device behaviour’. The authors
point out that changes in the environment can affect WSN performance and so
focus on fault tolerant routing. They use acknowledgment packets when finding
traffic routes, despite the extra load on the network, arguing that the trade-
off in reliability is worth it. However, in compensation, their protocols limit
acknowledgments to motes close to the destination of the transmitted packet.
They also implement wait-time periods during which a mote listens for a response,
but after which responses are ignored. Thus, the number of acknowledgements is
kept relatively small. In evaluating their protocols, the authors measure the time
required for a packet to traverse a WSN. However, this measurement is affected
by clock skew C drift in the internal mote clocks. They compensate for this
with linear regression methods. In our work, acknowledgment of packets for the
purposes of authentication is necessary. Thus, where authentication is critical,
we need all acknowledgments. We dealt with clock skew in our protocols by using
time lags in order to allow for receipt of packets.
Finally, the paper [KCA07] discusses the use of Zigbee together with IEEE
802.15.4 standards, and points out that they do not support time synchroniza-
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tion for cluster topologies. They propose a work-around for this, based on time
divisioning beaconing, and testing is performed on MicaZ motes supported by
TinyOS. The protocol allocates a packet sending timing schedule to each AG and
its cluster in order to avoid collisions between packets sent within the cluster.
A ’super-frame’ schedule is also allocated across the WSN. Their protocol aims
to align itself with the IEEE 802.14.5 protocol specification which, they point
out, does not support a beacon-only approach. Thus, their work heads towards
filling a gap in that standard. As noted in our discussion on integration issues in
the previous section, we also encountered difficulties with existing specifications.
The authors of [KCA07] also identify clock skew as an issue as did the authors
of [WBLS07].
In summary, the issues raised in the above papers are clock skewing and collision
resistance. In addition, to these issues, in our work and that of [KCA07], a
lack of support is identified in the motes themselves for proper integration with
standards defined by MACs, Zigbee and IEEE 802.15.4, thus making integration
across some platforms difficult, if not impossible.
Based on this analysis and comparison, we now provide recommendations for
consideration by researchers who may consider integrating several protocols on
these platforms in the future.
  The use of data aggregation in order to reduce collisions.
  A reduction in the number of acknowledgment packets where possible.
  Integration of the time division beaconing methods of [KCA07] with the
IEEE specifications for routing.
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Reference Clock Skewing
Collision
Resistance
Standards
Compliance
Li et al. [LL07] X
Wasilewski et al. [WBLS07] X
Koubaa et al. [KCA07] X X
Our Approach X X X
Table 8.3: Implementation issues identified in recent work
  Recognition of the difficulties in integrating Zigbee and IEEE 802.15.4
across some platforms.
In particular, and of relevance to the last point, the TinyOS driver set needs to
be redesigned so as to incorporate the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
Table 8.3 summarizes the main implementation issues identified in recent work.
8.7 A Recovery Standard Proposal for WSNs
As a result of the work in this thesis,, we are able to propose a standard for the
design and implementation of WSNs. We begin with the scope of the standard,
along with definitions and general requirements, and then provide the design and
implementation details. The types of measurements needed are then addressed
followed, finally, by a discussion of how improvements can be identified and im-
plemented.
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8.7.1 Scope
This proposed standard applies to a single, secure BS along with sensor nodes
capable of operating as either member nodes or AGs. Sensors collect data and
transmit it to the BS. The BS can analyse incoming data and, based on it, makes
decisions about the state of the nodes and of the network.
The network is assumed to be stationary and low resourced but provides the
capability to self-organize (cluster), detect an attack on the nodes, determine
which nodes have been compromised (with high probability) and make a decision
to reprogram compromised nodes.
The aim of this proposed standard is to effect efficient recovery and continued
operation with the objective of maintaining the life of the network for as long as
possible.
8.7.2 Terms and Definitions
8.7.3 General Requirements
Any sensor nodes supported by open source TinyOS [WC06], and which are IEEE
802.15.4 compliant, can be used. Sensors which are also ZigBee compliant are
recommended.
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8.7.4 Design
In order to optimize the recovery process: each node plays the role of either a
member node or AG as appropriate under the conditions arising, including energy
remaining and number of neighbours.
In order to recover compromised nodes: reprogramming of all or of any subset of
the nodes is possible.
In order to recover disconnected communications: reclustering of the WSN is
possible.
In order to avoid several typical attacks: authentication is implemented in the
recovery protocols.
8.7.5 Implementation
There are three protocols to be implemented:
  Reclustering
This protocol should be initiated by the BS. The choice of AGs is the
main step in reclustering, as the member nodes of an AG’s cluster are then
determined by its communication range.
A node v provided with a metric M(v) which measures its energy level and
number of neighbours acts as a AG if it has never been compromised, and
1. it has a larger metric M(v) than all of its 1-hop neighbours and has at
least two unconnected neighbours, or if
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2. it is in the coverage set formed by its neighbour with the largest metric
M.
  Reprogramming
Modify Deluge in order to reprogram individual sensor nodes by replacing
the AM BROADCAST ADDR parameter in the engine with the node ID
of the node to be recovered. This allows effective implementation of the
reprogramming protocol.
It is assumed that the entire WSN is stationary and within range of the
BS; however, it is not necessary for the BS to be in range of each node.
  Authentication
Each node shares a common secret with the BS. In communications be-
tween nodes and the BS associated with reclustering or reprogramming,
authenticated messages, using a combination of ID, the shared secret and
a current random number (which may be the network time), are used. Any
hash function acceptable as a standard to hash this data as a verification
tool. No node knows the secret of any other node.
8.7.6 Measurements
The measures of interest in this standard are:
  Execution time of each protocol described in Chapter 7 separately.
  RAM and ROM needed to perform each protocol separately.
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  WSN life-time given a fixed number of nodes and under various attack
scenarios.
8.7.7 Improvement
Changes in hardware and improvements in computing speed may affect some
of the components of this proposed standard. Future versions of the standard
should take these into consideration.
8.8 Summary
In this project, we have presented an integrated recovery technique implemented
on TelosB and MicaZ motes in a low resourced, stationary and mobile deployment.
We described the issues arising in integrating several separate protocols reclus-
tering, reprogramming and authentication, using Zigbee with IEEE 802.15.4 and
the reprogramming module Deluge, and compared our challenges and solutions
with those faced by other researchers in this area.
We have also proposed a standard for the implementation of recovery in stationary
WSNs.
Based on this analysis and comparison, we now provide recommendations for
consideration by researchers who may consider integrating several protocols on
these platforms in the future.
  The use of data aggregation in order to reduce collisions.
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  A reduction in the number of acknowledgment packets where possible.
  Integration of the time division beaconing methods of [KCA07] with the
IEEE specifications for routing.
  Recognition of the difficulties in integrating Zigbee and IEEE 802.15.4
across some platforms.
In particular, attention needs to be given to the fact that the TinyOS driver set
needs to be redesigned so as to incorporate the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
In the next and final chapter, the implications of this work and the directions for
future work is presented.
My work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything
which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important
one.
—C. Grant Luckhard
Chapter 9
Conclusions
The research of security in WSNs has grown rapidly in recent years. In this
thesis, we presented the problem of how to recover WSNs from attack. This has
become a very serious issue to the current network infrastructure. The aim of our
research is to investigate principal approaches for effective and efficient recovery
mechanisms; to develop general recovery mechanisms which can cope with most
attacks targeting on WSNs; and to explore fundamental theoretical frameworks
that can support the development and deployment of such systems. As a result,
we present a recovery approach that includes a clustering algorithm for low-
resource stationary WSNs in conjunction with a reprogramming mechanism to
enable efficient recovery from node compromise while maintaining the operation
of the network. The recovery approach takes into account the state of individual
sensors to ensure energy-sensitive cluster and network organization.
In this chapter, we examine how successful the project has been with respect to
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the original requirements given in Chapter 1. It summarizes the main contribu-
tions of this thesis on the recovery of WSNs, and draws overall conclusions, and
highlights any areas where further work could be carried out.
In Section 9.1 we present the achievements of the thesis. Section 9.2 provides
several suggestions for future work.
9.1 Achievements
The contribution of this thesis can be summarized as:
  A recovery mechanism that combines network reclustering and node repro-
gramming to dynamically re-organize the network into a clustered network
architecture that does not include compromised nodes, thus permitting the
network to be operational while initiating node reprogramming procedures
to recover compromised nodes.
  Demonstration that the proposed recovery mechanism comprising of net-
work reclustering and node reprogramming can be implemented efficiently
on both a sensor network testbed using TelosB motes and NS-2 simulation
platform.
  An efficient authenticated reprogramming request protocol from the BS to
a compromised node, from an AG to the BS on behalf of a compromised
node and from the BS to the network.
  A comparison of the performance of the recovery protocols between the
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stationary and mobile WSNs demonstrating that our recovery protocol for
mobile WSNs is best possible.
9.2 Future Work
The proposed distributed and decision-making recovery protocols presented in
this thesis are the first of their kind and is a methodology by which the sen-
sor networks can assess the levels of damage from attacks and choose relevant
recovery techniques to restore the nodes or even the networks. In this section,
we discuss future work that we will be undertaking in order to strengthen the
proposed methodology for the sensor network recovery. It should be noted that
future work is not limited to the areas discussed..
First and foremost, due to the limited resources available to us, we did not test our
recovery mechanisms on large scale physical WSNs but on a simulation platform.
It would be very interesting to see the test results from the network with hundreds
of motes, especially for the reclustering algorithms. Potentially, this kind of
research testbed can benefit other researchers by providing a standard data set.
More research could be undertaken to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of
applying such design to the mission critical areas such as battlefields.
Secondly, our authentication protocols were developed based on TelosB and Mi-
caZ. The poor computation capabilities and the small size of memeory determined
that no powerful authentication can be performed on those two platforms. Some
customized hardware can also be considered in the future to run some better
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authentication functions.
Next, with regard to the assumptions made in Chapter 5, we require the use of
a shared secret to authenticate reprogramming and reclustering for the purposes
of recovery. This shared secret is also useful for authenticating the legitimacy
of sensor data messages from the network, which helps to avoid other types of
attacks.
We assume that secrets are stored in a tamper-resistant section of the node and
that calculations involving it are executed in this tamper-proof section. While
the use of a tamper-proof or secure area for storing secrets and executing com-
putations is a standard solution to key management, it is difficult to design and
implement such a secure area on a small device such as a mote. In future work,
we would be interested in investigating the possibilities of building such a secure
environment in WSN motes.
In our situation, the sensors were permitted to move around a convex area. This
assists in ensuring that, at any time, some node is within range of the BS as the
radius of communication of the BS is likely to be circular (or spherical). However,
in a practical deployment of a mobile WSN, many nodes may not be in range of
the BS at all times. There are two possibilities for research here. One refers to a
situation in which the range of the BS is limited and nodes are allowed to move
out of it; the other refers to a non-convex area where, for instance, stone or metal
walls block transmission. Both areas are of interest and models for both need to
be developed.
Last but not least, in the real world, WSNs still have to be exposed to many
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potential threats, such as weather, animal interference etc. How our recovery
protocols perform in extreme conditions could raise more interesting research
motivations.
In anything at all, perfection is usually attained not when there is no
longer anything to add, but when there is no longer anything to take
away.
—Antoine de Saint-Exupe´ry
Glossary
AG Aggregator Node, 3
BS Base Station, 3
CDS Connected Dominating Set, 25
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi-
neers, 50
MAC Medium Access Control, 44
MPR Multi-point Relays, 9
RAM Random-access Memory, 14
ROM Read-only Memory, 96
WSN Wireless Sensor Network, 1
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Appendix A
MPR Protocol
In this appendix, a brief description of MPR protocols is present to show how it
operates in sensor networks.
The original MPR is source-dependent; that is, the forward node set is dependent
on the source of the broadcast and communication latency. Recently, Adjih,
Jacquet, and Viennot [AJV02] proposed a source-independent MPR. The CDS
is constructed based on MPR following two simple rules. In this section of the
thesis, we enhance the source-independent MPR through a simple modification.
[Wu03] proposed an enhanced source independent MPR based on the recently
proposed sourceindependent MPR. The enhancement is done without increasing
the complexity of the method. The effectiveness of the enhancement is confirmed
through a simulation study on both sparse and dense networks.
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A.1 MPR
Let N(V) denote the set of all nodes that are in V or have a neighbour in V . V
covers U if U ⊂ N(V). In MPR [QVL02], each node v maintains 2-hop neighbour
set N(N(v)). Node v selects a small forward node set, C(v), from its 1-hop
neighbour set to cover its 2-hop neighbour set; that is, C(v) ∪ v is a CDS for
N(N(v)). C(v) is also called the coverage set for v. When u is selected by v as a
forward node, v is called the selector of u. Note that several selectors may exist
for a particular node. A forward node may or may not actually retransmit the
message; its actual status is determined by the following MPR rule.
  MPR rule: a node re-transmits the message once and only once if the first
message received is from a selector.
The collection of nodes that have re-transmitted the message plus the source
node form a CDS.
Let N1(V) = N(V) - V denote the nodes at distance one from V and N2(V)
= N(N(V)) - N(V) denote the nodes at distance two from V. A simple greedy
algorithm for computing C(v) (initially empty) at v is as follows.
Algorithm 3 Greedy Algorithm
Add u ∈ N1(v) to C(v), if there is a node in N2(v) covered only by u.
Add u ∈ N1(v) to C(v), if u covers the largest number of uncovered nodes in
N2(v) that have not been covered.
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A.2 Source-independent MPR
The original MPR is source-dependent. Adjih, Jacquet, and Viennot [AJV02]
recently proposed a localized algorithm to construct a CDS based on MPR, and
it is source-independent. A node belongs to a CDS if
  Rule 1: the node has a smaller ID than all its neighbours.
  Rule 2: the node is a forward node selected by its neighbour with the
smallest ID.
A.3 Enhanced MPR
A.3.1 Enhanced Rule 1
In the following, we propose two extensions to source independent MPR: one on
Rule 1 and the other on the greedy algorithm.
  Enhanced Rule 1: the node has a smaller ID than all its neighbours and
it has two unconnected neighbours.
The Enhanced Rule 1 together with the original Rule 2 will generate a CDS under
all cases except complete graphs. Note that when the network is complete, there
is no need for CDS, because each source forms a CDS.
Theorem 1: If the given graph is not a complete graph, the set of forward nodes
selected by the Enhanced Rule 1 and Rule 2 forms a CDS.
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Proof: It has been shown in [AJV02] that forward nodes selected by Rule 1 and
Rule 2 form a CDS. We only need to show that whenever a smallest ID node v
within its 1-hop neighbourhood is removed based on the Enhanced Rule 1, the
resultant forward nodes still form a CDS.
Because the graph is not a complete graph and all of v’s neighbours are pair-
wise connected, there must exist a node that is not a neighbour of v. Let w
be such a node with the smallest ID. Since v has the smallest ID in its 1-hop
neighbourhood, either v or w has the smallest ID in the 1-hop neighbourhood of
any neighbour of v. When one neighbour of v, say u, is selected by its smallest
ID neighbour v (w) to reach w (v) in MPR, based on Rule 2, u is a forward node
and it covers v and all neighbours of v. Therefore, v can be removed.
A.3.2 Enhanced forward node selection
Node u is a free neighbour of v if v is not the smallest ID neighbour of u. In the
enhanced forward node selection, we first include all free neighbours, then nodes
with higher degrees (i.e., covering more uncovered 2-hop neighbours) are selected
and use the node ID to break a tie if needed until N2(v) is covered.
Algorithm 4 Extended Greedy Algorithm
Add u ∈ N1(v) to C(v), if there is a node in N2(v) covered only by u.
Add u ∈ N1(v) to C(v), if u covers the largest number of uncovered nodes in
N2(v) that have not been covered by the current C(v). Use node ID to break
a tie when two nodes cover the same number of uncovered nodes.
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